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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation collects two recent articles I have written and one older article. The
first two articles develop a notion of tiered rationality. The first is a purely theoretical
piece, and the second is an application of the concept to criminal law. The third
article is distinct and separate from the previous two. It concerns countervailing
e↵ects in the regulation of speech.
The first article, “Meta-Rational Choice,” addresses several foundational prob-
lems in the economic conception of the rational actor. The principal result is that for
any possible decision-maker, there exists a real-valued function such that every choice
the decision-maker would select could be represented as maximizing that function.
The formal framework constructed to prove this result resolves several paradoxes
associated with earlier conceptions of economic rationality. Several implications and
interpretations of the result are explored.
The second article, “Bounded Criminality,” applies the meta-rational approach to
the analysis of criminal law. Law and Economics scholars have traditionally modeled
criminal deterrence as a simple function two factors: (i) severity of punishment,
and (ii) probability of punishment. Building on this insight, Gary Becker’s (1968)
seminal essay argued that optimizing on the benefits of deterrence and the cost
of enforcement should be the policy objective of the criminal law. Yet empirical
and experimental research in behavioral economics has shown that individuals often
do not respond rationally to incentives. Instead, theories of bounded rationality
predict that individuals form heuristics to guide their decision-making when decision
costs are su ciently high. This paper combines the insights of Becker’s model of
criminal deterrence with a theory of decision costs, arguing for a nuanced revision
of the objective of criminal law: that the function of the criminal law should not be
to create first order disincentives to commit particular crimes, but rather to instill
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in individuals the formation of second order heuristics not to undertake a rational
deliberation of the costs and benefits of criminal activity in the first place.
The final article, “Harmful Speech,” presents an economic argument opposing the
regulation of speech. Among the most common justifications for the regulation of
speech is that some categories of expressive activity cause “harm.” Conventionally,
opponents of speech regulation have contested the putative “harmfulness” of sup-
posedly harmful speech, or argued that the benefits outweigh the harms. This paper
accepts, arguendo, the “harmfulness” of some classes of speech, but identifies three
countervailing e↵ects which suggest that regulation might be ine↵ectual, or that it
may even exacerbate the harmfulness.
Chapter 2
Meta-Rational Choice
The engine for nearly all theoretical inquiry in economics is the hypothesis that indi-
viduals behave rationally. Its capacity to generate precise conclusions and adaptabil-
ity to novel applications have allowed economics to envelope practically the whole
of social science within its conceptual framework.1 Yet it faces ever-growing skep-
ticism. Over the past several decades, the assumptions upon which the hypothesis
relies have su↵ered trenchant attacks,2 and a mounting body of experimental work
has revealed multifarious confounding observations.3
Real world behavior seems, at least in some circumstances, to deviate systemat-
ically from the rational actor hypothesis. These observations have elicited divergent
responses from scholars. Conventionalists regard research undermining the rational
actor hypothesis to be an assault on economic science, framing its findings as in-
convenient obstacles rather than progress.4 Behavioralists meanwhile celebrate the
1The expansion of economic methodology to non-economic subject matter is sometimes described
by the appellative, “economic imperialism.” Becker, 1976 gives an extended discussion of the cross-
disciplinary applicability of economic theory. See also Hirshleifer, 1985, and Lazear, 2000.
2Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961.
3This literature is vast. Some prominent examples include Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Kahne-
man, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981. For a general overview on the
development of the field, see Baron, 2000; Thaler, 2015; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974.
4Defenders of the rational actor hypothesis have principally taken three distinct tacks. The first
is to present evidence that real-world behavior does in fact tend to correspond with the predictions
of the rationality assumption in most cases. See List, 2004 (finding that apparent deviations from
the rationality assumption tend to dissipate as decision-makers acquire experience), The second is
to dispute the methodological soundness of the countervailing evidence. See Plott and Zeiler, 2007,
Wright and Ginsburg, 2012. Both approaches have produced interesting and persuasive results, and
I am inclined to think they rightly tamp down the enthusiasm of overzealous behavioralists, who
imprudently declare economic rationality to be a “refuted” hypothesis. Nevertheless, these e↵orts
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development toward a more empirically grounded conception of decision-making.5
And between these extrema there have arisen a myriad of nuanced intermediate
positions.
Nearly all scholars recognize the pressing and fundamental nature of the questions
posed. Even the most stalwart conventionalist must concede some answer is wanted.
Yet attempts to amend or displace the “rational choice” paradigm with better foun-
dations have failed to win widespread adoption. Thus, incongruously in the face of
empirical challenges, the rational actor hypothesis remains the modus operandum of
mainstream theoretical economics.
The field is presently in a state of skeptical suspension. Challenges to rational
choice theory go unanswered, but no generally accepted alternative has yet emerged.
We find ourselves inhabiting a precarious moment, which seems to possess all the
telltale signs of an impending “scientific revolution,”6 yet the revolution does not
come.
Whether rational choice theory can be salvaged or whether we ought demolish
the edifice to build upon wholly new foundations is a question of some moment. Yet
we are not forced to choose between the two, for the alternatives are not mutually
exclusive. In the face of controverting empirical evidence, some demolition is well
warranted. However, what is built in its place can be made to resemble in its essence
that which preceded it.
The contribution I aim to make is a modest one: the components of my theory
are present already in the prior literature. The innovation proposed in this article
is not to introduce new elements for consideration, but rather to arrange the puzzle
to preserve the orthodoxy seem indisputably to fall short of ruling out the existence of systematic
non-rational phenomena altogether. And inasmuch as I am inclined to agree that the rational actor
hypothesis cannot be so easily dismissed, neither do I believe the countervailing evidence can.
5For example, Korobkin and Ulen, 2000.
6Kuhn, 1962 claims that the condition for a “crisis” (potentially leading to a “paradigm shift”
or “scientific revolution”) is the discovery of experimental anomalies, which cannot be explained by
prevailing scientific theory. This surely describes the present state of economics. By Kuhn’s lights,
the resolution of such anomalies is not necessarily the adoption of a new theoretical “paradigm,” but
in some (indeed most) cases, an extension of the existing paradigm. The question for economics is
whether the present anomalies can be accounted for by “normal science,” or whether their resolution
requires a new theoretical basis.
It bears remarking that the applicability of Kuhn’s model to “progress” in the social sciences
is rather more controversial than its applicability in the natural sciences. And indeed, even with
respect to the natural sciences, several of Kuhn’s premises (most notably the incommensurability
of paradigms) have been forcefully rebutted (for example, in Field, 1973). Regardless, while it is
intuitively appealing to regard the present state of economics in Kuhnian terms, nothing critical to
this article depends upon a Kuhn’s conception of scientific progress.
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pieces already on the table.
The meta-model presented in this article extends classical models of rational-
ity to accommodate the presence of decision costs,7 and decision-making procedures.
Very many theories which could be construed as attempting something similar to
my approach exist already. However, these earlier e↵orts have encountered profound
conceptual and technical di culties, in consequence of which they can hardly be con-
sidered “improvements” on conventional models of rationality. The models I present
resolve the most critical problems which have heretofore plagued earlier attempts to
formalize a general theory of behavior (along with some problems that have not re-
ceived adequate scholarly attention) while retaining most of the advantages possessed
by conventional theories of rationality.
2.1 Background
Let us start with some definitions. First, let “potential behavior” denote the coun-
terfactual acts that an individual would choose given some state of the world. Next,
let “utility functions” denote real-valued function meant to represent a decision-
maker’s preferences. And let “utility-maximization” refer to choice selections which
correspond to the maximization of a utility function.
The “rational actor hypothesis” is the proposition that the potential choices of
any decision-maker can be represented by utility-maximization. Given a set of avail-
able choices, the rational decision-maker will select the alternative which returns the
greatest utility value. The rational actor hypothesis is the central conceit of “ra-
tional choice theory,” which develops the hypothesis into a framework for analyzing
incentives and behaviors in variegated circumstances and under varying constraints.
Interpreting the theoretical claim is not straightforward. The rational actor hy-
pothesis may be understood as positing at least two distinct propositions. For clarity,
let us disambiguate between a “weak” rational actor hypothesis and a “strong” ra-
tional actor hypothesis.
The weak rational actor hypothesis makes no psychological claim about decision-
makers’ deliberative processes. It holds merely that whatever cognitive mechanisms a
decision-maker might employ in the formation of a choice, his actions are ultimately
representable as the maximization of some utility function. The weak hypothesis
critically denies (or at least reserves a rmation of) the “reality” of utility. Util-
ity functions are—under the weak interpretation—merely “useful fictions,” which
7This is a core claim of any theory of “bounded rationality.” See generally, Gigerenzer, 2001;
Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1955.
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impose a convenient structure upon reality.
By contrast, the strong rational actor hypothesis asserts that utility-maximization
does not merely represent how individuals decide, but that it is how individuals
decide.8 I suppose rather few economists (and fewer decision theorists) would adopt
the strong interpretation presently.9 Nevertheless, there are compelling arguments
for a strong interpretation, which I investigate further in this article.
The interpretive distinction is an important one. It is therefore worth a brief
digression to develop a clear intuition on the di↵erence between the weak and strong
interpretations. Consider the following thought experiment: Imagine we set out to
create robots capable of mimicking human decision-making. Suppose we construct a
machine with all the external characteristics of an ordinary human being. It is phys-
ically capable of producing any behavior that a human being is physically capable of
producing, and it is capable of accepting all the sensory inputs—information about
its environment—that a human being is capable of perceiving. Internally, let us as-
sume that our hypothetical robots are unconstrained by computational limitations.
Yet though they are physically capable of any actions that a human is, and
though they “perceive” as well as humans do, and though they are unburdened by
computational limitations, this is still insu cient to produce the behaviors that a
human being might produce. We have not yet coded any instructions for the robot
to execute. Suppose then that our hypothetical robots are designed to accept an
initializing input when they leave the factory. Our robots are loaded with a “utility
function”—an infinite array mapping all possible states of the world to points along
a real number line. In any circumstance the robot encounters thereafter, it will select
the action which maximizes the expected value of its utility function.
The weak rational actor hypothesis is equivalent to the claim: that for any given
human being, there exists some utility function, such that if we loaded that utility
function into a robot doppelga¨nger, then the robot’s behavior would be indistinguish-
able from the human being’s behavior (how we might discover the utility function
which produces this e↵ect is a separate issue—the point is merely that it exists).
The strong rational actor hypothesis is equivalent to the claim that all human
beings simply are utility-maximizing robots (albeit composed of meat and bones
8I am inclined to believe that greater emphasis on this distinction would resolve many of the
more trivial disagreements about the validity of the rational actor hypothesis.
9The distinction is sometimes described as di↵ering in what is taken to be the atomic unit
of analysis. What I refer to as the “strong rational actor hypothesis” may be construed as tak-
ing preferences as atomic, whereas the “weak rational actor hypothesis” takes choice behavior as
atomic. See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, p. 5. Some economists have distinguished
between the weak hypothesis as relating to “decision utility” and the strong hypothesis as relating
to “experienced utility.”
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rather than gears or circuitboards).10
Both interpretations assert that human behavior can be represented as mechanis-
tic utility-maximization. They diverge as to the significance of the claim. The weak
interpretation is agnostic as to the question why human behavior can be mimicked
by utility-maximizing robots. The weak interpretation merely asserts that it can
be. The strong interpretation commits to the proposition that human behavior can
be mimicked by utility-maximizing robots, a fortiori, because humans simply are
utility-maximizing robots.
2.1.1 Expected Utility Theory
The standard specification of the rational actor hypothesis is given by “expected util-
ity theory,” formalized in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953).11 Given that an
individual’s preferences are logically consistent, and assuming his choices reveal his
preferences (the “revealed preferences hypothesis”)12 the von Neumann-Morgenstern
10This recasting of the rational actor hypothesis may clarify the intuition why the strong inter-
pretation might be regarded as more extravagant. It should also provide some intuitive purchase
as to my framing of these conceptions as di↵erences in interpretation.
11The model is constructed axiomatically (note that the use of the term “axiom” is somewhat
misleading. It is however the term that von Neumann, Morgenstern, and their successors used to
denote their theoretical premises. Economists in the first half of the twentieth century seem to have
been influenced by developments in logic and foundational mathematics, borrowing terminology
to denote not-quite-analogous concepts in decision theory. This curious a↵ectation seems also to
have been the genesis of the bastardized usage of “ordinal” and “cardinal” when talking about
preferences and utilities in economics).
Expected Utility Theory takes an individual’s preference ordering as its input. A preference
ordering is simply a list of states of the world hc0, c1, . . .i such that the individual either prefers
ci+1 over ci or is indi↵erent as between ci+1 and ci (this is given by the “completeness” and
“transitivity” axioms.) The model further assumes that when those states of the world obtain with
some probability, the individual’s preferences in the resultant lotteries are stochastically consistent
(this is given by the “independence” and “continuity” axioms). By varying the probability terms,
the individual’s indi↵erence points may be determined (i.e., where an individual is indi↵erent as
between some cm and the probability p of some cn (where n > m) plus the probability (1 p) of some
co where m > o). Using these indi↵erence points, we can identify the values of a utility function,
u : {c0, c1, . . .}! [0, 1], assigning real values to states of the world, such that maximization of the
function corresponds to the preference ordering hc0, c1, . . .i.
Although von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953 is the standard formulation, it is not the only
formal model of Expected Utility Theory. For example, see Alt, 1971 [1936]; Suppes and Winet,
1955. Moreover, if probabilities are meant to represent uncertainties rather than risks, Expected
Utility Theory will require a subjective formulation, the standard formulation of which is Subjective
Expected Utility Theory, axiomatized by Savage, 1954.
12I.e., that choosing outcome A over outcome B implies that he prefers A over B; and that
choosing lottery A0 over lottery B0 implies that he prefers the expected outcome of A0 over the
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representation theorem establishes that there exists a unique (up to a ne transfor-
mation) utility function, which represents his preferences for states of the world as
points along the real number line.
For example, suppose there are three states of the world: A, B, and C. An
individual is observed to prefer outcome A over outcome B, and to prefer outcome
B over outcome C. Let us represent the utility of A with u(A) = 1 and the utility of C
with u(C) = 0. The von Neumann-Morgenstern representation theorem establishes
that for any real number r 2 R, there exist a probability p 2 [0, 1] that A will obtain,
such that the expected utility EU (p ·A+(1  p) ·C) = p · u(A)+ (1  p) · u(C) = r.
And because we defined u(A) = 1 and u(C) = 0, it follows that r = p.
Now, because B is preferred to C, and A is preferred to B, it follows that u(B) <
EU(1 ·A+0 ·C) and u(B) > EU(0 ·A+1 ·C). So there must exist a point x 2 [0, 1]
such that u(B) = x. Specifically, we can represent the utility of B as the point
at which the decision-maker is indi↵erent as between outcome B and the lottery
p · A+ (1  p) · C, which will be given by u(B) = p.
There is much more to say about expected utility—its consistency when nested
and its implicit incorporation of diminishing marginal utility among other things.
These topics are thoroughly explored in a multitude of economics textbooks. For
present purposes, there are two critical points. First, that ordinal preferences (i.e.,
that A is preferred over B, and B is preferred over C) are converted into a cardinal
representation (i.e., that the utilities u(A), u(B), and u(C) are points on a real
interval). Second, that we can infer a cardinal representation of the utility of B from
the expected utility of p · u(A) + (1  p) · u(C).
Thus, given any set of potential choices, assuming logical and probabilistic con-
sistency, and assuming choices reveal preferences, it is possible to construct a utility
function, the maximization of which corresponds to the potential behavior of any
individual. More concisely: a decision-maker is “rational” i↵ his choices can be
represented as the maximization of an expected utility function. The von Neumann-
Morgenstern representation theorem establishes that such a function must exist (and
tells us how it can be constructed) i↵ certain plausible assumptions are satisfied.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern representation theorem is an extraordinarily pow-
erful result. Recasting the theorem in terms of our hypothetical “utility-maximizing
robot,” it is equivalent to saying that if a human being’s behavior satisfies certain
logical and probabilistic constraints, then there must exist some utility function,
which if fed into the robot, would produce behavior identical to that human being’s
behavior. More than this, the von Neumann-Morgenstern representation theorem
establishes that the utility function will be unique (i.e., that each human being’s
expected outcome of B0.
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behavior will correspond—up to a ne transformation—to the maximization of one
and only one utility function), and it suggests how to determine what that utility
function is.
The implications which follow from the theorem are manifold. Indeed, the most
interesting results in theoretical economics could fairly be characterized as merely
unpacking the consequences of the von Neumann-Morgenstern representation theo-
rem.
However, a wealth of experimental and empirical research seems to demonstrate
that individuals in the real world often fail to satisfy the theorem’s antecedent con-
ditions.13 Its “plausible assumptions” about the logical and probabilistic consistency
of revealed preferences seem ever less plausible the closer we scrutinize. For example,
suppose a decision-maker were presented with two decisions. In the first decision, he
must choose between:
A. 50% probability of receiving $100.
B. 100% probability of receiving $50.
In the second decision, he is given $100 upfront. He must choose between:
C. 50% probability of having to lose the $100.
D. 100% probability of having to lose $50.
Variations of this setup have been tested in very many experiments, and it has
been found that most test subjects will tend to select choices (B) and (C). This is
inconsistent with von Neumann-Morgenstern rationality. If individuals prefer option
(B) over (A), then that means their expected utility EU(.5 ($100)+.5 ($0)) < u($50).
But if this is true, then they should choose (D) rather than (C). Experiments like
this seem to reveal that individuals in the real world fail to satisfy the conditions
which expected utility theory assumes.
The experimental and empirical evidence is doubly alarming for classical concep-
tions of rationality. It suggests not only that real-world behavior deviates from the
premises of expected utility theory, but that it deviates systematically. Systematic
deviation implies that expected utility theory is not merely inaccurate, but pro-
foundly mistaken in its characterization of human decision-making. The evidence
implies the existence of mechanisms not captured by the expected utility model.
It has become fashionable to name these systematic deviations with appellations
like “anchoring e↵ect,” “ambiguity aversion,” “availability bias,” “endowment ef-
fect,” “optimism bias,” among a profusion of other labels.14 The general payo↵
13Supra Note 34.
14Supra Note 34.
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of these various observations is not only that real-world behavior fails to converge
toward rationality, but that it converges toward something else altogether.
To summarize the foregoing discussion: expected utility theory establishes that if
individuals’ preferences have a logically consistent structure, and if individuals re-
spond consistently to probabilities, and if their choices reveal preferences, then their
preferences may be represented as the maximization of a real-valued function. And
conversely, if preferences can be represented as the maximization of a real-valued
function, then they must have the structure assumed by expected utility theory.
However, the experimental tests demonstrate that human behavior is systematically
inconsistent, and we must therefore conclude that it cannot be the case that individ-
uals’ choices are representable as the maximization of an expected utility function.
Restated in terms of our hypothetical utility-maximizing robot: the experimental
and empirical research suggest that for any real human being, there cannot exist
any utility function which would cause a utility-maximizing robot to replicate the
behavior of its human model.
This is a potentially devastating result.15 If expected utility theory fails to provide
a general representation of human behavior, then it leaves us with no principled
basis for describing individuals’ responsiveness to incentives. It renders otiose the
conventional analysis of equilibria, and thereupon the whole edifice of theoretical
economics crumbles.
Economics thus finds itself in the lamentable position of a science in search of a
theory. Although there have been valiant attempts to rebut the experimental and
empirical evidence,16 which do much to mitigate the damage by showing that individ-
uals do tend to behave rationally in very many situations, nevertheless the volume
and validity of controverting observations ultimately seem irresistible: in at least
some situations, people do in fact systematically behave in a manner inconsistent
with the axioms of expected utility theory. At a minimum therefore this implies that
expected utility theory cannot be a complete theory of decision-making.
2.1.2 The Menagerie of Biases and Heuristics
Given that expected utility theory is at best a partial description of human behavior,
the question naturally arises whether there exists any general theory capable of
15This is sometimes presented as a problem merely for the use of cardinal utility in economic anal-
ysis. This is undersells the significance of the behavioral research. Violations of the completeness
and transitivity axioms are deeply problematic for any conception of preference-driven behavior,
regardless whether it is represented cardinally or ordinally.
16For example, Al-Najjar and Weinstein, 2009. See generally supra Note 4.
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representing real-world decision-making?
Some scholars have answered this question skeptically. They speculate that hu-
man behavior may be too complex a phenomenon to be reducible to a tractable
general model.17This skeptical position characterizes human behavior as an arbi-
trary collection of decision-making procedures (or perhaps mere brute tendencies),
lacking any intelligible underlying structure: individuals exhibit the “anchoring ef-
fect” in some situations, “availability bias” in other situations, and “loss aversion”
in yet other situations, etc. Some behavioralists would go further, a rmatively com-
mitting to the proposition that no general explanation may be constructed as to
why—except perhaps that these cognitive traits are the byproduct of historical ac-
cidents in the course of biological evolution, no more susceptible to elucidation than
why humans have ten toes rather than twelve. Although this position is rarely made
explicit, the gist of it is detectable in much recent scholarship.18
There are many reasons to resist the characterization of human behavior as an un-
structured menagerie of biases and heuristics. First, we should want a tractable gen-
eral model of behavior if we hope to do any science. Of course, wanting a thing does
not make it possible, but we should not give up the project merely because our initial
attempts have failed. There is good reason to suspect—at least pre-theoretically—
that a general model of behavior is obtainable. Minimal self-reflection seems to reveal
that our actions are motivated by our preferences for their expected outcomes. It
does not seem that people instinctively and unthinkingly deploy arbitrary heuristics
to determine choices.19
Second, the menagerie conception is unlikely to withstand even basic tests. For
example, one very simple test would be to ask individuals to select from two choices:
(A) receiving $10 or (B) receiving $5. It seems utterly obvious that very nearly
everyone would choose to receive $10. I anticipate few critics would challenge this
“result.” Presumably, the alternatives could be varied to obtain similar results for:
2. (A0) losing $10 (B0) losing $5
3. (A00) receiving $2 (B00) receiving $1
4. (A000) receiving $10,001 (B000) receiving $10,000.
17For example, see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, p. 317.
18Supra Note 17. See also Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 1998.
19Although I am inclined to regard this argument the most powerful reason to reject the “un-
structured menagerie” conception of human behavior, I expect that it will be unpersuasive to many
readers. It seems that very many economists have adopted a doctrinaire inflexibility about what
constitutes “evidence,” founded upon surprisingly superficial epistemological dogma. While it is
surely the case lay people and clinical psychologists tend to overvalue introspection as a source of
knowledge, the prevailing economic disdain for it is surely an overcorrection.
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No matter how the payo↵s are varied in this setup, it seems eminently plausible that
individuals will consistently choose the dollar-maximizing alternative when choosing
between certain outcomes.20
The only plausible deviations from maximizing behavior in these simple tests
admit explanations consistent with the rational actor hypothesis. For example, an
individual might choose to receive $10 rather than $10.01 if the inconvenience of
dealing with a penny were greater than its $0.01 value.21 Yet bracketing o↵ such
trifling snags in experiment design, the anticipated result is so obvious that the
“experiment” can hardly be thought worth conducting. Of course people will choose
to receive more money rather than less, and to lose less money rather than more.
To the extent that dollars are a tool for measuring preference magnitudes, the test
implies that individuals’ preferences tend to be logically consistent (i.e., that their
preferences are complete and transitive). Or at least they are consistent in the
pared down case of preferring more money to less money. Generalizing the claim
to all preferences requires some work, and the implications will be fuzzy a best.
Nevertheless it establishes an important insight.
If we assume that individuals value money instrumentally (i.e., as a means of
achieving outcomes and not for its own sake) and if we assume that individuals are
able to consistently assign monetary values to outcomes (i.e., that they are will-
ing to pay proportionally more to achieve outcomes they prefer more), then the
observed logical consistency in individuals’ preferences for money will tend to gener-
alize to their preferences for states of the world.22 This implies the existence of some
structure in human behavior and furnishes some reason to doubt the “unstructured
menagerie” conception of decision-making.
Considerable care is required here. It is very easy to overstate the significance
of the “more money” test. It merely suggests by way of a proxy that there ex-
ists some consistent principle underlying human behavior, which resembles utility-
maximization. It suggests that when the elaborate decision problems posed to test
subjects in experimental settings are simplified—reducing the cognitive cost of bar-
gaining, evaluating probabilities, and grappling with unknowns—individuals do seem
20Indeed, the “reference point” may also be freely varied, and the result is likely to be unchanged.
21Other deviations—also consistent with economic rationality—may be motivated by religious,
moral, or political commitments. Another possible explanation for deviation might be the suspi-
cion that tends to accompany o↵ers of “free money.” Indeed, the enterprising psychologist might
thereupon hypothesize the existence of “free money aversion,” or a “too good to be true” heuristic.
I would regard these as artifacts of the experiment design however, and in any case consistent with
the predictions of the theory presented in this article.
22More precisely, the claim requires that there exist a homomorphism between non-monetary
outcomes and money.
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to exhibit some consistent behavior. They do not flap about randomly, applying ar-
bitrary heuristics hither and thither, sometimes choosing to receive less money or to
lose more. Yet all that can be inferred is that if decision problems are made su -
ciently simple, then behavior will tend to exhibit some consistent overall structure.
Undoubtedly, many readers will find the foregoing hypothetical “experiment”
trivial and uninteresting. It certainly is, but this only reinforces the point. It is
obvious that general behavioral patterns exist—that preferences for outcomes do
tend to drive decision-making.
And of course no experimentalist possessing a scintilla of ambition or creativity
would bother to conduct the “more money” test, precisely because its outcome is
trivial. For this reason, there exist few publications “confirming” rational behavior
in such reductive setups.23 Meanwhile, scholarly journals are replete with studies
revealing the ineptitude of test subjects facing strange and unnatural decision prob-
lems. Given the incentives to produce novel scholarship, behavioral research will tend
to generate an exaggerated impression of how badly the received view fails. Indeed,
research in any scientific field will tend to generate an exaggerated impression of the
defects of any received view. It is entirely understandable why so many economists
would feel inclined to adopt a nihilistic attitude toward general theories of behavior,
given the volume of seemingly unrelated, inconsistent, and self-defeating cognitive
biases uncovered in the lab. The sheer abundance of experimental articles reporting
observations of non-rational behavior are liable to create the impression that human
behavior is considerably less ordered than it is in fact.
But let us not lose perspective. The rational actor hypothesis was not conjured
from thin air, but induced from robust patterns observed informally in everyday life.
Meanwhile, the observations gathered from lab experiments are invariably elicited
by hurling probability riddles upon test subjects. Typically, these test subjects are
hapless undergraduates, the selection of whom deliberately excludes those majoring
in economics, statistics, or any other art which might prepare them to grapple with
such problems. And inasmuch as money-seeking behavior does not straightforwardly
imply rationality, it is a far weaker inference from the existence of observed anomalies
to the conclusion that human behavior has no general structure.
Now, lest I be misunderstood, I do not mean to imply that experimentalists
ought to devote more attention to reductive experiments like the “more money”
test, nor indeed that they should design experiments with the aim of “verifying”
the axioms of expected utility theory. Clearly, the interesting experiments are those
which yield controverting observations. The point is simply to be mindful that
the reason why observations of non-rational behavior are scientifically interesting
23Some examples are discussed in Zamir, 2018.
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is precisely because strong evidence of rational behavior would arise in reductive
experiments. An economist disa rming the rational actor hypothesis on the basis
of the anomalies thus far observed would be like a physicist doubting the law of
gravitation after observing examples of buoyancy, aerodynamic lift, and magnetism.
This is not to say that the persistent observation of anomalies cannot undermine our
belief in a proposed general law, but merely that we should exercise caution when
jettisoning a theory that seems to work in most instances—especially in the absence
of an acceptable replacement.
Another reductive test of the menagerie conception would be to provide test
subjects with an “expected utility calculator” in any of the experiments where non-
rational behaviors have previously been observed. Suppose the calculator accepts two
inputs: the utility that test subjects assign to states of the world and the probabili-
ties associated with each outcome attached to a given choice. Using these inputs, the
calculator outputs the test subjects’ utility-maximizing choices. The relevant ques-
tion is whether, given the results produced by the calculator, test subjects would
continue to exhibit logically or probabilistically inconsistent behavior. Would test
subjects select the utility-maximizing choice if they were told which alternative were
utility-maximizing?
Again, assuming away artifacts of experimental design—i.e., assuming test sub-
jects understand what the calculator does and how to use it—it seems obvious
that access to the calculator would dramatically reduce observations of non-rational
decision-making. Of course test subjects will select the utility-maximizing choice
if they are told which choice is utility-maximizing. The implications of this are
nontrivial. The “expected utility calculator” test implies the source of non-rational
decision-making. It reveals that individuals do want to maximize, but simply lack
the cognitive tools required to do so e↵ectively in scenarios where they lack access
to an “expected utility calculator.” Indeed, this intuition seems to be precisely what
motivates experimentalists to exclude economics students from their testing pools.
Trained individuals are less susceptible to the inconsistent behaviors which experi-
mentalists seek to uncover. But this concedes that people generally would employ
the tools of economics and statistics to make optimal choices if only they had access
to that knowledge.
The “more money” test and “expected utility calculator” test remind us of our
theoretical baseline and help us to identify what is marginal (and why it is marginal).
The extravagant conclusion which skeptics draw from the experimental and empirical
literature—that individuals do not systematically seek outcomes which maximally
satisfy their preferences—is not justified on the ground of such margin-pushing ex-
periments.
2.1. BACKGROUND 19
I have perhaps devoted more discussion to rebutting the menagerie model (or
anti -model as the case may be) than some might think warranted. It seems that a
majority of theorists still believe that a successful general theory may yet be devised.
Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of the nihilistic view ought not be underestimated,
and insofar as some readers may hold such a view, the foregoing remarks are worth
stating expressly.
2.1.3 Remedial Theories
If a general model of behavior can be devised, then the next question is what such a
theory might be. The predominant approaches toward a general descriptive theory of
decision-making can be divided into two intersecting classes: (i) theories of bounded
rationality, and (ii) generalized expected utility theories.
The relationship between theories of bounded rationality and generalized ex-
pected utility is rarely made explicit. This has led to some confusion. Exploring
their relationship is useful to understanding how behavioral decision theory has de-
veloped. The two categories are neither coextensive nor disjoint. Some (but not nec-
essarily all) generalized expected utility theories are theories of bounded rationality,
and some (but not necessarily all) theories of bounded rationality are generalized
expected utility theories.
Theories of bounded rationality provide an intuitive explanation why real world
decision-making often appears to diverge from the predictions of rational choice the-
ory, whereas generalized expected utility theories emend expected utility theory to
construct models which more closely represent real world behavior. Theories of
bounded rationality might be characterized as o↵ering an answer to the apparent fail-
ure of the strong rational actor hypothesis, and generalized expected utility theories
as o↵ering an answer to the apparent failure of the weak rational actor hypothesis.
This requires further elaboration, yet before embarking upon a thorough treat-
ment of that relationship, we should first get clear on what precisely “bounded ra-
tionality” and “generalized expected utility theories” denote.
Bounded Rationality
All theories of bounded rationality begin from the central premise that decision-
making is costly.24 These costs include search, cognitive strain, computation, and
the opportunity cost of deliberation, among other things. I will refer to these costs
generally as “decision costs.”
24The concept of bounded rationality was first described in Simon, 1955.
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Explicitly defined, a “decision cost” is any cost not arising from the outcome of a
choice, but rather arising from the act itself of choosing. Decision costs are a function
of two variables: the set of facts which give rise to the decision, and the method that
the decision-maker uses to select a choice.
For example, one possible method of selecting a choice is “rational deliberation”:
the decision-maker could survey the expected utility of each alternative and select
the action which returns the greatest value. This of course is the method described
by expected utility theory. However, rational deliberation is not the only method
available to a decision-maker. He could choose the alternative with which he is most
familiar, or which minimizes risk, or which minimizes the disutility of the worst case,
or which maximizes the utility of the best case. The possible ways of choosing are
practically limitless.
Let “decision-making procedure” denote any possible method that a decision-
maker can conceivably employ in selecting a choice. More formally, a decision-making
procedure is a mapping from states of the world to choices. The set of decision-
making procedures includes rational deliberation, heuristics, coin flips, and any other
conceivable method used to determine a choice.25
Theories of bounded rationality are plausible, because the presence of decision
costs can explain why rational decision-makers seem to behave non-rationally. Ra-
tional deliberation tends to require comparatively greater investment in decision-
making. Individuals may therefore be better o↵ accepting a reduction in the ex-
pected utility of outcomes in order to save on decision costs. In other words, it is
sometimes rational to choose not to be “rational.”26
To illustrate the point, consider the following decision problem: Select from
among the three alternatives below. Take it as given that each choice refers to a
distinct monetary value not equal to any other alternative, but that no alternative
varies from any other by more than two cents.
(A) Receive b1012235 · ⇡c   1000b1012232 · ⇡c cents.
(B) Receive x cents, where x is the largest twin prime such that x  2023.
25Rational deliberation and heuristics do not exhaust the set of all decision-making procedures.
The literature typically defines “heuristics” as being decision-making procedures which tend to
select worse choices than rational deliberation (i.e., at least some members in the set of potential
choices will yield lower payo↵s than the potential choices selected by rational deliberation), but
which also incur less decision cost than rational deliberation. However, we can of course conceive of
methods of decision-making which select worse choices than rational deliberation and incur more
decision cost.
26This is approximately what Simon had in mind with the concept of “satisficing.” Simon, 1956.
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(C) Receive y dollars, where y is the number of times the word “their” appears in
the United States Declaration of Independence.
Most individuals faced with this problem would presumably select an arbitrary
choice, because a possible two cent improvement in payo↵ cannot justify the tedious
work of determining the optimal choice. It is not worth the e↵ort to work out which
of the three alternatives denotes the greatest monetary value.27
Implicit in theories of bounded rationality is the recognition that the selection
of a decision-making procedure is itself a decision. Individuals do not simply select
actions, they must also choose how to choose a possible action. Choosing how to
choose is itself a decision. Let us call the choice of action a “first order” decision,
and the choice of first order decision-making procedure a “second order” decision.28
Arranging decisions hierarchically in this way, it becomes sensible why rational
actors might choose not to be “rational.” It can be second order rational not to
choose to be first order rational. Given the prohibitive decision costs associated with
optimization, first order rational deliberation might perform worse than some other
first order decision-making procedure on balance.
Thus does bounded rationality explain apparent deviations from the predictions
of expected utility theory. And it does so while preserving the kernel of the strong
rational actor hypothesis: that decision-makers are optimizing. They are optimiz-
ing over decision-making procedures rather than actions. Yet their behavior is still
fundamentally optimizing. They are still essentially rational. If a rigorous second or-
der theory of rationality were constructed, then we might reasonably suspect that it
could explain the “anomalies” observed in the experimental and empirical literature,
while preserving the basic conceptual framework of utility-maximization.
Yet two profound problems are immediately apparent. First, if we are to under-
stand every decision as analyzable into two distinct decisions—i.e., (i) what to do,
and (ii) how to decide what to do—then this begs the question: is the decision how
to decide how to decide not also a decision? And is the decision how to decide how
to decide how to decide not another decision still?
The bounded rationality approach kicks the lid o↵ Pandora’s box, for if decision-
making procedures are themselves taken to be choices, then every first order decision
27The payo↵s are (A) $20.01, (B) $19.99, and (C) $20.00. I assume of course that the decision-
maker does not derive any pleasure from working out the values, although if he did, then this might
be characterized as a negative decision cost (or maybe a “decision utility”). Negative decision costs
are not addressed any further in this article, but they are compatible with the model I present.
28Few authors have treated the layering of higher order decisions explicitly. Sunstein and
Ullmann-Margalit, 1999 describe something approximately equivalent to my conception.
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implies not only a second order decision, but rather an infinitude of higher order
decisions.
Decision Choice Set
. . . . . .
nth order Methods of selecting an (n  1)th order choice.
. . . . . .
Third order Methods of selecting a second order choice.
Second order Methods of selecting a first order choice.
First order Actions.
The abyss of an infinitude will naturally tend to elicit some discomfort, however this
is not by itself fatal. What does render the problem dire is the premise, essential
to theories of bounded rationality, that all decision-making is costly. There does
not seem to be any principled reason to suppose that the decision costs associated
with each ith order choice converge to zero as i ! 1. We are left therefore with
the intolerable result that all decisions presumptively imply infinite decision costs.
This is not progress, for we have moved from trying to explain apparently irrational
decision-making to the absurd conclusion that decision-making is impossible. That
cannot be right.
Surprisingly few theorists of bounded rationality have attempted to address this
problem.29 To avoid the issue, they simply assume a finite hierarchy of higher order
decision-making. More specifically, nearly all models of bounded rationality assume
exactly two levels of decision-making, surmising decision-makers to be second order
rational. No justification is o↵ered for this restriction.
It is di cult to fathom how bounded rationality could be regarded a satisfactory
general theory of behavior without addressing the infinite regress problem. The core
conceptual move cannot avoid question-begging in the absence of an explanation
why the model should be delimited to a finite hierarchy, or why we should believe
decision costs to be convergent when iterated to infinity. Thus arises the first major
obstacle to developing a theory of bounded rationality.
Yet even putting aside the infinite regress problem, there exists a second major
obstacle. Bounded rationality hypothesizes that for any ith order decision, where
i > 1, decision-makers are faced with the choice: which (i  1)th order decision-
making procedure to employ. If the decision, for any i, depends on the expected
utility of each (i  1)th decision-making procedure less its decision costs, then the
29Despite the dearth of attempts to resolve it, behavioral economists are certainly acutely aware
of the problem. See Conlisk, 1996. See also Minsky, 1986, referring to the problem as “Fredkin’s
paradox.”
2.1. BACKGROUND 23
decision-maker would need to determine what the expected utility of selecting that
decision-making procedure would be. But if the decision-maker were to run through
the deliberation necessary to determine the expected utility of using every available
(i  1)th order decision-making procedure, then he would incur the very decision
costs (and more) which higher order rationality was posited to avoid. Specifically, he
would incur the decision cost of determining the expected utility of every alternative
plus the decision cost determining the decision costs of every alternative plus the
decision cost of selecting a maximum.
This is ugly but not yet calamitous. Choice sets (of any order) can be constrained
to finite cardinalities. Plausible arguments may be raised for adopting a finiteness
assumption, and this avoids the threat of yet another infinite regress. But what is
not so easily fixed is far more profound: that it is never (i+ 1)th order rational to
choose ith order rationality, for any i 2 [2,1).
The decision cost of rational deliberation for any ith order of decision-making,
where i > 1, must be greater than the decision cost of (i  1)th order rational de-
liberation. Therefore, ith order rational deliberation cannot have expected payo↵s
greater than (i  1)th order rational deliberation. But if ith order rationality returns
worse payo↵s than (i  1)th order rationality, then it would be (i+ 1)th suboptimal
to choose to employ ith order rational deliberation. It would be suboptimal, because
there will always be at least one ith order decision-making procedure which returns
a better payo↵: i.e., simply to do the (i  1)th order rational deliberation without
weighing whether it would be optimal.
It is important to recognize here that “choosing (i  1)th order rational delib-
eration” is not identical to ith order rational deliberation. It could be ith order
suboptimal to choose (i  1)th order rational deliberation. The ith order choice to
be (i  1)th order rational can be (i+ 1)th order rational, even if it is not ith order
rational.
The problem then, stated more succinctly, is that any ith order rational delibera-
tion will subsume (i 1)th order rational deliberation. Deliberating whether it would
be ith order rational to be (i  1)th order rational requires undertaking the (i  1)th
order rational deliberation, and therefore it will always be inferior to just doing the
(i 1)th order rational deliberation without considering alternatives. In other words,
higher order rationality is redundant—it necessarily duplicates all the decision costs
of lower order rationality. Therefore, it can only add decision costs by considering
non-rational (i  1)th order alternatives, undermining its very raison d’eˆtre.
And of course, the experimental and empirical evidence has established that at
the ground level, individuals do not use first order rational deliberation. Therefore,
no individual is ith order rational at any order of decision-making i, contradicting the
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principal claim of bounded rationality: that individuals are rational at some order
of decision-making.
Direct description of the problem is admittedly somewhat abstract, and a nu-
merical example may help ground intuitions. Suppose an individual were planning
to travel from New York to Washington, and he had to choose whether to journey
by train or by air. He has several possible second order choices. He could weigh the
various factors: speed, convenience, comfort, price, risk of accidents, risk of delay,
etc., to determine the expected utility-maximizing choice. That would be a first
order rational deliberation. Alternatively, he could choose whichever mode of transit
sprung to mind first. Or he could choose whichever mode of transit were cheaper.
Or he could choose whichever mode of transit were faster. Or he could choose the
closer local destination: the train station or the airport. Or he could flip a coin.
How should the decision-maker select from among these alternatives? If the
individual were second order rational, then he would calculate the net expected
utility of each decision-making procedure, subtract their decision costs, and choose
the optimal decision-making procedure. He would then apply the optimal decision-
making procedure to determine an action.
Suppose the expected utility of traveling by airplane were 10 and the expected
utility of traveling by train were 5. And suppose further the following values:
Decision-Making First Order Decision Second Order
Procedure Expected Utility Cost Expected Utility
Rational Deliberation 10 8 2
Cognitively Salient 5 1 4
Cheapest Alternative 5 3 2
Fastest Alternative 10 7 3
Coin Flip 7.5 1 6.5
To get a sense of the mechanics of second order rationality, let us consider the third
alternative: “choose the cheapest alternative.” The expected utility of choosing the
cheapest alternative is 5 (given in the second column), and the cost of determin-
ing the cheapest alternative—i.e., the burden of comparing prices and hunting for
discounts—is 3 (given in the third column). Therefore, the second order expected
utility of choosing the “choose the cheapest alternative” decision-making procedure
is 2 = 5  3 (given in the fourth column).
This alternative is plainly not the second order expected utility-maximizing pro-
cedure, since there are other decision-making procedures which return greater second
order expected utility values. The second order rational decision-maker would choose
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the decision-making procedure which returns the greatest second order expected util-
ity value. That would be the “coin flip” decision-making procedure, which returns a
second order expected utility of 6.5.
But now consider: in order to ascertain that the second order expected utility of
using “coin flip” is 6.5, the decision-maker would have to determine the first order
expected utility and decision cost of the coin flip. And in order to determine that
it is the optimal decision-making procedure, he would have to determine the second
order expected utilities of all the alternative decision-making procedures. And in
order to do this, he would have to determine all of their first order expected utilities
and decision costs. And these are the same decision costs (and more) that he would
have had to undertake if he were simply first order rational.
Thus, the second order decision cost of rationality would be the sum of all the
first order decision costs (in the example, 8 + 1 + 3 + 7 + 1 = 20). The second
order rational individual would therefore experience a (third order) expected utility
of  12.5 = 7.5  20.30 Yet this leads to an absurd result. If the decision-maker were
simply first order rational, then he would experience an expected utility of 2, which
is greater than the utility of employing second order rational deliberation. After
all, 2 >  12.5. Rather than investing e↵ort to determine the best decision-making
procedure, individuals would be better o↵ simply engaging in first order rational
deliberation spontaneously. Certainly, “do a first order rational deliberation” is an
available second order decision-making procedure, and assuming it incurs negligi-
ble decision costs, it will always be superior to second order rational deliberation.
Indeed, under these assumptions it is trivially the case that first order rational de-
liberation will always return greater utility in the aggregate relative to any ith order
rational deliberation, for i > 1. Thus, we are left where we started: a theory of
first order rationality, which the experimental and empirical evidence has already
controverted.31
More problematically still, the foregoing considerations generate a doubly intol-
erable result. If the decision-maker has incurred the decision costs necessary to
determine the payo↵s of employing every available decision-making procedure, then
although he may conclude that it would have been second order optimal to choose
30Of course, some of the decision costs of the alternatives may be overlapping. It may be the case,
for example, that the decision-maker can determine the cheapest alternative or fastest alternative
at less cost after having already undertaken rational deliberation. Nevertheless, it would still be
the case that the second order decision-making procedure would incur at least the cost of first order
rational deliberation and whatever second order deliberation is required to compare alternatives.
31The problem I have just described has some antecedents in related fields. In macroeconomics,
there is some relationship with “rational expectations,” and in operations research, it bears some
similarity to the “decision-making paradox” described in Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1989.
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some suboptimal first order procedure in order to save on decision costs, it would be
preposterous to actually adopt that decision-making procedure in selecting a choice.
When he has formed this determination, he has already incurred the decision cost of
first order rational deliberation. He had to perform the first order rational deliber-
ation in order to know its payo↵s and to see that it was not second-order optimal.
But having done this, he knows the optimal action. Knowing the optimal action,
it would be ridiculous to then choose a suboptimal action, on the specious ground
that the decision-making procedure which determined the suboptimal act would be
second order optimizing. The coin flip is second order optimal because it saves on
decision costs, but those decision costs have already been “spent” determining this
information.
More concisely: in order for decision-makers to decide second order rationally
which first order decision-making procedure to use, they must weigh the payo↵s of
using each decision-making procedure against its decision costs. However, in order
to gauge the payo↵s of a decision-making procedure, decision-makers will need to
determine the utility value of its output. And determining the utility value of its
output is the very thing that notions of higher order rationality were posited to avoid.
Therefore, second order optimization cannot improve on first order optimization.
And this generalizes to higher order rationality straightforwardly. For convenience,
let us refer to this problem as the “idempotent hierarchy problem.”
Generalized Expected Utility Theories
Whereas theories of bounded rationality propose substantive claims about the psy-
chology of decision-making, generalized expected utility theories tend to focus in-
stead on predictive validity. Broadly, generalized expected utility theories attempt
to preserve the maximization hypothesis of classical rationality while altering the
formulation so as to better conform with experimental observations. The fundamen-
tal premise which these theories share is a plausible one: that the utility functions
described by the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem are too simplistic to represent
how real people evaluate states of the world. Yet this does not necessarily entail
that human behavior could not be represented as the maximization of some di↵erent
function.
The defining objective of generalized expected utility theories is to supply a
more empirically grounded formulation of utility maximization. The intuition is that
decision-makers may be represented as maximizing something. Whether this position
is tenable depends upon what that “something” is, and whether the alternative for-
mulation proves to be more consistent with observed behavior than expected utility
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theory.
Experimental work has tended to focus on test subjects’ inconsistent choices
under conditions involving risk and uncertainty. Accordingly, generalized expected
utility theories typically focus on reformulating the probability functions of expected
utility theory, informed by the results of experimental observations.
The most influential generalized expected utility theory is “prospect theory,”
first exposited in Kahneman and Tversky, 1979.32 Prospect theory introduces three
complications to the expected utility model. First, utility is characterized not as a
function of states of the world, but rather in terms of gains and losses. Test subjects
have been observed to be more than twice as sensitive to perceived losses than to
perceived gains. Therefore, prospect theory posits that changes to the state of the
world with respect to a reference point determines a subject’s “value function.”
Second, probabilities are subject to underweighting and overweighting when con-
tributing to a choice. Test subjects have been observed to behave as if a probability
were greater or less than its given value. These variations were not due to misesti-
mations or miscalculations, but rather an apparent quirk in the operationalization
of known probabilities. Prospect theory thus posits a weighting function, which
modifies perceived probabilities.
Together, the value function, v, and probability weighting function, ⇡, describe
“prospects,” which are sets of ordered pairs {hv(c0), ⇡(p0)i , hv(c1), ⇡(p1)i , . . .}, where
ci is a state of the world and p0 is the probability of its obtaining. The value func-
tion describes a discontinuous ‘S’-shaped utility curve, and the probability weighting
function overweights lower probabilities and underweights higher probabilities. The
prospects thusly formulated are then “edited” with various heuristics to simplify the
decision problem before decision-makers maximize their payo↵ from the modified
“expected utility function.”
The foregoing description admittedly glosses over many nuances. And there have
emerged several competing generalized expected utility theories which resist analogy
to prospect theory. Nevertheless, the rough and ready summary su ces for the
purposes of illustration.
In their favor, generalized expected utility theories have the benefit of being “em-
pirically grounded” ab initio. Like prospect theory, nearly all generalized expected
utility theories start from a base of experimental observation. However, they su↵er
from two critical drawbacks.
First, they fail to provide much explanatory insight as to why individuals seem so
inept at evaluating outcomes and reasoning probabilistically. Prospect theory posits
that individuals behave as if they were maximizing over sums of values discounted
32See also Tversky and Kahneman, 1992.
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by probability weighting functions, but it supplies no insight as to what might cause
such behavior. It simply describes how test subjects were observed to behave. It
does not explain. This is a repairable defect of course, for if an otherwise satisfactory
generalized expected utility theory were discovered, then it might reasonably be
anticipated that—with some ingenuity—explanatory intuitions might be extracted
from it.
The merit of a generalized expected utility theory thus depends almost wholly
upon its capacity to predict behavior. Yet this leads to the second complaint: that
when the parameters of the very experiments upon which generalized expected utility
theories are based are varied, their models seem to be no more resilient than classical
expected utility theory at predicting behavior.33
The second defect is dispositive, but the first is still worth further discussion. One
approach to mitigating the explanatory problem, which some generalized expected
utility theorists have proposed, involves embedding generalized expected utility the-
ories within the broader conceptual framework of bounded rationality. Given that
probabilistic reasoning is cognitively onerous, it is plausible that when facing situa-
tions involving risk or uncertainty, decision-makers will more readily avail themselves
of non-rational (and accordingly less costly) decision-making procedures. The prob-
ability weighting function of prospect theory, for example, might represent an aspect
of some commonly employed decision-making procedure. This approach has several
advantages and several disadvantages.
In its favor, embedding a generalized expected utility model within a concep-
tual story of bounded rationality can provide a plausible intuitive foundation. By
characterizing a generalized expected utility theory as modeling a particular decision-
making procedure which individuals deploy when facing risk or uncertainty, there is
a compelling story why decision-makers might exhibit probabilistically inconsistent
behavior. Optimizing under conditions of risk and uncertainty entails high decision
costs. Consequently, the higher order rational decision-maker might plausibly choose
to adopt the decision-making procedure described by a generalized expected utility
theory when facing those risky or uncertain decisions.
Yet embedding generalized expected utility theories within the explanatory frame-
work of bounded rationality has drawbacks. Recall that theories of bounded rational-
33For example, Birnbaum has published a number of experimental papers testing prospect theory
and its variants, o↵ering compelling evidence of its fragility. See, e.g., Birnbaum, 2004, 2006,
2008a, 2008b; Birnbaum and Navarrete, 1998. Birnbaum’s results seem to suggest that alternative
generalized expected utility theories are considerably more durable, however these too have fared
poorly when tested against novel experimental designs. Researchers advancing this line of inquiry
may view these rejected models not as failed enterprises, but rather as hopeful steps toward a
general theory approached incrementally. I am doubtful of the experiment-driven theory approach.
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ity encounter obstacles of their own: the infinite regress problem and the idempotent
hierarchy problem. The use of bounded rationality as an explanatory support for
generalized expected utility theories is thus a double-edged sword.
Moreover, simply “embedding” the two approaches without rigorously formulat-
ing a complete general framework leaves too much unanswered. Why should anyone
believe a proposed generalized expected utility theory describes how individuals rea-
son about all decisions? Why would decision-makers choose the procedure described
by prospect theory rather than rank-dependent expected utility theory, or any other
deliberative mechanism? Why not mix and match a variety of decision-making pro-
cedures? If decision-makers do mix and match, then what other decision-making
procedures do decision-makers use? When do they choose them? And why?
In the absence of a rigorous and complete formulation of the broader bounded
rationality framework, the proposal of a generalized expected utility theory amounts
to a bald assertion that such-and-such decision-making procedure is always second
order optimal and that individuals are second order rational. Merely “embedding”
without more is an admission that the generalized expected utility theory is not
fully general. Moreover, if a generalized expected utility theory purports to be a
complete theory of behavior, then it begs the question why other decision-making
procedures are necessarily worse. And if it is conceded to be an incomplete theory
of behavior, then it leaves unanswered the most pressing question—what conditions
trigger deployment of the decision-making procedure described by that theory?
Of course, the generalized expected utility theorist could sidestep all this. Gen-
eralized expected utility theories do not need to provide any psychological account
of decision-making. The generalized expected utility theorist may simply concede
the criticism—that his theory has no intuitive basis—but insist nevertheless that it
is good at prediction, and that prediction is all that matters.
Regardless, although the explanatory weakness of generalized expected utility
theories is interesting, the point is moot. The generalized expected utility theory
approach relies fundamentally upon a theory’s capacity for prediction, and no theory
yet advanced succeeds in generating good predictions consistently.
* * *
To harden intuitions, it is worth restating the goals of bounded rationality and
generalized expected utility theories in terms of our hypothetical utility-maximizing
robots. Both may be understood as attempts to salvage the claim that robot dop-
pelga¨ngers—whose decisions would be identical to those of a human—can be con-
structed.
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The principal claim of bounded rationality is that a utility-maximizing robot’s
behavior could be made indistinguishable from a human’s if it were allowed two
initializing inputs: (i) a utility function, and (ii) a decision cost assignment (assigning
disutility values to decision-making procedures).
The principal claim of generalized expected utility theories is that a robot’s be-
havior could be made indistinguishable from a human’s if its treatment of the utility
function were something distinct from the straightforward maximization of expected
utility.
2.2 A Meta-Model of Meta-Rational Choice
The decision-making structure presented in this section is both a theory of bounded
rationality and of generalized expected utility. Importantly, it remedies all four of the
major defects identified in the previous section. Qua theory of bounded rationality,
it provides an endogenous answer to the infinite regress problem and idempotent
hierarchy problem. Qua generalized expected utility theory, it embeds the deviations
from expected utility theory within the framework of bounded rationality explicitly.
It requires no ad hoc manipulation of the probability function, and it is necessarily
consistent with observed behavior.
The theory is expressed in the form of a meta-model. It is a framework for
generating representations of decision-making behavior—a model describing models
of decision-making. Formally, a “model” in the meta-model is an ordered triple,
containing (i) a set of all possible actions, (ii) a utility function, and (iii) a decision
cost assignment.
The main result is that for any set of potential behaviors, there exists a model rep-
resenting those chosen behaviors as optimal. The intuition is that decision-makers’
behaviors can be represented by some decision-making procedure capable of generat-
ing choices for every possible state of the world, which is ith order rational. However,
the value of i is not assumed arbitrarily in my meta-model. Rather, the value of i is
itself taken as the result of optimization.
My strategy is to construct a set containing every possible decision-making pro-
cedure of any hierarchical order. Each of these decision-making procedures will have
some representative utility value (it’s “meta-utility”). I prove that for any set of
potential actions, there must exist a model and a meta-utility-maximizing decision-
making procedure within that model, which selects those actions.
The structure of my exposition is straightforward. First, I define decision-making
and states of the world (§2.2.2). Second, I define a hierarchy to represent higher order
decisions (§2.2.3). Third, I define “meta-utility” and “meta-rationality” in formal
2.2. A META-MODEL OF META-RATIONAL CHOICE 31
terms (§2.2.4), proving that any set of behaviors may be characterized as the product
of a meta-rational procedure in some model.
2.2.1 Notation
Consistent with convention, functions are treated as sets of ordered pairs. Functions
may be defined either explicitly or in relational terms, depending on ease and clarity
of notation. For example, the function mapping integers to their squares f : Z! Z
may be defined either by f(x) = x2 or equivalently by f = {hx, yi | y = x2}. The
variable term f is used to denote functions. If two variables are needed to denote
functions, prime notation is introduced. For example, f , f 0, f 00, etc., denote distinct
functions. The terms g and h name particular functions defined below, and they will
never be used as variable designations.
In general, the terms x, y, and z are used to signify variable objects—with sub-
scripts adopted in case more than three variables are needed. The variable term S
will be used to designate sets—again with subscripts adopted in case more than one
variable is needed. The terms i, j, k, and l designate index variables. If a symbol
is intended to designate a universal variable for a specific kind of object which or-
dinarily has a subscripted name, then the term may be used without subscripts to
indicate that it designates any object of that type. For example, where a0, a1, . . . 2 A
name specific members of A, it may be understood that the terms a or ai in the for-
mulas 8a 2 A (a = y) and 8ai 2 A (ai = y) are, respectively, equivalent to writing
8x 2 A (x = y). For objects with subscripted names, the subscript n or m will be
used to designate particular variables. For example, 9an (an = x).
Note further that the use of superscripts should be read as an alternative to
subscripts as a means of recycling base terms. Superscripts will only denote expo-
nentiation when the base is a number. For example, x2 simply denotes some object
distinct from x0 and x1—it does not denote x ⇥ x. However, 2x does denote expo-
nentiation.
As a general rule, subscripts, superscripts, overbars, and prime notation do not
designate operations. They are simply used to name terms and variables. The only
exception is when the base term is a number, in which case superscripts should be
read as exponentiation.
Importantly, a common structure which arises in the meta-model is the ordered
pair hf, ii. For convenience, the notation fi is introduced to abbreviate hf, ii. It is
especially important in this context to recognize that fi and fj do not denote distinct
functions. Rather, they denote ordered pairs, the first element of both being the same
function. More precisely, they abbreviate hf, ii and hf, ji, where the first element
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in both ordered pairs is the identical function f . Two objects of that form, which
are distinct in both their elements, would be denoted fi and f 0j, where fi abbreviates
hf, ii and f 0j abbreviates hf 0, ji.
Also, as a general guide to symbol choice, the general convention I have adopted
is to signify increasing generality with increasingly elaborate notation. For example,
the meta-model defines a0, a1, . . . 2 A, and A0, A1, . . . 2 A.
The notation is meant to emphasize clarity over rigor. Thus, for example, when
defining a0, a1, . . . 2 A and A0, A1, . . . 2 A, the question which A 2 A contains
a0, a1, . . ., is meant to be understood from context. The obvious alternative would
have been to disambiguate by defining a00, a
0
1, . . . 2 A0 and a10, a11, . . . 2 A1, and
A0, A1, . . . 2 A. However, this would add unnecessary notational clutter, as only one
A 2 A is ordinarily relevant. Common sense and common conventions are otherwise
assumed throughout.
2.2.2 Actions and States of the World
Let c0, c1, . . . represent “conditions” (or “states of the world”). Conditions are the
simplest elements of the meta-model. Let C = {c0, c1, . . .} 6= ? represent the set of
all possible conditions.
Let “actions” be represented as ordered pairs, consisting of “antecedent condi-
tions” and “consequent conditions,” with the form hc, {hr, c0i , hr0, c00i , . . .}i, where
c, c0, c00, . . . 2 C and r, r0, . . . 2 R, such that r + r0 + . . . = 1.
The intuitive interpretation is that an action is a lottery which moves individuals
from some antecedent condition to consequent conditions with some probabilities.
In other words, phc, {hr, c0i , hr0, c00i , . . .}iq represents an action performed when the
state of the world is c, which leads to the outcome c0 with probability r, to outcome
c00 with probability r0, and so forth.
Definition 2.2.1 (Alternatives). For any sets x0, x1, y0, y1, z0, and z1, Let z0 ⇠ z1
i↵ z0 = hx0, y0i, z1 = hx1, y1i, and x0 = x1.
The foregoing definition implies that if two possible choices, hci, S0i and hcj, S1i,
share the same antecedent condition, i.e., that if ci = cj, then they are “alternatives”
if S0 6= S1 (obviously, they are simply identical if S0 = S1). The “choice set,” given
some state of the world, cn, is the equivalence class formed by the ⇠ relation on
the set of all possible choices, such that the first member of every element of the
equivalence class is cn.
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Definition 2.2.2 (Choice Functions). For any set S, let G(S) = S ! SS denote
the function space of choice functions g0, g1, . . . 2 G(S) on any set S, for which
8x 2 S (x 6= ?).
Definition 2.2.3 (Set of Representations). Given any set of possible conditions C,
let the set of all ordered pairs that could represent actions be defined by:
A(C) = C⇥
8<:x | x ✓ R⇥ C ^ Xhy,zi=i2x y = 1
9=;
Now, let A(C) denote the set of all valid representations of possible actions:
A(C) =
 
x | 9g  x ✓ A(C) ^ g 2 G(A(C)/ ⇠) ^ Img(g) ✓ x  
The objective here is to define a set containing all valid representations of actions.
For any state of the world c 2 C, there should exist at least one action ai such that
the actor can choose ai if c obtains (i.e., there exists some S, such that ai = {cj, S}
for any cj 2 C).34 Of course, there may be more than one possible action available
in any given antecedent condition—but there must be at least one possible action if
a set An 2 A(C) is meant to represent the set of all possible actions. The intuition
here is that no state of the world exists where an individual inhabiting that state of
the world has no possible choices.35 This is because in any state of the world, he
must have at least one possible course of action (although when there is only one
choice, this admittedly does some abuse—albeit harmless for present purposes—to
the words “choice” and “decision.”).
Now, while some An may exhaust the set of possible actions for a particular
decision-maker at a particular time, there are of course other conceivable representa-
tions (i.e., other sets of possible actions, Ak, Al, . . . 2 A(C)). Definition 2.2.3 defines
the set A(C), and we may be assured that there exists some An 2 A(C), such that
An represents the set of all possible actions of any individual decision-maker in any
possible state of the world.
As a matter of notational convention, such representations will be denoted by up-
percaseA0, A1, . . . 2 A(C). Particular actions will be denoted by lowercase a0, a1, . . . 2
A 2 A(C).
34The condition given by the expression 9g  g 2 G(A/ ⇠) ^ Img(g) ✓ x  is meant to ensure that
for any state of the world, there exists at least one choice alternative available to the decision-maker.
35At the margins, it seems that even where it may seem that an individual cannot act, it must at
least be the case that “doing nothing” is a possible action—perhaps in some cases the only possible
action. Even in such cases, there exists a possible choice (i.e., to do nothing).
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Figure 2.1: The state of the world is c0
It may help some readers to observe the foregoing construction in action. Con-
sider the following “toy model,” using the game of chess as an exemplar. To model
“actions” in chess using the foregoing framework, let Cch be the set of all possible
(legal) chess positions. The “set of possible actions” in this context can be identified
as the set of legal chess moves.36
Next, examine what sorts of elements the “set of actions” would contain. Take a
particular position for example, call it c0 2 Cch , where the only pieces on the board
are the White King at g1, the Black King at f3, and a Black Pawn at g3 (Figure 2.1).
If it is White to move, then there are two legal actions: Kf1 and Kh1. Let us denote
the position where the White King is on f1 as c1 (Figure 2.2), and the position where
the White King is on h1 as c2 (Figure 2.3).
Now, let AW represent the set of possible White actions. It follows then that
hc0, {h1, c1i}i 2 AW and hc0, {h1, c2i}i 2 AW . And there exists no x such that
hc0, {x}i 2 AW and x 6= h1, c1i and x 6= h1, c2i. Continuing in a similar fashion for
all possible legal chess positions, we may construct a set to represent all possible
White moves in all possible positions (i.e., the set AW ). Of course, the legal moves
for Black will di↵er (Black cannot, after all, move the White pieces). And so there
will be a distinct set of possible actions AB 2 A(Cch), which identifies every legal
Black move in every possible position. And the set of all possible actions in chess
36Of course moves are reductive lotteries where the outcome is always certain (i.e., if the player
moves a pawn forward one square, then it will transform the position to one where the pawn is
advanced one square with total certainty). There is zero probability that, upon moving the pawn,
the position can be anything else.
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Figure 2.2: The state of the world is
c1
80Z0Z0Z0Z
7Z0Z0Z0Z0
60Z0Z0Z0Z
5Z0Z0Z0Z0
40Z0Z0Z0Z
3Z0Z0Zko0
20Z0Z0Z0Z
1Z0Z0Z0ZK
a b c d e f g h
Figure 2.3: The state of the world is
c2
may be identified as Ach = AW [ AB.
Certainly there exist many other formulations AX , AY , . . . 2 A(Cch), which con-
tain di↵erent sets of possible actions (for example, chess variants like “suicide chess”
and “knight relay chess”). These would be distinct variants on the game of chess,
which use the same board and pieces as classical chess (i.e., the same Cch), but which
utilize di↵erent rules. The set of all possible sets of valid actions (i.e., the set of all
variants of chess), AW , AB, AX , AY , . . ., given an 8 ⇥ 8 board and the standard set
of pieces, is denoted A(Cch).
2.2.3 Hierarchy of Decision-Making Procedures
Next, it will be necessary to construct a hierarchy of decision-making procedures. Let
us begin by defining formally what a “decision-making procedure” is. A decision-
making procedure is simply a mechanism for deciding among alternative choices.
For example, the set {hc0, S0i , hc1, S1i , hc2, S2i} represents one possible decision-
making procedure, where c0 6= c1 6= c2 if S0 6= S1 6= S2. This set may be interpreted
as extensionally equivalent to the conditional imperative: “If the state of the world
is ci, then choose the action represented by hci, Sii for i 2 {0, 1, 2}.” Note that this
representation abstracts away the psychological mechanisms which go into the pro-
duction of the choice. The psychological aspect of decision-making will be captured
by the assignment of decision costs below (Definition 2.2.12). For present purposes,
let any decision-making procedure be identified by its inputs and outputs.
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In the simplest case, decision-making procedures output sets of actions (e.g., if
S0, S1, S2 2 A 2 A(C) in the example immediately above). However, decision-making
procedures can also have a nested structure. In treating the decision how to decide,
the decision-maker employs a second order decision-making procedure. The output
of the second order decision-making procedure is not an action, but rather a first
order decision-making procedure.
To account for these higher order decision-making procedures, let us construct
a hierarchy of decision-making procedures inductively, beginning with the base case
of decision-making procedures which output sets of actions only (call the set L0).
Let us then define L1 decision-making procedures, which select either actions or L0
decision-making procedures as its outputs; and L2 decision-making procedures, which
select actions, L0 decision-making procedures, or L1 decision-making procedures
as its outputs; and so forth. The set of decision-making procedures Li may be
thusly defined for any arbitrarily large i, such that the output of any decision-making
procedure in Li may be any member of Lj, such that 0  j < i.
For convenience, I first define two “conversion functions.” These are simply
technical tools which will be used in the construction of the hierarchy.
Definition 2.2.4 (Conversion Function I).
a. Given any set of possible conditions C, for any A 2 A(C), and any action
a = hc, Si 2 A,37 let  (hc, Si) = hc, hc, Sii.
b. And for any set of actions y ✓ A 2 A, let the “first conversion function” be
defined by h0(y) =
S
x2y{ (x)}.
The first conversion function inputs a set of possible actions y and outputs a set,
such that for all x 2 y the output of h0(y) is the union of all { (x)}. For example:
h0({hc0, S0i , hc1, S1i , hc2, S2i}) = {hc0, hc0, S0ii , hc1, hc1, S1ii , hc2, hc2, S2ii}
Definition 2.2.5 (Conversion Function II).
a. For any function f and any object x, let ⌧(hf, xi) = {hx, hf, xii | x 2 Dom(f)}.
b. And for any set of ordered pairs y, such that the first member of every member
of y is a function, let the “second conversion function” be defined by h1(y) =S
z2y ⌧(z).
37Definition 2.2.3 guarantees that there will exist some set S, for which hc, Si 2 A, for all c 2 C
and A 2 A(C).
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The second conversion function inputs a set of ordered pairs, the first member of
each being a function. It outputs a set of ordered pairs, such that every element in
the domain of every function maps to that function. For example, if X = {hf, ii ,
hf 0, ji}, and f = {hc0, S0i , hc1, S1i} and f 0 = {hc2, S2i , hc3, S3i}, then:
h1(X) = {hc0, hf, iii , hc1, hf, iii , hc2, hf 0, jii , hc3, hf 0, jii}
Definition 2.2.6 (Hierarchy of Decision-Making Procedures). Given a set of possible
actions A 2 A(C) and indices j 2 Ord, and index set I, the set of decision-making
procedures is defined hierarchically by the formula:
Lj(A) =
[
gk2G(x)
((P(Img(gk)) \ {?})⇥ I)
Where x is given by: x =
(
h0(A)/ ⇠ if j = 0⇣S
k<j h1(L
k(A)) [ h0(A)
⌘
/ ⇠ if j   1
The foregoing definition describes the sets of decision-making procedures, given
some C and A 2 A(C). The sets are defined cumulatively. To simplify notation,
I will omit the argument when it is clear from context. I.e., pLjq refers to Lj(A)
when A is understood from context. In the base case, L0 is defined as the set of all
decision-making procedures which output actions and only actions.
Next, L1 is the set of decision-making procedures which output either actions or
members of L0. These are represented as sets, outputting either actions, or members
of L0, again with the restriction that every antecedent condition (triggering either
actions or subordinate decision-making procedures from L0) must be unique in each
L1 decision-making procedure.
For example, where a0, a1 2 A 2 A and y0, y1 2 L0, one possible decision-
making procedure in L1 is x = h{hc0, a0i , hc1, a1i , hc2, y0i , hc3, y1i}, 0i 2 L1. The
interpretation is straightforward. If a decision-maker were to employ decision-making
procedure x, given some state of the world ck, then in case k 2 {0, 1}, he will
choose action ak. And in case k 2 {2, 3}, then if yk = hS, ji there will exist some
hck, ani 2 S, and he will choose action an. Otherwise, x is undefined for conditions
where k 62 {0, 1, 2, 3}.
The second element of every decision-making procedure is simply an identifying
marker, which allows multiple extensionally equivalent decision-making procedures
to be defined within a model.
Continuing on inductively, Lj may be defined for any arbitrarily large j 2 Ord .
Any ordered pair hf, ii is a “decision-making procedure” i↵ there exists some Ln such
that hf, ii 2 Ln. Let L(A) refer to the set of all decision-making procedures.
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Definition 2.2.7 (Set of All Decision-Making Procedures). Given some A 2 A(C),
let the set of all decision-making procedures L(A) =
S
i2Ord L
i(A).
Lemma 2.2.0.1 (Inclusion). For any A 2 A(C) indices i, j 2 Ord, and index set K,
such that i  j, Li(A) ✓ Lj(A).
Proof. First observe the general proposition that for any sets S0 and S1, if S0 ✓ S1
then for every choice function g 2 G(S0/ ⇠) there will exist some corresponding
g0 2 G(S1/ ⇠) such that Img(g) ✓ Img(g0) (this follows trivially from Definition
2.2.2). And it follows that:[
gi2G(S0/⇠)
(P(Img(gi) \ {?})⇥K) ✓
[
gj2G(S1/⇠)
(P(Img(gj) \ {?})⇥K) (2.1)
Let S0 and S1 be defined by:
S0 =
(
h0(A) if i = 0 S
k<i h1(L
k(A)) [ h0(A)
 
if i   1
S1 =
(
h0(A) if j = 0⇣S
k<j h1(L
k(A)) [ h0(A)
⌘
if j   1
Thus, if S0 ✓ S1, then it follows that Li ✓ Lj for all i  j (Definition 2.2.6). And it
follows immediately from i  j that S0 2 S1. Therefore, Li ✓ Lj.
Definition 2.2.8 (Transformation Function). Let the function T : {Li | i 2 Ord}!
{Li | i 2 Ord} be defined by: T (Li) = Li+1.
The transformation function is helpful to proving the existence of fixed points in
the results below.
Abbreviation 2.2.8.1. For any index i 2 I, any A 2 A(C), and any decision-
making procedure hf, ii 2 L(A), let pfiq be an alternative name for hf, ii.
Theorem 2.2.1 (Fixed Point). Given some A 2 A(C), the transformation function
T has a fixed point in L(A). That is, 9n (T (Ln) = Ln).
Proof. Lemma 2.2.0.1 establishes that for any i, j 2 Ord , if i  j then Li ✓ Lj.
Observe further that it is the case that T (Li) ✓ T (Lj) (again, assuming i  j)
(Definitions 2.2.6, 2.2.8, Lemma 2.2.0.1). Ergo, T is monotonic. And therefore, the
existence of a fixed point follows directly from the Knaster-Tarski theorem.
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Definition 2.2.9 (Rank). Given any set of possible conditions C and some A 2 A(C),
let   = {hfi, ni | 8x (fi 2 Ln ^ (x < n =) fi 62 Lx))}.
The “rank” of a decision-making procedure is simply the lowest level of the hierar-
chy defined by Definition 2.2.6 of which that decision-making procedure is a member.
In other words, if  (fn) = m, then fn 2 Lm and fn 62 Lk for all k < m. In words,
let us thus refer to fn as being “of rank m + 1” or “(m+ 1)
th order” i↵  (fn) = m.
For example, a decision-making procedure which outputs actions and only actions is
a member of L0, which means it is “first order,” or “of rank 1.”
2.2.4 Meta-Utility
Definition 2.2.10 (Simple Utility). For any set of possible conditions C, let U(C) =
C! [0, 1] denote the function space of “simple utility functions” u0, u1, . . . 2 U(C).
A simple utility function simply assigns some real number in the interval [0, 1] to
each state of the world.
Definition 2.2.11 (Simple Expected Utility Functions). Given any set of possible
conditions C and any A 2 A(C), let the function EU : (A⇥ U)! R be defined by:
EU(hc, Si , u) =
X
hr,ci2S
ru(c)
Definition 2.2.12 (Decision Cost Assignments). Given any set of possible conditions
C, some index set I, and any A 2 A(C), let D(C, A) = Si2I ((C⇥ {fj | fj 2 L ^
 (fj) = i})! [0, 2i+1]) denote the function space of “decision cost assignments”
d0, d1, . . . 2 D(C, A).
A decision cost assignment is a function which assigns each decision-making pro-
cedure a numerical value signifying its cost. Importantly, the value assigned to a
decision-making procedure is limited by the procedure’s rank. For example, a first
order decision-making procedure can have a decision cost in the interval [0, 2]. A sec-
ond order decision-making procedure can have a decision cost in the interval [0, 4].
And for any fn such that  (fn) = m, the decision cost can be in the range [0, 2m].
The reason why, for any decision-making procedure fi, the maximum assignable
value of d(c, fi) increases as  (fi) increases is to allow decision costs to reorder
potential behavior completely at each level in the hierarchy. Consider the maximum
conceivable impact decision costs can have on decision-making. The most dramatic
e↵ect would be to reverse a decision-maker’s behavior, so that he behaved as if his
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most preferred state of the world were his least preferred state of the world. Thus,
if in some model, u(cn) = 0 and u(cm) = 1, then in the extremum case, decision
assignment would have to be capable of reordering his behavior so that he behaved
as if u(cn) > u(cm).
Definition 2.2.13 (Model). Given any set of possible conditions C, let M(C) =
{hA, u, di | A 2 A(C) ^ u 2 U(C) ^ d 2 D(C, A)} denote the set of all models
M0,M1, . . . 2M(C).
A model represents all the relevant variables in the structure of decision-making,
given a set of possible states of the world: the set of all possible actions, a utility
function, and a decision cost assignment.
Definition 2.2.14 (Meta-Utility Functions). Given any set of possible conditions
C, let ⇡(c) 2 [0, 1] represent the probability that some c 2 C occurs.38 Next let Q
be the set of all ordered triples hci, fj,Mki, such that Mk = hA, u, di 2 M(C) and
fj = hf, ji 2 L(A) and ci 2 Dom(f). More formally:
Q = {hci, fj,Mki | 9A, u, d (Mk = hA, u, di 2M(C) ^ fj 2 L(A) ^ ci 2 Dom(f))}
And let “meta-utility functions” µ : Q! R be defined by:
µ(c, fn,M) =
(
⇡(c) (EU(f(c), u)  d(c, fn)) if f(c) 2 A
µ(c, f(c),M)  ⇡(c)d(c, fn) if f(c) 62 A
Intuitively, the meta-utility function µ(c, fn,M) returns something like expected
utility. It is the “expected utility” of using a particular decision-making procedure
fn, given some state of the world c 2 C in some model M 2 M(C). For first
order decision-procedures, this reduces to the simple expected utility of choosing the
action determined by fn less the decision cost of fn, all discounted by the probability
that c obtains. For higher order decision-making, the calculation is essentially the
same, except that each higher order decision-making procedure imposes an additional
expected decision cost.
Definition 2.2.15 (Procedure Utility). Given any set of possible conditions C, let
the “procedure utility” function ⇢ : {hfi,Mji | 9A, u, d (hA, u, di =Mj 2M(C) ^ fi 2
L(A))}! R, be defined by:
⇢(fn,M) =
X
ci2Dom(f)
µ(ci, fn,M)
38Note that
P
x2C ⇡(x) = 1.
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The “procedure utility” of a decision-making procedure fn is the sum of the
meta-utility values f(c) for every element c in the domain of f . Intuitively, it is the
expected meta-utility of the decision-making procedure for every condition in which
it could be deployed.
Definition 2.2.16 (Global Decision-Making Procedures). Given any set of possible
conditions C, any set of possible actions A 2 A(C), and any set of procedures S,
let   : P(L(A)) ! P(L(A)) return the subset of S, such that the domain of every
decision-making procedure is equal to C. More formally:  (S) = {fi 2 S | Dom(f) =
C}.
Intuitively, a “global decision-making procedure” is a decision-making procedure
which is defined for every possible state of the world. Global decision-making proce-
dures are significant, because they can represent not only a method of determining
a choice, but a decision-maker’s behavior in toto.
Definition 2.2.17 (S-Rational Procedures). Given any set of possible conditions C,
and any model M = hA, u, di 2M(C), and any set of decision-making procedures S,
let R : (P(L(A))⇥M)! P(L(A)) return the subset of  (S), defined by:
R(S,M) = {fi | 8fj (fi 2  (S) ^ (fj 2  (S) =) (⇢(fi,M)   ⇢(fj,M))))}
Intuitively, R(Ln,M) returns the set of decision-making procedures in Ln such
that every member of R(Ln,M) returns a procedure utility value greater than or
equal to any other global decision-making procedure in Ln. That is, R(Ln,M) is the
set of “Ln-rational decision-making procedures.”
Theorem 2.2.2 (Ratcheting). For any M = hA, u, di 2 M(C) and fi 2  (Lk(A))
and f 0j 2 R(Ll(A),M) such that k  l, it must be the case that ⇢(fi,M)  ⇢(f 0j,M).
Proof. Suppose for reductio that ⇢(fi,M) > ⇢(f 0j,M). Because k  l, it follows from
Lemma 2.2.0.1 that Lk ✓ Ll, and therefore that fi 2 Ll. Now if ⇢(fi,M) > ⇢(f 0j,M),
then this contradicts the assumption that f 0j 2 R(Ll,M) (Definitions 2.2.15, 2.2.17).
Thus, it cannot be the case that ⇢(fi,M) > ⇢(f 0j,M), and therefore it must be
the case that ⇢(fi,M)  ⇢(f 0j,M).
The ratcheting theorem implies that the procedure utility of any Li-rational pro-
cedure must be greater than of equal to the procedure utility of any Lj-rational
procedure if i > j. In other words, the procedure utility of Li-rational procedures
cannot decrease as i increases.
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Corollary 2.2.2.1 (Boundedness). For any M = hA, u, di 2 M(C), any index n,
and any fi 2 R(Ln,M), the procedure utility of fi must be bounded, such that  2 
⇢(fi,M)  1.
Proof. Let us first prove the upper bound ⇢(fi,M)  1, for all fi 2 Ln(A) and
M 2 M(C). Consider any a = hc, Si 2 A 2 A(C). Since Phr,ci2S r  1 (Definition
2.2.3), and u(c)  1 for all c 2 C (Definition 2.2.10), it follows that EU(a, u)  1
for all u 2 U (Definition 2.2.11). Because the only positive term in the construction
of µ(c, fi,M) is EU(a, u) (Definition 2.2.14), and
P
cj2C ⇡(cj)  1, it follows that
⇢(fi,M) 
P
cj2Dom(f) ⇡(cj)EU(✓(cj, f(cj)), u)  1 (Definition 2.2.15).
To prove the lower bound  2  ⇢(fi,M), let us start with first order pro-
cedures and generalize inductively. Observe that for any fi 2 R(L0(A),M), for
every a 2 Img(fi), EU(a, u)   0 (Definition 2.2.10, 2.2.11), and its decision as-
signment is bounded d(c, fi)  2 because  (fi) = 0 (Definition 2.2.12). Thus, in
the extremum case that d(c, fi) = 2 and EU(f(c), u) = 0, the meta-utility will be
bounded EU(f(c), u)   d(c, fi)    2 . Therefore, since
P
cj2Dom(f) ⇡(cj)  1, it
follows that  2  Pcj2Dom(f) ⇡(cj)(EU(f(cj), u)   d(cj, fi)) = ⇢(fi,M) (Definition
2.2.15). Now, having established that for any fi 2 R(L0(A),M) the procedure util-
ity ⇢(fi,M)    2, it follows from Theorem 2.2.2 that for any arbitrarily large k, if
fi 2 R(Lk,M) then  2  ⇢(fi,M).
Definition 2.2.18 (Behavior Function). Given any set of possible conditions C, let
the set of “behavior functions” B : A(C)! h0(
S
A(C)) be defined by:
B(A) =
[
gi2G(A/⇠)
{Img(gi)}
Denote particular behavior functions using lowercase b0, b1, . . . 2 B. A behav-
ior function simply maps states of the world to actions, representing the potential
behavior of a decision-maker.
Definition 2.2.19 (Reduction Function). For any c 2 C and any set of possible
actions A 2 A(C), let the “reduction function,” ✓ : C⇥L(A)! P(A), be defined by:
✓(c, fn) =
(
f(c) if f(c) 2 A
✓(c, f(c)) if f(c) 62 A
The reduction function returns the action determined by a decision-making pro-
cedure given some state of the world. For first order decision-making procedures, the
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output is trivial. However, for higher order decision-making procedures, the e↵ect of
the reduction function is to unnest the hierarchy of decision-making procedures to
output an action. For example, if the state of the world is c0, and decision-making
procedure f0 determines that when c0 obtains, a decision-maker should use decision-
making procedure f 00; and decision-making procedure f
0
0 determines that when c0
obtains, a decision-maker should use decision-making procedure f 000 ; and decision-
making procedure f 000 determines that when c0 obtains, a decision-maker should do
a0, then the “reduction” of f0 is that ultimately the decision-maker should do a0.
More formally: suppose that f0 = hf, 0i 2 L2(A). And suppose f(c0) = f 00. And
suppose that f 0(c0) = f 000 . And suppose that f
00(c0) = a0 2 A. It follows from the
definition of the reduction function therefore that, ✓(c0, f0) = a0.
Definition 2.2.20 (Decomposition Function). Given any set of possible conditions
C, and any set of possible actions A 2 A(C), let the “decomposition function,”   :
L(A)! P(h0(A)), be defined by:
 (fn) =
[
ci2Dom(f)
{✓(ci, fn)}
The decomposition function gives the set of all conditional behaviors determined
by a given decision-making procedure. In other words, it “collapses” any ith or-
der decision-making procedure into a behavior function. For example, the decision-
making procedure x = h{hc0, h{hc0, h{hc0, a0i , hc1, a1i}, 0ii , hc2, a2i}, 0ii , hc3, a3i}, 0i
may be decomposed  (x) = {a0, a3}.
Definition 2.2.21 (Meta-Rational Procedure). Given any set of possible conditions
C and some model M 2 M(C), where LF (A) is the least fixed point of T , let a
“meta-rational procedure” in M be any fi such that fi 2 R(LF ,M).
Let us signify that some fm is a meta-rational choice procedure in model M with
the superscript notation pfM⇤m q. And let us say that fM⇤m “models” b 2 B(A) i↵
 (fM⇤m ) = b.
Theorem 2.2.3 (Finiteness of Meta-Rational Meta-Utility Values). Given any set
of possible conditions C, and any c 2 C and any M 2M(C), and any meta-rational
procedure fM⇤i , the meta-utility of every decision is bounded  2  µ(c, fM⇤i ,M)  1.
Proof. This follows directly from Definition 2.2.21 and Corollary 2.2.2.1.
Theorem 2.2.4 (Representability). Given any set of possible conditions C, any
A 2 A(C), any behavior function b 2 B(A), and any index j 2 N, there exists an fn,
such that  (fn) = b and  (fn) = j and |Img(f)| > 1.
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Proof. First, observe that for any choice function g, it must be the case that g 2
G(h0(A)/ ⇠) i↵ Img(g) 2 B(A) (Definition 2.2.18). Next, note that for any x, it
must be the case that x 2 P(x); therefore, a fortiori, for any choice function g, it
must be the case that Img(g) 2 P(Img(g)). Consequently, for any function g, and
any index i 2 I, it must be the case that g 2 G(h0(A)/ ⇠) i↵ hImg(g), ii 2 L0(A)
(Definition 2.2.6). And by transitivity, b 2 B(A) i↵ hb, ii 2 L0(A). And it follows
from Definition 2.2.20 therefore that for any b 2 B(A), there exists some f0 2 L0(A),
such that  (f0) = b.
Next, if |C| > 1 and there exists some f 00, such that  (f 00) = k and  (f 00) = b,
then there must exist functions f 000 and f
000
0 , such that  (f
00
0 ) = k or  (f
000
0 ) = k, and
f 00 [ f 000 = f 0. Note that  (f 000 ) [  (f 0000 ) =  (f 00) (Definition 2.2.20). Now, define
f †0 = h{(Dom(f 00)⇥ {f 000 }) [ (Dom(f 000)⇥ {f 0000 })}, 0i. Since  (f 000 ) = k or  (f 0000 ) = k,
it must be the case that  (f †0) = k + 1 (Definition 2.2.6). And b =  (f
0
0) =  (f
00
0 ) [
 (f 0000 ) =  (f
†
0) (Definition 2.2.20). And by construction,
  Img(f †)   = 2 (trivially, this
value can be extended to any x > |C| by analogous construction).
Now, since we have already established that there exists an f0, such that  (f0) = 0
and  (f0) = b for each b 2 B, and since we have also established that if there exists
an f 00, such that  (f
0
0) = k and  (f
0
0) = b, then there must exist an f
†
0 , such that
 (f †0) = k + 1 and  (f
†
0) = b, it follows by induction that for any j there exists an
f ††0 , such that  (f
††
0 ) = b and  (f
††
0 ) = j. Note that the identifier index is irrelevant
for present purposes.39
Theorem 2.2.5 (Existence of a Meta-Rational Representation). Given any set of
possible conditions C, any A 2 A(C), and any behavior function b 2 B(A), there exist
infinitely many models M = hA, u, di 2M(C), for which there exists some fM⇤n , such
that  (fM⇤n ) = b.
Proof. Theorem 2.2.1 establishes the existence of a fixed point, LF . Theorem 2.2.4
establishes that for any b 2 B, there must exist some fm 2 L, such that  (fm) = b.
What remains is to show that fm is a meta-rational procedure for some M 2M.
This can be demonstrated trivially with an ad hoc construction. Let u be any
member of U(C). We will want to define a decision cost assignment dm, such that
fm 2 R(LF ,M =
⌦
A, u, dm
↵
). First take any arbitrary decision cost assignment
dm 2 D(C, A). Now, define dm by:
dm(c, f
0
i) =
8><>:
dm(c, f 0i) if  (f
0
i) <  (fn)
2 (f
0
i)+1 if  (f 0i)    (fn) and f 0i 6= fn
0 if  (f 0i)    (fn) and f 0i = fn
39For any fi and fj ,  (fi) =  (fj).
2.3. INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATIONS 45
Observe that dm 2 D(C, A) if dm 2 D(C, A) (Definition 2.2.12). Also, it must be
the case that fn 2 R(L (fn),M) by construction. And now, because every decision-
making procedure f 00j 6= fn such that  (f 00j )    (fn) is assigned maximum costs,
i.e., 2 (f
00
j )+1, it must have a procedure utility less than fn; and the greatest meta-
utility value of any decision-making procedure f 000k such that  (f
000
k ) <  (fn) would
be
P (fn)
l=1 2
l < 2 (fn)+1. Therefore it must be the case that fn 2 R(LF ,M).
2.3 Interpretation and Implications
2.3.1 Informal Restatement
It is worth restating the foregoing formal model and its results in words. The concept
of “global decision-making procedures” is the most intuitive starting point from which
to access the theory. A decision-making procedure is “global” if it accounts for all
the decisions that an individual might encounter, specifying the choices he would
make in each circumstance.40
Imagine an exceedingly meticulous decision-maker planning for contingencies.
Determined that he should never face a decision for which he is unprepared, let us
suppose he maps out a plan of action for every conceivable state of the world. He
will do x0 if he encounters state of the world c0; he will do x1 if he encounters state
of the world c1; and so forth, for every possible state of the world. The conjunction
of all the potential plans he would select form a “grand plan of action.” That grand
plan of action is a global decision-making procedure. It is “global” because it ac-
counts for every possible contingency. Note that a global decision-making procedure
perfectly represents an individual’s potential future behavior.41 Also note that I am
not claiming that any real individual could (much less does) formulate such a grand
plan of action—the hypothetical is meant to be illustrative.
Now let us consider what kinds of things an xi in the schema “if ci then do xi”
could be. In the meticulous decision-maker’s grand plan of action, xi could simply
be to do some action; but in other cases, xi may be a subordinate plan for selecting
an action, and in other cases still, a subordinate plan for selecting a subordinate plan
for selecting an action.
For example, the meticulous decision-maker could adopt the general rule: that
if he is feeling lethargic and sees a nearby co↵ee shop, then he will purchase a ca↵e`
40This is characterized formally in Definition 2.2.16, supra.
41By “perfect,” I mean that it predicts his behavior without error, so long as he does not deviate
from the plan. Of course, if he does deviate from the plan, then we would not call the plan a valid
representation.
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macchiato. Of course, his plan could be more nuanced. He could make it a rule that
he will order a cappuccino if it is earlier than 10:00 a.m., and a macchiato otherwise;
or he could order a ca↵e` americano if he is in a contemplative mood, and a macchiato
if he is in a whimsical spirit. And of course the triggering conditions need not be
stated in general terms. In other words, it need not be a rule. His plan could be a
particularized enumeration of actions: ordering a macchiato at 3:23 p.m. on July 10,
2018; a ca↵e` corretto at 7:32 p.m. on July 11, 2018; and so forth, for every future
co↵ee purchase he will make in his life.
However, a decision-making procedure need not directly prescribe any particular
action at all. Decision-making procedures can boot the decision to another sub-
ordinate decision-making procedure. For example, the meticulous decision-maker’s
plan of action might prescribe: that if he is feeling lethargic, then he should locate
the nearest co↵ee shop, determine what the most popular beverage happens to be
at that establishment, and order whatever that is. The action is not fixed in this
case. Rather, it is the outcome of another subordinate plan. And of course, the
subordinate plan could boot the problem to a more subordinate plan.
Now, there are two objectives for the meta-model. It must first establish that
for any set of potential actions which a decision-maker would perform, it is possi-
ble to construct some global decision-making procedure which prescribes all those
potential actions and only those potential actions (or boots the decision to subordi-
nate decision-making procedures which prescribe all those potential actions and only
those potential actions). Second, the theory must establish that there exists some
model, which characterizes that representative global decision-making procedure as
some sort of utility-maximization.
In order to see how the meta-model accomplishes this, we need to specify the
meaning of “meta-utility” and “model.” Let us start with meta-utility. The meta-
utility of a decision is simply the expected utility of a selected action, less the aggre-
gate expected decision costs associated with selecting that choice. It is important to
recognize that meta-utility values are downward looking in the hierarchy. An nth or-
der decision-making procedure must cash out in some (n 1)th order decision-making
procedure, which must cash out in some (n  2)th order decision-making procedure,
and so forth until an action is selected by some first order decision-making proce-
dure. The meta-utility of the nth order procedure includes the expected utility of the
action and the expected decision costs of every (m  n)th order procedure. But the
meta-utility of the (n+ 1)th order decision-making procedure which selected the nth
order decision-making procedure is not included in the meta-utility of the nth order
procedure.
Let us consider this in terms of our meticulous decision-maker’s plan of action.
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Suppose he is lapsing toward a torpid state, and he believes that a co↵ee would
revive him. He can select from among infinitely many plans—he might seek out the
nearest co↵ee shop and order whatever is most popular there; he might seek out a
particular familiar co↵ee shop and order his favorite beverage; he might weigh the
purchase of co↵ee against taking a nap; or he might undertake a rational deliberation
to determine the optimal action.
Suppose he chooses to drink a macchiato at the nearest co↵ee shop. The meta-
utility of his “lethargy plan” is the expected utility of consuming the macchiato, less
the expected decision cost of the lethargy plan, less the expected decision costs of
all the subordinate plans of action which led to the consumption of the macchiato.
Since the meta-utility is always downward looking in the hierarchy, this does not
include the meta-utility of the “grand plan” which selected the “lethargy plan.”
The principal contention of the meta-rational theory is that individuals are meta-
utility maximizers. Of course, this raises the question: meta-utility-maximization at
what order of decision-making? Since decision-makers must decide how to decide
how to decide, etc., meta-utility values would seem to decrease as order increases, as
ever more decision costs are heaped on at each additional order of decision-making,
with no stopping point. This is the infinite regress problem described above.
Theorem 2.2.1 establishes that there exists a least fixed point in the infinite hierar-
chy of decision-making—a point at which the hierarchy reaches a limit. There being
no principled finite stopping point to the chain of questions—how the decision-maker
decides to decide to decide, etc.—the theory identifies “meta-rational procedures” as
those which maximize meta-utility irrespective of order. The existence of the fixed
point establishes that there exists a determinate (albeit infinitely large) set of possible
decision-making procedures, from which the decision-maker may select a maximiz-
ing alternative. A “meta-rational procedure”—i.e., the best grand plan of action—is
whatever global decision-making procedure returns the greatest meta-utility value
when the hierarchy is extended to the fixed point. In other words, it is a global
decision-making procedure in the fixed point (which includes all orders of decision-
making below the fixed point), which maximizes meta-utility. Note that this need
not be a decision-making procedure at the highest order of decision-making. It could
be some first order decision-making procedure. It is whatever global decision-making
procedure at any order of decision-making maximizes meta-utility.
Implicitly, the construction operates as if the decision-maker were choosing both
the optimal decision-making procedure and the optimal order of decision-making. It
endogenizes the question what order of decision-making from which the meticulous
decision-maker should choose his grand plan of action.
The conceit is that the meticulous decision-maker, when adopting a grand plan
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of action, surveys the vast realm of all possible plans, and adopts whichever global
decision-making procedure returns the greatest meta-utility value. All of the subor-
dinate plans he chooses are implicit in the grand plan. The meta-utility maximizing
grand plan could be some deeply nested decision-making procedure; or it could be
a first order decision-making procedure. The point is that whatever grand plan the
meticulous decision-maker adopts, it is the meta-rational plan.
Yet the persistent skeptic will object that if the meticulous decision-maker chooses
the meta-utility maximizing grand plan, then this implies that he is employing a
rational deliberation at some even higher order of decision-making. This is a mistaken
interpretation of the “grand plan.” It is technically mistaken, because the meta-
rational procedure was determined at a fixed point. There can be no “grander plan”
which selects the “grand plan,” or else the “grander plan” would have been the “grand
plan” selected from all the plans in the fixed point. It is conceptually mistaken,
because the decision-maker does not choose the meta-rational procedure—he is the
meta-rational procedure. It cannot be turtles all the way down. A hierarchy of plans
selecting plans selecting plans, etc., cannot describe which plan is ultimately chosen.
At the fundament, there must be a root decision-making procedure which determines
which plans are in fact adopted.
Note that the meta-utility-maximization does not imply that the decision-maker
has employed a rational deliberation. His behavior can be rational without his hav-
ing undertaken a rational deliberation. Indeed, the idempotent hierarchy problem
guarantees that he is not adopting rational deliberation at the fundamental level.
Rather, the theory claims that meta-rationality is a property of whatever grand plan
he adopts. The grand plan need not be—nor would ever realistically be—to delib-
erate rationally. The grand plan is not to do a maximization, but rather has the
property of being maximizing, whatever it prescribes the decision-maker do.
This is a subtle but important point. A grand plan of action is not really so
“grand,” if it is still subordinate to some more fundamental plan of action. If decision-
makers are ever to act, there must be a starting point, at which the decision-maker’s
behavior is not chosen but simply done. It is important to recognize that this ob-
servation is not the same as positing an ad hoc starting point. The theory only
claims that there must be a starting point—some procedure which is not chosen, but
which simply is what the decision-maker does. No specific procedure—certainly not
rational deliberation—is assumed in the meta-model.
Finally, the numerical values representing the decision-maker’s expected utility
and decision costs are models. Because any values can be assigned, infinitely many
models can be constructed, representing states of the world, utilities, and decision
costs. Some models may lack su cient expressive capability to describe the decisions
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he faces—these would be defective models because they fail to represent decision
problems ab initio. Other models may fail to determine a meta-rational procedure,
because no meta-utility suprema exist in the set of all decision-making procedures
(i.e., the least fixed point). Other models may specify meta-utility values, the maxi-
mizations of which fail to reflect the decision-maker’s behavior in fact—these would
be defective models because their meta-rational procedures di↵er from his actual
grand plan of action. Yet among the infinitude of possible models, it must be the
case that some models validly represent the meticulous decision-maker’s grand plan
as a meta-utility-maximizing global decision-making procedure. The existence of
such models is established in Theorem 2.2.5. Moreover, Corollary 2.2.2.1 establishes
that the meta-utility of that meta-rational procedure must be some finite value.
In other words, whatever the lethargic decision-maker chooses to do—whether
purchasing the house special at a nearby co↵ee shop, or taking a nap, or hopping on
one foot backwards to the post o ce—there exists a model which can describe that
behavior as consistent with a meta-utility-maximization. In other words, there is a
meta-rational grand plan of action, which prescribes he do precisely what he does in
fact.
Let us return finally to the hypothetical utility-maximizing robot leitmotif. The
theory here presented maintains the principal claim of bounded rationality: that
a meta-utility-maximizing robot can replicate all the potential choices of a human
being if given two initializing inputs: (i) a utility function, and (ii) a decision cost
assignment. Theorem 2.2.5 proves that for any set of potential behaviors, there must
always exist a set of inputs which would reproduce those potential choices in a meta-
utility-maximizing robot. The weak interpretation of the rational actor hypothesis
is thus proven true.
2.3.2 Implications
The theoretical payo↵s of the meta-rational conception are several. The most im-
portant payo↵ is that the meta-model solves the four problems identified in Section
2.1.3 above.
The infinite regress problem is solved, because the set of all decision-making
procedures constructed in Definition 2.2.6 represents a complete set containing every
conceivable decision-making procedure which could possibly represent a decision-
maker’s behavior (for a given model). Whatever set of potential behaviors describes
the decision-maker’s choices, that set will correspond with global decision-making
procedures in the fixed point, and there will exist models which characterize a subset
of those decision-making procedures as being meta-rational.
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The question giving rise to the infinite regress—why the decision-maker would
choose that decision-making procedure—is answered endogenously. Any decision-
making procedure of a higher order than the meta-rational procedure would also
have been an element of the set containing all conceivable decision-making proce-
dures. The meta-rational decision-making procedure cannot have been the output
of a higher decision-making procedure, or else that other decision-making procedure
would be the meta-rational procedure. Consequently, it cannot be the case that the
meta-rational procedure was “chosen,” and therefore the question why it was cho-
sen is rendered meaningless. Additionally, Corollary 2.2.2.1 neutralizes the threat of
infinite decision costs.
The idempotent hierarchy problem is solved, because decision-makers are not
represented as adopting rational deliberation at any order of decision-making greater
than the first order. Rational deliberation in the meta-model is simply one among
many possible decision-making procedures. The meta-rational theory only claims
that individuals would undertake a rational deliberation i↵ rational deliberation were
the meta-rational chocie. Of course, rational deliberation may not be meta-rational
(indeed, it cannot be in fact).
Meta-utility maximization is a property of meta-rational procedures. The claim
is not that decision-makers choose the meta-rational procedure. Rather, the claim
is that a model exists which represents the decision-maker’s behavior as optimal
with respect to meta-utility. This is a nuanced point, which should be distinguished
from the “as if” arguments often given for the weak interpretation of classical ra-
tionality. The meta-rational answer is more substantive. Once again, the meta-
rational decision-maker cannot have employed rational deliberation to choose the
meta-rational procedure, because the meta-rational procedure cannot have been the
output of any other decision-making procedure. The theory simply does not claim
that meta-rationality is the product of a rational deliberation. Therefore, there can
be no paradox.
The explanatory vacuousness of generalized expected utility theories is also solved,
because the meta-rational conception explicitly embeds maximization within the
framework of bounded rationality. Note that the meta-rational meta-model is a
species of generalized expected utility, because in any model of the meta-model, the
decision-maker’s behavior is characterized as maximizing something—specifically,
meta-utility (again, this should not be confused with the claim that the behavior is
to maximize).
And finally, the fragility of prior generalized expected utility theories is circum-
vented, because Theorem 2.2.5 will hold true for any set of possible behaviors. Critics
may complain that this “feature” of the meta-rational approach renders the meta-
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theory unfalsifiable and therefore unscientific. This grossly misunderstands the point.
Of course the meta-model is unfalsifiable. That is why it is a meta-model and not
simply a model. It is a model of models. It is a theory about how behaviors can be
represented. The results of the meta-model are entirely about the models definable
in it. And models are abstractions: there is nothing claimed at the meta-theoretical
level for empirical data to verify or falsify. It is not even clear what “falsifiability”
would mean for a meta-theory. Indeed, if falsifiability were taken as an acceptability
condition of meta-theories, then the scientific method (and indeed, the principle of
falsifiability itself) should likewise be regarded defective. It is worth noting addi-
tionally, to answer the misguided Popperian critique directly, that any of the models
definable in the meta-model would in principle be falsifiable.
In addition to resolving the four problems identified above, the meta-rational ap-
proach supplies further benefits still. Methodologically, the economic conventionalist
should be pleased that the meta-model grounds classical expected utility analysis.
Conventionalists have often justified the use of classical expected utility analysis as
“assuming away frictions.” However, this excuse—without saying anything more—
is question-begging. The experimental and empirical observations of behavioralists
suggest systematic e↵ects far more serious than mere “frictions.” They imply funda-
mentally di↵erent principles in human behavior than expected utility theory assumes.
For the justification to be persuasive, the “frictions” excuse requires a more robust
account than methodological conventionalists have heretofore provided.
The meta-rational meta-model provides foundation to the claim that apparently
non-rational behaviors are indeed the product of frictions. The support is not merely
that meta-rationality resembles classical rationality in form. Rather, it allows for
an explicit characterization of decision costs as “frictions.” If we “assume away
frictions,” as the conventionalists purport to do, then this would specify the set
of models with the decision cost assignment dn : (C⇥ L) ! {0}, assigning zero
decision costs to every decision-making procedure in L. Now observe that the meta-
rational procedure in any model containing dn would simply reduce to expected utility
maximization. In other words, expected utility theory simply is meta-rational choice
theory with a constant assignment of decision costs.42
Next, theorists of bounded rationality should be pleased that the meta-model
solves the infinite regress and idempotent hierarchy problems. These obstacles had
threatened to undermine the essential premises of bounded rationality. But more
than this, the meta-model can be used to justify the previously ad hoc assumption of
42The choice of zero is merely a way of matching the language of the “frictions” narrative. In
fact, any constant decision cost assignment would reduce a meta-rational model to an expected
utility model.
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second order rationality. Observe that all meta-rational models can be “flattened”
into a theory of second order decision-making (albeit with some loss of expressivity).
More precisely, a function   : {hc, fii | c 2 Dom(fi)^ fi 2 L(A)}! (h0(A)⇥ R) can
be constructed, defined by:  (c, fi) = hh0(✓(c, fi)), µ(c, fi,M)i, which collapses every
decision-making procedure in an infinite hierarchy of decision-making, along with its
corresponding meta-utility, into a set of first order decision-making procedures.
Of course, merely defining   is not su cient to establish a complete and consistent
theory of second-order bounded rationality. However, the remaining work is clearly
only a matter of working out the formal details. Consequently, the assumption
of costless second order rationality (with no higher orders of decision-making) can
be justified by mapping to any traditional two-layer theory of bounded rationality
from a meta-rational model. Since the meta-rational model does not make ad hoc
assumptions about the height of the hierarchy, the two-layer model can be interpreted
not be an arbitrary restriction, but rather as a simplification of the meta-rational
representation.
Third, theorists of alternative generalized expected utility theories should be
pleased that the meta-model can be used to bridge the gap between their theories
and bounded rationality. Alternative decision-making models may be subsumed
under the meta-rational theory as describing particular decision-making procedures,
which meta-rational individuals are “likely to choose” under specified conditions (for
example, conditions involving risk or uncertainty).
The meta-rational choice theory developed here is thus an ecumenical conception.
The only viewpoint which receives no succor is the menagerie of biases and heuristics,
which, as argued in Section 2.1.2, should not have been regarded plausible in the first
place.
2.3.3 Strong and Weak Interpretations of Meta-Rationality
Just as conventional conceptions of the rational actor admit both strong and weak
interpretations, so too will the meta-rational meta-model admit analogous “strong”
and “weak” interpretations.
The “weak” interpretation is simply that there always exists a meta-rational
procedure in some model, which represents a decision-maker’s behavior. The weak
interpretation of the meta-rational thesis is simply that there exist models under
which a meta-rational procedure is representative of behavior, and Theorem 2.2.5
establishes that the proposition must be true.
The “strong” interpretation takes utilities and decision costs as real phenomena,
and by implication implies that meta-utilities are also real. The strong interpretation
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of the meta-rational thesis is somewhat more appealing than the strong interpreta-
tion of expected utility theory for several reasons. First, its psychological claims
are more circumscribed. A meta-rational procedure can be any psychological pro-
cess whatever. The strong interpretation of meta-rationality does not specify how a
decision-maker decides, but merely asserts that however he does decide, that repre-
sentative decision-making procedure has the property of being meta-rational.
To appreciate the plausibility of the strong interpretation, consider its negation:
that decision-makers adopt decision-making procedures which do not maximize meta-
utility. If the negative claim were true, then that would mean for at least some deci-
sions, individuals adopt behaviors for which the aggregate decision costs—inclusive of
the global decision-making procedure’s decision cost—are greater than the aggregate
decision costs of some alternative which returns a greater meta-utility value.
But now consider why the decision-maker would choose some subordinate decision-
making procedure, for which a superior (with respect to meta-utility) alternative
existed. Suppose the representative decision-making procedure of a decision-maker
were fn. And suppose that the meta-rational procedure in the representative model
M 2 M were some f 0M⇤m , such that f 6= f 0. Let S0 = f \ f 0, and let S1 = f 0 \ f . It
must be the case that S0 6= ? 6= S1, because f 6= f 0.
Now consider why a decision-maker would use a decision-making procedure in
S0 rather than a corresponding procedure in S1. By assumption, the aggregate
meta-utilities of the decision-making procedures in S1 are greater than the aggregate
meta-utilities of the procedures in S0. Surely, the decision-maker would rather use the
choices in S1 if he were only aware that the choices in S1 were superior to the choices
in S0. After all, “utilities” are by definition measures of what the decision-maker
seeks to experience; and “decision costs” are measures of what the decision-maker
seeks to avoid. Thus is it plausible that the reason why he employs the choices in S0 is
that he is unaware that superior choices exist. He must be adopting fn, because the
choices in S1 are inaccessible to him. Of course, they are not absolutely inaccessible,
for a helpful advisor might draw the decision-maker’s attention to the existence of
better decision-making procedures (thereby drastically reducing the decision cost of
selecting them from a higher order of decision-making). They are inaccessible in the
same sense that an A. Lange und So¨hne chronograph is inaccessible to the average
person: their “prices” are prohibitively high.
In other words, discovery of the better choices in S1 imposes additional decision
costs—the decision cost assigned to f 0M⇤m —such that fn generates less aggregate
decision cost than f 0M⇤m . And the only principled answer to the question how much
less is that the di↵erence should be su cient to o↵set the reduction in meta-utility.
But if this were the case, then fn would be the meta-rational procedure—not f 0m—
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contradicting the assumption that fn is not the meta-rational procedure.
Whether the strong or weak interpretation should be accepted is a philosophical
question. I am inclined to believe the strong interpretation is plausible. Yet at a
minimum, under the meta-rational conception, the weak interpretation is assuredly
true; and the strong interpretation is at least more plausible than under conventional
conceptions of rationality.
2.3.4 Extensions
Suppose the strong interpretation of the meta-rational actor hypothesis were true.
The strong interpretation takes decision-making procedures, utilities, and decision
costs as real phenomena. If they are real, then it follows that for every decision-maker,
there exists some meta-rational decision-making procedure which is representative
of that decision-maker. It is natural therefore to wonder what the “true model” of
an individual might be.
The meta-model is too underdetermining to answer this question. Theorem 2.2.5
holds merely that some meta-rational procedure in some model will be extensionally
equivalent to the “true” model. It is an existence theorem. However, to operational-
izing the concept requires more than this—it requires a specification for identifying
what the “true” model might be.
The concern is more than merely academic. Theorem 2.2.5 assures logical co-
herence, but it is not predictive. It is little comfort to the scientist, seeking to
make predictions, that a predictive model must exist among a panoply of predictive
models. For any n observations of an individual’s behavior, the scientist desires a
model, which reliably predicts what the (n+ 1)th observation would be. Theorem
2.2.5 guarantees that whatever the (n+ 1)th observation turns out to be, there exists
a meta-rational model which would have predicted it. But this only pushes the prob-
lem back a step, for the question simply becomes whether it is possible to predict
which model will predict behavior. To say that some prediction is true in any state
of the world only begs the question: how to we predict which prediction will be the
true one?
As formulated in this article, the meta-model cannot determinatively answer this
question. However, it can be a helpful framework upon which to build a satisfactory
answer. Specifying which among the infinitude of behaviorally consistent models
will be predictive (i.e., which determines what the (n+ 1)th observation will be) is
clearly a valuable scientific objective. If the strong interpretation of the rational
actor hypothesis under the meta-rational conception is true, then this imposes one
constraint on the potentially valid representations. That the representative decision-
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making procedure is meta-rational in the representative model. Yet this is still
underdetermining. More criteria are needed.
Some plausible theoretical extensions to the meta-model are: (1) some constraint
on the range of decision cost assignments; (2) some constraint on the total number of
decision-making procedures chosen; and (3) some constraint on total decision costs.
Developing a rigorous extension along these lines would be a substantial undertaking,
which would greatly exceed the intended scope of this article. I o↵er only a sketch
of how such an extension might be realized.
The first constraint—on the range of decision cost assignments—reflects the in-
tuition that decision costs are unlikely to vary wildly when one decision-making
procedure is used over a domain of many similar states of the world. For example,
whatever decision-making procedure is used to choose whether to take the elevator
or the stairs on one day, that procedure is ceteris paribus unlikely to be vastly more
or less costly to employ when faced with a similar decision on some other day.
This of course requires a formal definition of the “similarity” relation. A possible
first step is to treat conditions not as primitives, but rather as sets of fact-claiming
propositions. By “fact-claiming” proposition, I mean to exclude tautological claims
like true mathematical propositions and true logical propositions. Let p0, p1, . . . rep-
resent fact-claiming propositions, and let P = {p0, p1, . . .} be the set of all fact-
claiming propositions. Now, “conditions” or “states of the world” may be defined as
any set of propositions such that 8pi, pj 2 P ((pi () ¬pj) =) (pi 2 c _ pj 2 c)).
A “triggering condition” for any decision-making procedure fi 2 L may be defined
as
T
Dom(f).43
The similarity relation  may now be defined so that p(ci, cj, ck)q is true i↵
|ci \ cj| > |ci \ ck|. In words, ci is more similar to cj than ck i↵ the set of propositions
which are true of both ci and cj has a greater cardinality than the set of propositions
which are true of both ci and ck.
The second constraint—on the total number of decision-making procedures im-
plicated by the representative global procedure—is motivated by a desire to avoid
ad hoc decision cost assignments, such that every decision is decided by a unique
decision-making procedure. It seems obvious that decision-makers do not have in
their repertoire of decision-making procedures a unique decision-making procedure
for every state of the world. Decision-making procedures tend to be general and
43It is worth noting that the extension which describes conditions as composed of propositions
allows the hierarchy to represent logical conditionals. Altering the domain of subordinate decision-
making procedures allows for expression of logical negation and logical disjunction. This is su cient
to support a propositional logic of decision-making. The hierarchy may thus be interpreted as a set
of logical propositions, prescribing actions given a set of contingent propositions.
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applicable over a range of possible conditions.
There are a number of ways this constraint could be modeled. For example,
consider two decision-making procedures fi and f 0j such that Dom(f) = Dom(f
0).
Assume the rank of both decision-making procedures is greater than 1. The set of
subordinate decision-making procedures in fi is given by Img(f), and the set of sub-
ordinate decision-making procedures in f 0j is given by Img(f
0). The constraint may be
expressed as a general tendency that if Img(f) > Img(f 0) then 8c (d(c, fi) > d(c, fi)).
In words, a higher order decision-making procedure which boots to a larger number
of subordinate procedures will tend to have a higher decision cost.
The third constraint—that total decision costs should be minimized—is based
upon the intuition that choices depend to some extent upon the conditions under
which they are decided. Very high decision costs have the capacity to overwhelm
the expected utility term in a meta-utility function, rendering it e↵ectively otiose.
However, decision-makers do seem in very many circumstances to be sensitive to the
expected utility of their choices. Therefore, for a given decision-making procedure fi,
the aggregate decision costs assigned, i.e.,
P
c2Dom(f) (µ(c, fi,M)  EU(c, ✓(c, fi))),
should not be greater than necessary.
Of course, it is clearly the case that decision costs can utterly overwhelm the
expected utility term in a meta-utility function. To illustrate, consider the cryp-
tocurrency Bitcoin. The value of a Bitcoin token is approximately $6,500 as of
November, 2018. The Bitcoin address holding the greatest number of tokens is
“3D2oetdNuZUqQHPJmcMDDHYoqkyNVsFk9r,”44 which has a balance of approx-
imately 140,000BTC, for a total fiat value of more than $900 million. Any individual
could, of course, simply transfer all the tokens to himself. And it is plausible that
individuals would tend derive quite a lot of utility from possessing $900 million. All
the thief would need is the “private key” associated with the address. However, dis-
covery of the private key is—in the language of complexity theory—an NP -Complete
problem. The decision cost is astronomically high. So high, in fact, that it is not
worth anyone’s e↵ort to attempt the task, despite the expected payo↵ of $900 million.
And increasing the payo↵s tenfold, a hundredfold, or a thousandfold are unlikely to
alter behavior, because the decision costs associated with hacking private keys are
so great that any meta-rational procedure will tend to select some “Don’t bother
hacking Bitcoin” heuristic. This, indeed, is the very point of cryptocurrencies. They
rely upon decision costs—rather than armed guards—to protect holdings.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suppose that few of the decisions that real indi-
viduals routinely face are comparable to hacking Bitcoin private keys. In most cases,
increasing or decreasing the expected payo↵s of outcomes will tend to influence the
44The address is the “cold wallet” of the cryptocurrency exchange, BitFinex.
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choices they would select.
The three constraints, taken together, could be used to determine which meta-
rational models are more or less likely to be predictive. One possible mechanism for
operationalizing the three proposed constraints would be to formulate a “fit” func-
tion, measuring the extent to which a given model violated the three constraints.
More specifically, the factors would be: (i) the variance of decision costs assigned to
a decision-making procedure, (ii) the number of subordinate decision-making pro-
cedures, and (iii) the total aggregate decision costs implicated by a representative
decision-making procedure. The fit function would return, for every model and meta-
rational procedure within that model, some quantitate value, representing the degree
of “fit” within the constraints. Increasing variance in the assignment of the decision
costs of a decision-making procedure over triggering conditions would decrease a
model’s “fit” value. Decreasing decision costs assigned to a decision-making proce-
dures, which rely on a greater number of subordinate procedures would decrease a
model’s “fit” value. And increasing total decision costs implicated by a meta-rational
procedure would decrease a model’s “fit” value. Of course, weights could be added
to emphasize the relative importance of the three constraints.
The maxima of the “fit” function would determine the models which are most
likely to be predictive. Such an approach may usefully operationalize the meta-
rational conception, identifying those models described by the meta-model, which
are most likely to be representative of real decision-making. Minimizing the role that
decision costs play in the formulation of meta-utility is therefore a facially plausible
theoretical presumption.
Of course, the most forcing constraints would require an empirical investigation
of actual human behavior, charting out the terrain of decision-making procedures
and decision costs. There is a limit to how far we can reason from first principles.
At some point, predicting behavior requires an investigation into how real people
behave in the real world.
It is important to observe that further extensions to the meta-model would not
require a program of research vastly di↵erent from what behavioral economists and
psychologists already do. The identification of common behavioral patterns—in par-
ticular non-rational behavioral patterns—is precisely the kind of terrain-mapping
which would lead to a more precise characterization of decision-making procedures
and decision costs. The meta-rational approach is not revolutionary. It merely im-
poses a theoretical structure on the work of behavioral researchers, resolving some
of the conceptual problems latent in the underlying assumptions.
Yet this article’s contribution is not wholly impotent, for it indicates some gaps
in the present state of the research. While the volume of research identifying various
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decision-making procedures continues to grow steadily, little attention has been given
to locating the ranks of decision-making procedures in the hierarchy. Neither has
there been much e↵ort directed at measuring decision costs, identifying the tipping
points at which rational deliberation becomes too costly, and alternative decision-
making procedures are chosen.
Concededly, “tipping point” tests may often be di cult to perform in the lab.
In principle, there are two straightforward mechanisms for measuring decision costs.
The first involves a manipulation of decision costs, posing approximately analogous
decision problems with equivalent payo↵s, increasing in complexity. Meta-rationality
suggests that as the di culty of the problem is increased, subjects will tend to aban-
don rational deliberation in favor of some less costly decision-making procedure. The
payo↵s of the decision problem can then be used to estimate a disutility curve in-
creasing in problem complexity, representing the decision cost assignment of rational
deliberation. The process can then be continued to induce further changes from
fine-grained heuristics to more coarse-grained heuristics, progressively sacrificing a
greater proportion of expected payo↵ for reductions in decision costs.
The basic strategy is attractive when stated in vague terms. However, it is di cult
to imagine how a rigorous experiment might be devised, which progressively increases
the decision cost of rational deliberation. Many assumptions would be required, and
designing a satisfactory experimental setup would be a non-trivial problem.
The second approach to determining a “tipping point” would be to vary payo↵s
to observe changes in decision-making procedures. The idea is that when decision-
makers are faced with outcomes, which diverge dramatically in payo↵s, avoiding the
cost of choosing an inferior action will tend to justify a greater investment in decision-
making. Thus, increasing payo↵s should, ceteris paribus, tend to cause individuals
to behave more rationally.
There have been few studies, pursuing the second strategy, presumably because
testing meaningfully increasing stakes would require more funding than experiments
with adequate sample sizes are able to access. The evidence thus far uncovered
has been inconclusive,45 and it is certainly insu cient for the purposes of quantify-
ing decision costs. Nevertheless, it is di cult to overestimate the inventiveness of
experimentalists, and it remains entirely possible that less obvious mechanisms for
measuring decision costs may yet be devised.
It is worth remarking that meta-rational models are not only descriptive. A
meta-rational procedure also prescribes how decision-makers should behave in the
presence of decision costs. In contexts where the relevant functions are known, the
45See, e.g., Diekmann, 2004, Smith and Walker, 1993, Fehr-Duda, Bruhin, Epper, and Schubert,
2010.
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normative implications can be extremely useful. Three obvious contexts in which
the normative analysis could prove fruitful are: the analysis of legal decision-making,
operations research, and machine decision-making.
Where a model is given, and if there exist meta-utility suprema in L, the iden-
tification of meta-rational procedures will determine how decision-makers ought to
behave. In the law, decision costs are helpfully monetized in the form of court costs.
The robust literature in the Law & Economics literature studying the second order
decision whether to employ “rules versus standards” analogizes well to the meta-
model.46 Further exploration, for example, might investigate what third order rule
should be used to determine what second order rule should be used to determine
whether a “rule” or a “standard” should be used.
However, a normative operationalization of meta-rational models would likely re-
quire substantial simplification in order to make it tractable. These simplifications
could be implicit in the models given. For example, in the context of legal decision-
making, there will exist minimum fixed costs of an adjudicative hearing. These
minimum fixed costs would e↵ectively truncate the infinitely large hierarchy of deci-
sions to some finite maximum order, above which higher orders of decision-making
could be ignored.
2.4 Conclusion
The meta-rational meta-model resolves several critical conceptual problems under-
mining the rational actor hypothesis. In particular, the infinite regress problem,
idempotent hierarchy problem, explanatory vacuousness of generalized expected util-
ity theories, and predictive fragility of generalized expected utility theories. In ad-
dition, it provides foundation to conventional expected utility analysis, second-order
models of bounded rationality, and psychological researches in heuristics.
The meta-model also provides theoretical support for the directions which be-
havioral researches have pursued over the past several decades, while suggesting re-
finements for future research, such as an increased focus on the study of hierarchical
order and decision costs.
The principal result is to establish that any set of potential behaviors can be
represented in some model as a meta-rational procedure. Individuals are necessar-
ily representable as “rational” actors. It suggests moreover the plausibility of the
stronger hypothesis: that individuals are not only representable as meta-rational,
but that they are in fact meta-rational.
46For example, see Kaplow, 1992.
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Chapter 3
Bounded Criminality
The vast majority of the Behavioral Law & Economics literature focuses on the
mitigation of cognitive biases and heuristics. Indeed, “debiasing” and “insulation”
are practically assumed to be sound policy goals, ipso facto, wherever biases and
heuristics may be found. Of course, no one disputes that self-interested rationality
is a valid normative model. The “revolutionary” claim of behavioral economics is
not that the rational actor hypothesis fails to describe how people ought to behave,
but rather that the rational actor hypothesis fails to describe how people do behave
in fact. Thus, the thinking goes, strategies to eliminate non-rational behavior will
close the gap between how people ought to act and how they do in fact act.
Undoubtedly, debiasing and insulating strategies do tend to e↵ect e ciency, as-
suming perfect competition. However, the vast majority of markets routinely su↵er
from one or more forms of market failure—negativing the assumption of perfect com-
petition. In such cases, we may want, as social engineers, to increase the gap between
privately optimal behavior and behaviors in fact. Where the private objective and
social objective fail to align, it may be possible to exploit systematic non-rational
behavior to e↵ect second order incentive alignment. That is, to use predictable
and systematic non-rational behavior as a tool to correct for market ine ciencies.
Lamentably (and perplexingly), few scholars have yet seized upon the exploitation
of non-rational behavior as a method of e↵ecting incentive alignment.
In this paper, I investigate this possibility in the context of criminal law policy,
arguing that superior deterrent e↵ects may be achieved with less enforcement and
more lenient sentencing by exploiting the phenomenon of “bounded rationality.” Sec-
tion 3.1 briefly summarizes the history of economic theories of criminal law, and also
addresses some historical objections to the premises underlying economic approaches
to criminal law. Section 3.2 describes how the conventional economic conception of
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criminal deterrence may be extended to incorporate systematic non-rational behav-
ior. Section 3.3 cashes out that conceptual work in a formal model, from which an
alternative “e cient” level of criminal deterrence may be computed. In Section 3.4,
I suggest some possible practical applications of my model in policymaking. Section
3.5 concludes with an overview of what I have tried to accomplish in this essay.
3.1 Background
3.1.1 The Elements of Criminal Deterrence
The Enlightenment era legal philosopher Cesare Beccaria was among the first instru-
mentalists, arguing that punishments should not exceed the net benefits derived from
incapacitation and deterrence.1 However, the importance of Beccaria’s work extends
well beyond his philosophical rejection of retribution as a ground for punishment.
His analysis of deterrence implicitly relied on economic methods and results, an ap-
proach which would reemerge two hundred years later when scholars in the Law &
Economics movement began systematically applying economic methods to the study
of criminal law. Yet Beccaria’s insights remain a pellucid description of the funda-
mental framework Law & Economics scholars employ in analyzing the criminal law;
the wealth of insights bears substantial direct quotation:
It is not only the common interest of mankind that crimes should not
be committed, but that crimes of every kind should be less frequent, in
proportion to the evil they produce to society. Therefore the means made
use of by the legislature to prevent crimes should be more powerful in
proportion as they are destructive of the public safety and happiness, and
as the inducements to commit them are stronger. Therefore there ought
to be a fixed proportion between crimes and punishments.
It is impossible to prevent entirely all the disorders which the passions of
mankind cause in society. These disorders increase in proportion to the
number of people and the opposition of private interests. If we consult
history, we shall find them increasing, in every state, with the extent
1Cesare Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene [Of Crimes and Punishments], Chapter
12, Edward D. Ingraham, trans. (1764) [1819] (“The end of punishment, therefore, is no other than
to prevent the criminal from doing further injury to society, and to prevent others from committing
the like o↵ence. Such punishments, therefore, and such a mode of inflicting them, ought to be
chosen, as will make the strongest and most lasting impressions on the minds of others, with the
least torment to the body of the criminal.”).
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of dominion. In political arithmetic, it is necessary to substitute a cal-
culation of probabilities to mathematical exactness. That force which
continually impels us to our own private interest, like gravity, acts in-
cessantly, unless it meets with an obstacle to oppose it. The e↵ect of
this force are the confused series of human actions. Punishments, which
I would call political obstacles, prevent the fatal e↵ects of private in-
terest, without destroying the impelling cause, which is that sensibility
inseparable from man. The legislator acts, in this case, like a skilful ar-
chitect, who endeavours to counteract the force of gravity by combining
the circumstances which may contribute to the strength of his edifice.2
Given the private welfare function, P (an) = B(an)  K(an), where B(an) is the
benefit of undertaking action an, and K(an) is the the cost of undertaking an, it
may arise that the optimal choice, a⇤ = maxan P (an) is a criminal act. This is, in
Beccaria’s words, the “gravity” that impels people to commit crime: it is simply
the choice that maximizes their payo↵s. However, by imposing a criminal sanction,
S(an), discounted by the probability of enforcement ⇡, the law manipulates parties’
cost-benefit calculations by imposing “political obstacles,” such that:3
P †(an) = B(an) K(an)  ⇡(an)S(an) (3.1)
The idea is that when the expected sanction ⇡(an)S(an) is su ciently large, then
a⇤ 6= an, and parties will voluntarily refrain from undertaking the proscribed activity
an, since it will no longer be privately optimal.
3.1.2 Criminological Skepticism about Economic Models of
Deterrence
Before proceeding to modern approaches to criminal deterrence, I will consider and
rebut some objections to Beccaria’s rudimentary formulation in the recent crimi-
nal law literature.4 I have included this discussion with some hesitation, and it
bears remarking on what role this plays in my argument. Readers of early drafts
2Beccaria, supra note 1, Chapter 6.
3Observe that in an alternative framing of the problem, K(an) could be interpreted to include
⇡(an)S(an). I have chosen to treat the terms separately for analytical clarity, though prior Law
& Economics scholars writing on criminal law have typically considered ⇡S(an) to be an element
of K(an). The choice to treat the two terms separately is motivated merely by my preference for
clarity over parsimony, and obviously has no e↵ect on the results.
4It bears observing (if only because there yet remains a dwindling but still sizable number
of lawyers with little or no exposure to Law & Economics) that numerically, the overwhelming
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of this paper have given vastly di↵ering opinions on the importance of addressing
this point. Those whose backgrounds were in Law & Economics complained that it
was an unnecessary digression, while those whose backgrounds were in criminology
complained that it was too cursory. So much reveals the methodological divide in
criminal law scholarship. Upon consideration, it seems to me that some defense of a
critical premise—that punishment has a deterrent e↵ect—is warranted, since at least
some portion of readers, whom I hope to reach, will regard a defense of the economic
approach to criminal deterrence an essential precondition to further theoretical elab-
orations. Yet it is not my objective to conclusively establish this point here, and an
exhaustive investigation of this issue would lead us far astray. Rather, I should like
simply to acknowledge the controversy, point to several persuasive arguments against
the criminologist’s skepticism, and proceed quickly to the novel contributions to the
economic approach I propose in Section 3.2.
According to the Beccarian formulation, the expected sanction consists of two
terms: the probability of enforcement ⇡, and the magnitude of sanction S(an). If the
simple model, P †(an) = B(an) K(an)  ⇡(an)S(an) is correct, then it follows that,
ceteris paribus, a 1/2 reduction in the probability of enforcement would be wholly
o↵set by a doubling in the magnitude of sanction, and vice versa. That is, by simple
arithmetic:
⇡(an)
2
⇥ 2S(an) = ⇡(an)S(an) = 2⇡(an)⇥ S(an)
2
(3.2)
However, there exists a substantial body of empirical research suggesting that the
majority of “objections” to the economic approach are not of the learned variety described in this
subsection. Rather, the predominant strain of critiques of the economic analysis of criminal law
(and indeed, of economic analysis generally) seem to arise from the puerile and abysmally ignorant
contention that economic models are unsound because “people don’t think like that.” While such
woefully stupid misunderstandings hardly merit reply, I shall in a spirit of charity o↵er the hopefully
edifying reminder that economic models are not meant to provide a psychological account of how
people reason, but rather an extensional account of how they behave. Thus, regardless of whether
people consciously perform cost-benefit calculations to determine their actions, or whether they are
“subconsciously” impelled toward utility-maximizing choices by instinct or habit is immaterial from
an economic perspective. That the “failure” of economics to track psychology somehow represents
a defect in the theory is based on a gross misconception.
It is true, behavioral economics poses a challenge to rational choice economics, and behavioral
economics is founded on “realistic” psychology rather than the Herculean ideal of homo economi-
cus. However, the conflict between rational choice theory and behavioral economics does not arise
because behavioral economics furnishes a better account of how people think, but rather because
it seems to provide a better prediction of how people will act. Never and nowhere is economics
concerned with what goes on in people’s heads, except insofar as it provides convenient indices to
how they will ultimately behave.
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equivalencies in Formula 3.2 fail to obtain in the real world.5 Instead, the evidence
indicates that increasing the probability of enforcement, ⇡, is vastly more e↵ective
than ratcheting up the magnitude of prescribed punishment, S(an),6 implying:7
⇡(an)
2
⇥ 2S(an) < ⇡(an)S(an) < 2⇡(an)⇥ S(an)
2
(3.3)
It is first worth pointing out that, even if this were generally the case, it would not
necessarily be as “fatal” for a severity-as-deterrence approach to criminal punishment
as some critics might suppose. It would merely require a trivial modification of the
sanction function—assuming the sociological data were su ciently strong to warrant
a modification of the formulation.8
However, it would be overhasty to infer Formula 3.3 from the raw sociological
data. Despite the eagerness of some criminal law scholars in declaring the “death” of
severity-as-deterrence and the economic analysis of criminal law generally,9 to reject
economic methodology because it fails to perfectly predict real-world e↵ects would
be as silly as rejecting Newton’s laws of motion simply because they fail to predict
the travel of a struck tennis ball. While it is true that spin, air pressure, lift, and
friction generally will create complications to the extent that the precise flight path of
5See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, et al., Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity:
An Analysis of Recent Research (Hart Publishing, 1999); Paul Langan & David Farrington,
“Crime and Justice in the United States and England and Wales, 1981-96,” Bureau of Justice
Statistics (1998); David Farrington, Paul Langan and Per-Olof H. Wikstrom, “Changes in Crime
and Punishment in America, England and Sweden between the 1980s and the 1990s,” 3 Studies in
Crime Prevention 104-131 (1994); Paul Gendreau, Claire Goggin & Francis Cullen, “The E↵ects
of Prison Sentences on Recidivism,” Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Public Works and Gov’t Services
Canada (1999) (finding that increasing prison sentences actually correlated with a 3% increase in
recidivism). See generally Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob. “Searching for Sasquatch:
Deterrence of Crime Through Sentence Severity” in Oxford Handbook of Sentencing and
Corrections 191, 173-195 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz, eds. 2012) (surveying the empirical
research contradicting deterrence theories’ predictions).
6See generally Michael Tonry, Learning from the Limitations of Deterrence Research, 37 Crime
and Justice 279-311 (2008).
7Or, more generally, ⇡(an)x ⇥ xS(an) < ⇡(an)S(an) < x⇡(an)⇥ S(an)x .
8For example, D(S) = ↵S    S2, such that increasing criminal penalties S(an) would yield
diminishing e↵ects (i.e., @D@S2 =  2 ).
9See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 6, at 280 (“[M]acro-level modeling of deterrent e↵ects of changes in
sanctions policies by economists and econometricians has reached a dead end, as Ronald Coase in
1978 predicted would happen concerning subjects on which the economist’s advantage was primarily
one of technique.”); Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, supra note 5, at 191 (“[T]he
continued centrality of this deterrence theory as a sentencing objective constitutes a false promise,
contributing to a waste of resources and a reduction in the public’s confidence in the criminal justice
system, while encouraging policy makers to ignore more e↵ective crime control strategies.”).
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a tennis ball will be practically incalculable, the principles of classical mechanics are
hardly “refuted” thereby; the laws of physics reveal a great deal about nature, even
when they fail at prediction. Likewise, the results of an economic theory should not
be rejected simply because they fail to account for every force operating in the real
world. The mere fact that empirical results diverge from theoretical predictions may
only signal that additional forces are at work, and that noise from these other forces
prevents us from isolating the processes-of-interest in our observations, in which case
the proper approach would not be to abandon what progress has been made, but
rather to identify and describe the other factors in play.
Lamentably, a significant contingent of criminal law scholars have quite exuber-
antly declined to pursue this eminently reasonable approach, opting instead to accuse
economists of ideological bias and fallacious reasoning. For example, Michael Tonry
writes, “[S]ome or much of the work on deterrence by economists may be conscious
or unconscious products of ideological, as opposed to merely disciplinary, ways of
thinking. . . . Many of the economists who have written on the deterrent e↵ects of
punishments are well-known political conservatives—Gary Becker, Richard Posner,
Isaac Ehrlich, John Lott—and others such as Joanna Shepherd are less well-known
conservatives,” although evidently in a magnanimous mood, he adds, “It is merely
human to be deeply attached to one’s intuitions.”10
In addition to such overeager announcements of the demise of economic theories
of criminal law, such criticisms abound with fundamental misunderstandings about
economic modeling. For example, Cheryl Marie Webster and Anthony Doob write,
“[Deterrence through severity] strategies assume that potential o↵enders conduct so-
phisticated analyses of the relative costs of various penalties.”11 This is hardly a
new criticism of the rational actor hypothesis, though it is easily answered. The
rational actor hypothesis does not assume that people consciously conduct sophis-
ticated cost-benefit calculations. The model is not intended to track deliberation,
but rather behavior. The reason why people, on average, will tend to behave in a
manner consistent with the rational actor model is not because they are consciously
deliberating about welfare maximization, but rather because the net e↵ect of gut in-
tuitions, genetic predispositions, and environmental conditioning ultimately cash out
in choices and actions which coincide with payo↵ maximization. A particular actor
may articulate reasons for her actions very di↵erent from welfare optimization—and
we need not say that one is a “right” or “wrong” account of the decision-making, ex-
cept insofar as it succeeds or fails at explaining behavior. Certainly, it is problematic
for the rational actor model if its predictions fail to track real-world decisions—as
10Tonry, supra note 6, at 304-305.
11Webster & Doob, supra note 5, at 182.
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appears to be the case (at least superficially) with severity-as-deterrence—but it is
not problematic that potential o↵enders are not consciously performing cost-benefit
analyses, as Webster and Doob complain.
Happily, it turns out that a number of the “frictions” at work are easily identifi-
able. First, the portion of the population that will commit at least one felony in their
lives is small—and they may simply be dismissed as outliers. This is not the most
satisfying explanation for such deviant behavior, but neither is it unwarranted. It
may simply be that criminals have highly idiosyncratic risk-preferences.12 Another
explanation may be time-inconsistent discounting.13 Yet another possible explana-
tion may be that criminals are psychologically incapable of rationally responding to
incentives.14
A di↵erent cluster of rationales considers whether it might simply be that particu-
lar social circumstances make criminal activity optimal for some people,15 even when
the cost of expected sanctions is rationally calculated—in which cases, incidentally,
it is likely that the collateral e↵ects of conviction will exacerbate the probability
of recidivism, since the e↵ects of post-incarceration collateral consequences tend to
12See, e.g., Cathy Buchanan & Peter R. Hartley, Criminal Choice: An Economic View of Life
Outside the Law, Policy 54-58, Autumn (1990) (“Results from studies in expected utility theory
suggest that the more risk-averse the individual is, the less he will like an increase in penalties
compensated by a reduction in capture probability. . . . On the other hand, risk-loving individuals
will be deterred more by increases in the probability of capture than compensating increases in
penalties. Since crime is a risky occupation, risk-loving and less risk-averse individuals will find it
a more satisfactory employment.”).
13See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, When Good People Do Bad Things: Time-Inconsistent Misconduct
& Criminal Law, FSU Public Law Research Paper No. 232 (2006).
14Id. at 57 (“Some crimes are committed by people who are either temporarily or permanently
insane, acting in a fit of passion or under the influence of drugs.”); Sheilagh Hodgkins, Mental
Disorder, Intellectual Deficiency, and Crime Evidence from a Birth Cohoert, 49 Arch Gen Psy-
chiatry 476-483 (1992) (finding that men su↵ering from major mental disorders were four times
more likely to be registered for violent o↵enses, while women with major disorders were 27 times
more likely to be violent o↵enders—though statistically, this still only accounts for a small minority
of prison populations).
15John R. Lott, Jr., A Transaction-Costs Explanation for Why the Poor Are More Likely to
Commit Crime, 19 J. Legal Stud. 243 (1990), observes that because bankruptcy and antislav-
ery laws impose a transaction cost on lending to individuals, whose primary asset is bare human
capital (i.e., since debtors cannot be enslaved to extract repayment through forced labor, and also
because bankruptcy shields them from debt recovery in certain cases, banks face an increase in
the probability that loans will go unpaid), it may be that for some persons the transaction cost of
theft may be su ciently below the transaction cost of borrowing, that theft will remain privately
optimal even when penalties are optimal. Ironically, the tradeo↵ then becomes that prohibiting
debt-recovery-through-slavery gets replaced by increased rates of incarceration, and if appears that
the most economically disadvantaged end up in chains either way!
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decrease the opportunity costs of crime.16
Another source of “friction” is that increasing severity of sanctions fails to a↵ect
parties’ private welfare calculations when they are unaware of what the law is—which
is likely the case for the vast majority of the population.17 It is important to keep
in mind that the function ⇡ represents the perceived probability of enforcement, and
S(an) represents the sanction believed to follow from an. Where the legal conse-
quences of lawbreaking are insu ciently publicized, it is no defect of the Becarrian
model (or a superficial defect at worst) that deterrence e↵ects fail to obtain. It is
trivially the case that actors will not be responsive to imperceptible incentives.18
Ultimately, although the point is not utterly without controversy,19 even if we take
it as given that the empirical data does not support severity-as-deterrence predictions
in society as it presently is, this need not necessarily be interpreted as a refutation
of the theory. More than 90% of the U.S. population will never commit a felony
in their lives,.20 and it may simply be the case that a severity-as-deterrence model
16Alec Ewald & Christopher Uggen, The Collateral E↵ects of Imprisonment on Prisoners, Their
Families, and Communities, Chapter 3 in Oxford Handbook of Sentencing and Correc-
tions (Joan Petersilia & Kevin Reitz, eds., 2012). See also John Schmitt & Kris Warner, Ex-
o↵ender and the Labor Market, Center for Economic and Policy Research (November 2010).
17See Kirk R. Williams, Jack P. Gibbs, and Maynard L. Erickson, Public Knowledge of Statutory
Penalties: The Extent and Basis of Accurate Perception, 23 Pacific Sociological Review 105-
128 (1980).
18I do not mean to suggest that greater public education will necessarily result in more e↵ective
severity-as-deterrence, though no doubt it could not hurt. Rather, I mean simply to point out
another possible explanation for the failure of severity-as-deterrence to manifest in empirical data.
19See, e.g., Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish
between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J. Law & Economics 343-364 (1999) (arguing that
California’s Proposition 8 demonstrates both the observable e↵ect of deterrence and incapitation
in crime rates). But see Cheryl Marie Webster, Anthony Doob & Franklin Zimring, Proposition
8 and Crime Rates in California: The Case of the Disappearing Deterrent, 5 Criminology &
Public Policy 417-448 (2006) (arguing that a more fine-grained analysis reveals that the crime
rates began dropping prior to the passage of Proposition 8, and pointing out other methodological
problems in Kessler & Levitt (1999)). But see Steven D. Levitt, The Case of the Critics Who
Missed the Point: A Reply to Webster et al., 5 Criminology & Public Policy 449-460 (2006)
(arguing that the data from Kessler & Levitt (1999) withstands the criticisms of Webster, et al.
(2006)).
20Sarah Shannon, et al., Growth in U.S. Ex-Felon and Ex-Prisoner Population, 1948 to 2010,
Paper presented at the 2011 Annual Meetings of the Population Assoc. of America (2011) (“By our
estimates, about 3.4 percent of the adult voting age population have once served or are currently
serving time in a state or federal prison. If we adopt a more inclusive definition of the criminal
class, including all convicted of a felony regardless of imprisonment, these numbers increase to 19.8
million persons, representing 8.6 percent of the adult population and approximately one-third of
the African American adult male population.”).
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is only e↵ective for approximately 90% of the population. As I have discussed in
the foregoing paragraphs, it seems plausible that the portion of the population who
commit felonies may for various reasons be unresponsive to the incentive e↵ects
of severity-as-deterrence, and it may be that increased sentence severity does not
translate to decreased crime rates for the simple reason that the deterrence e↵ect is
already maximal in industrialized nations (indeed, I will later argue that sanctions
very likely exceed the point at which marginal deterrence yields de minimis returns).
On this view, a better test of severity-as-deterrence might be to investigate whether
the converse proposition holds: that a reduction in the severity of sanctions results
in increased criminal activity.21
Finally, a discussion concerning skepticism about economic models in the crimi-
nological literature would not be complete without some mention of the sociological
data supporting the notion that increasing severity of sanctions generates a deterrent
e↵ect.22 In what is likely the most thoroughgoing technical defense of sanction-as-
deterrence, Silvia Mendes and Michael McDonald tackle the sociological data sup-
posedly “refuting” the e↵ect of severity directly, arguing that the apparently limited
e↵ects of sentence severity on deterrence may be attributed to conceptual errors on
the part of the statisticians interpreting the data.
[T]he dubious findings regarding the inconsistent e↵ect of the severity
component of deterrence theory are a consequence of theoretical slippage
when moving from the verbal theoretical statement to the statistical rep-
resentation of that statement. Our purpose is to demonstrate that the
failure to include any of the deterrence theory components “unbundles
the theoretical package.” For this reason, we argue that the empirical
ambiguity with respect to sentence severity arises because sometimes the
empirical formulation of deterrence theory fails to keep the theoretical
package intact. In particular, statistical models that isolate the compo-
nents through the use of separate, additive elements do not account for
the expected cost calculation as specified in the theory. Sentence length
does not work independently of the probability of arrest and conviction.
Rather, all three elements operate in combination.23
21Although, I will later argue that the reduction will have to be substantial to detect such e↵ects.
22See, e.g., Charles R. Tittle, Sanctions and Social Deviance—The Question of
Deterrence (National Science Foundation 1980); Richard C. Hollinger, Deterrence in the Work-
place: Perceived Certainty, Perceived Severity, and Employee Theft, 62 Social Forces 398-418
(1983).
23Silvia M. Mendes & Michael D. McDonald, Putting Severity of Punishment Back in the De-
terrence Package, 29 Policy Studies Journal 588-610, 590 (2001). See also Silvia M. Mendes,
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Nevertheless, the balance of opinion among non-economist criminal law scholars
seems to be that punishment is less e↵ective than policing, which if true would
require at least a minor modification of the the Beccarian cost-benefit formula. As
the foregoing discussion suggests, I do not agree that such modification is warranted,
though I will argue for a more nuanced understanding of costs and benefits in Section
3.2 for di↵erent reasons.
3.1.3 Becker’s Approach to Crime
Beginning in 1968, with the publication of Gary Becker’s seminal article, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach,24 there has been a steady flow of research on
criminal law and punishment from an economic perspective. The main line of inquiry
has followed Beccaria25, Bentham,26 and Becker,27 in treating instrumentalist objec-
tives (and deterrence foremost) as the exclusive grounds for criminal punishment.
Becker’s model remains the foundation, upon which most subsequent economic
theories of criminal law have built. Becker’s model treats crime in price theoretic
terms. The basic setup of the model begins with the premise that actors seek to
maximize their private welfare. In some circumstances, the optimal choice may be
a criminal act. In such cases, the actor’s choice create an externality (i.e., the harm
caused to victims). In the aggregate, the criminal’s benefit and the victim’s loss,
taken together, will usually represent a net loss.28
Policing and punishment create disincentives against the commission of crime
(See Formula 3.1). The e↵ect is analogous to increasing prices on demand. The ef-
fect of the law here is to increase the analogical “price” of criminal activity. Na¨ıvely,
therefore, our first intuition may be that punishments for all crimes should be max-
imal. The countervailing consideration however is that policing and punishment are
Certainty, Severity, and Their Relative Deterrent E↵ects: Questioning the Implications of the Role
of Risk in Criminal Deterrence Policy, 32 Policy Studies Journal 59-74 (2004).
24 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
25Beccaria, supra note 1
26Jeremy Bentham, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,” in 1 Works
of Jeremy Bentham 1, 86-91 (J. Bowring ed. 1843).
27Becker, supra note 24.
28Why this should be the case may not be immediately obvious, since theft, for example, is
merely a transfer of wealth; and transfers of wealth are, ceteris paribus neutral for social welfare
(assuming a Kaldor-Hicks aggregation criterion). One compelling explanation is that unchecked
criminal “transfers of wealth” create a rent-seeking scenario, since criminals must expend resources
to obtain their loot, while victims will responsively expend resources to guard their property. Since
the “prize” remains a fixed quantity, the e↵ect is nonproductive competition. See generally Becker,
supra note 24.
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costly.29 Thus, the price cannot be raised indefinitely, and optimal enforcement (i.e.,
where “enforcement” consists of policing and punishment) may be determined to be
the point, at which the marginal cost of enforcement is equal to the marginal benefit
of crime-reduction.
Translated into everyday terms, Becker’s claim seems eminently sensible. If the
destructiveness of crime costs more than enforcement, society should increase policing
and penalties. If, on the other hand, things get to a point where we spend more to
prevent crimes than the cost of simply allowing the crime to occur, then we have
gone too far. The proper investment in crime-prevention is such that society receives
an equal return in the reduction of the cost of crime. So far, so good.
3.2 A New Framework for Deterrence
The Becker model relies upon the “rational actor hypothesis,” which posits that
on average, people tend to make utility-maximizing choices. This view of human
behavior has come under intense attack in recent decades, although skepticism about
it has existed since the earliest days of economics.30 Indeed, it would be a mistake
to infer from Becker’s assumptions that he believes that they are true,31 at least no
more than a cartographer believes that Earth is flat.32 A theory, by necessity, makes
simplifying assumptions. This should not be seen as a concession, but rather the very
purpose of theory-building. Were a map perfectly similar to the thing it was meant
to represent, it would cease to be a representation, and would be instead a duplicate.
Maps help us to understand things by “flattening” reality and transforming it in
ways that preserve some relations in the world, while distorting others, to pick out
salient information for navigation. This principle applies to theoretical models no
less than to geographical representations.
Nevertheless, while this analogy may quell the most puerile criticisms of the
29Punishment is not always costly. For example, fines carry no social cost.
30See, e.g., Francis Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Applica-
tion of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences, 16 (1881) (“[T]he concrete nineteenth century
man is for the most part an impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian.”).
31Gary Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. Political
Econ. 385 (1993) (“[T]he economic approach I refer to does not assume that individuals are
motivated solely by selfishness or material gain. It is a method of analysis, not an assumption
about particular motivations. Along with others, I have tried to pry economists away from narrow
assumptions about self-interest. Behavior is driven by a much richer set of values and preferences.”).
32The analogy between theoretical models and maps plays an important illustrative role in the
work of the eminent philosopher of science, Ronald Giere. See generally, Ronald Giere, Ex-
plaining Science: A Cognitive Approach (1988).
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traditional economic method, it does beg the inquiry: how does the analysis change
when the rational actor hypothesis is suitably nuanced to capture certain sorts of
systematic departures from the rational actor model’s predictions.33
Behavioral economics furnishes a panoply of enticing options, which might make
a model of human behavior more “realistic.”34 However, for a number of complicated
reasons, about I have written about elsewhere, I find pure behavioral theories objec-
tionable. Thus, I shall take a somewhat more austere approach, more consistent with
mainstream Law & Economics, preserving the basic framework of the Becker model,
and supplementing it with a second order rational account of “bounded rationality.”
3.2.1 Bounded Rationality
The behavioral economics movement was sparked by Herbert A. Simon’s essay, A
Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,35 which introduced the concept of “bounded
rationality” into the economic literature. The idea is that the very act of performing
a cost-benefit deliberation is itself costly, and that deliberators are aware of this cost
and work it into their deliberations—though standard cost-benefit analysis tradition-
ally failed to account for it. Thus, in a world where information is not costless (as,
indeed, it is not in the real world), the perfectly rational actor must devote all his
time to accumulating background information and calculating what to do in order to
make the “optimal” decision, which is almost certainly a suboptimal way of whiling
away the day. Thus, Simon hypothesizes, what people actually do when deliberating
is to set a threshold of acceptability, such that if some contemplated activity passes
the threshold, it will be “good enough” to act upon, even if it is not the elusive
“best” choice.
My model does not follow Simon as far as his hypothesis about thresholds of
acceptability.36 However, I do take decision costs and restricted decision-making
domains as critical components of my model.
33It should be noted that while the rational actor model has been criticized for failing to predict
enough human behavior to be a meaningful description, it remains largely undisputed that it is a
compelling normative model of welfare-maximization.
34See generally, Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 Stanford L.R. 1471 (1998); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judg-
ment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124-1131 (1974); Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk, 47 Econometrica
263-291 (1979).
35 69 Quarterly J. of Econ. 99 (1955).
36Simon refers to this phenomenon as “satisficing.” Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and
the Structure of the Environment, 63 Psychological Review 129 (1956) (“Evidently, organisms
adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’; they do not, in general, ‘optimize.’”).
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The framework I propose is second order (although easily extendable to higher
orders). Rather than considering the material costs and benefits of actions, my
analysis considers the costs and benefits of how to decide on an action. The idea
is that when actors regularly encounter similar factual circumstances, they have a
variety of ways of deciding how to decide such problems. In some cases, where the
stakes are very large, or where the fact pattern occurs infrequently, the actor may
choose to perform a cost-benefit optimization. In other cases, where the decision
costs are substantial relative to the di↵erence in potential payo↵s, actors will likely
develop rules-of-thumb, cognitive “short cuts,” as a way of automating decision-
making, because the cost of case-by-case deliberation would represent a loss.
When selecting among the supernumerary possible cognitive shortcuts, it bears
inquiring why an actor would choose one shortcut over another. The answer, which
seems obvious on its face, is that he will select the shortcut that is welfare-maximizing,
when decision costs are included in the calculation. However, incorporating decision
costs is not as obvious as it may at first seem, since it begs the question why an actor
would choose to second order optimize. The natural answer might be that second
order optimization is third-order optimal. And so on, up the ladder.
There is some danger here that this “passing the buck” leads to an infinite regress.
I will not attempt to o↵er a thorough answer to this deeply theoretical problem here;
the infinite regress problem is tangential to the present topic.37 Briefly however, it
su ces to observe that we needn’t consider higher and higher orders of heuristic-
selection for the present inquiry, since the second order account seems a su ciently
plausible description to cover the interesting cases sans argumentative support.
Returning to the problem of criminal deterrence, there exists a salient character-
istic, which we might well suppose rational actors will collectivize at a second order
level: criminal activity. It may be that for many people, opportunities to commit
criminal acts present themselves, which from time to time happen to be privately op-
timal. And yet, I suspect that in a majority of such cases, people decline to seize such
opportunities, apparently choosing “suboptimal” law-abiding behavior and violating
the rational actor hypothesis.38 There exist a variety of philosophical explanations
for such deviant virtuousness—personal morality being the most obvious one. On
this view, actors internalize the norm that criminal act x is bad, and they get enough
disutility from performing the act itself that it tips the cost-benefit balance toward
37See Daniel Pi, A General Theory of Rationality (2014) for a possible resolution of that problem.
38I admit that I may be na¨ıve on this point, however it must necessarily be left to speculation,
since it is di cult enough to estimate rates of undetected crimes, much less unactualized undetected
crimes.
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some other, presumably legally permissible activity.39
There may be something to the moral view. However, I contend that a second
order rational explanation is more persuasive. If disincentives for crime are generally
su cient to deter the first order rational person from committing crimes, then (given
that even petty crimes require some amount of planning and skillful execution) the
second order rational person will simply adopt the second order heuristic not to
commit crime. Thus, while such a second order rational person may from time
to time miss out on golden opportunities to get away with a criminal act, he will
refrain from thusly acting—not because of any compelling moral reason, but because
such opportunities are so rare that they aren’t worth contemplating. Consequently,
they fall outside the domain of viable choices—outside the “bounds” of bounded
rationality.
3.2.2 An Example
A simple example involving a petty crime will hopefully illustrate the point. Suppose
that a first order rational person, call him Smith, parks his car on a particular metered
stretch of road. He can either feed the meter or risk incurring a parking ticket. Let
us assume that the penalty for parking illegally (i.e., without paying) is set at an
e cient level a` la Becker, such that the city has calculated the probability of catching
a sco✏aw, and set the fine at a rate, where repeated violations over time represent
a losing gamble.
Smith, su ciently motivated, could choose to stake out the road for several days,
monitoring how frequently the meter-maids patrol the block, formulate a more fine-
grained estimate of the probability of detection on the particular block at a given
time, and decide whether to pay or not on the basis of that calculation. He could
then “rationally” decide whether to pay or not, armed with a more refined estimate
of probabilities, thus generating a net benefit over time.
Of course, we would not regard Smith’s behavior as rational. Indeed, Smith
is not only irrational, he is insane. Stalking meter-maids to accumulate su cient
information to generate an “optimal” decision comes at an enormous cost. Looking
at the big picture, the information required to game the system surely represents a
titanic net loss, and Smith’s conduct would satisfy only the most myopic conception
of “rationality.”
Let us now consider a second order rational person, call her Jones. Jones has
formed the heuristic that she will always pay for parking. From time to time, she will
39See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic
Theory, 6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 317-344 (1977).
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end up paying for parking, even when (unbeknownst to her) the expected benefit of
not paying exceeds the expected cost. However, the opportunity cost being negligible,
she merrily spends her deliberation e↵orts on more productive enterprises.
What the example makes clear, I hope, is that first order rationality often fails
to be second order rational (it may also turn out, though less frequently, that second
order rationality fails to be third-order rational, that third order rationality fails to
be fourth-order rational, etc.). What is critical to observe is that the rational actor
hypothesis (broadly construed) is not the source of absurdity, for the rational actor
hypothesis is as true of Smith as it is for Jones.
Rather, to the extent that on some occasions Smith does not pay for parking,
while Jones always does, the question is not whether Smith is irrational or Jones
is irrational. Rather, they are both rational at di↵erent orders of decision-making.
Thusly construed, the rational actor hypothesis—that actors make choices that max-
imize their private welfare—becomes a more general claim. And whereas first order
rationality may seem absurd in some circumstances, higher order rationality seems
likely to provide a more plausible account of our pre-theoretical understanding of the
descriptor, “being rational.” For convenience (and conformity to common usage), I
will thus take “rational” to refer to the highest-order rationality within the scope of
discussion.
3.2.3 Cashing Out the Public Policy
So how does this conception cash out as public policy? The proposition that if
laws create su cient disincentives, then rational actors will refrain from committing
them, is hardly novel. Nor is the proposition that a subset of the population will
be unresponsive to disincentives, for a variety of psychological and pecuniary rea-
sons, which are di cult or impossible to address through the instruments of criminal
punishment.
What is novel here is that enforcement need not be su cient to e↵ect disincen-
tives for first order rational actors, since people do not typically behave first order
rationally. Rather, the law should be designed to incentivize the formation of the
second order heuristics, “not to park illegally,” “not to steal cars,” “not to burglar-
ize,” “not to download pirated software,” etc. Indeed, an ideal criminal law regime
would be generate the general heuristic, “not to commit crime.” This entails a sub-
tle, but significant shift in the way criminal law policy should be designed, since
the target of incentives is only incidentally to create direct disincentives for criminal
acts. Its primarily function, I contend, is to incentivize a way of deliberating about
the commission of criminal acts.
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The incentivization of “not to commit crime” heuristics may be accomplished
in several ways. First and most obviously, enforcement should be targeted toward
high-profile crimes. More visible enforcement is more likely to create the impression
that the probability of detection is high, increasing actors’ subjective assessments of
detection probability, and thereby reducing their (subjective) expected payo↵s. This
is because the information cost for high-profile crimes is low (one need only read a
newspaper to discover the latest criminal scandal of the day), whereas the cost of
discovering the true rate of criminal detection and punishment is prohibitively high.
Punishments for high-profile crimes should also be severe, for the same reasons.
Second, strategies should be developed to prevent the fragmentary formation
of heuristics. For example, in the realm of automobile theft, the goal should be
to encourage the development of the heuristic, “not to steal cars,” and not the
alternative heuristics, “not to steal expensive cars,” or “not to steal new cars.” If
thefts of expensive or new automobiles are more aggressively investigated, then savvy
criminals may be responsive to the poor payo↵s involved with the theft of expensive
or new cars, but form the alternative heuristic, “not to steal new or expensive cars,”
rather than the intended heuristic, “not to steal cars.”
Asymmetric enforcement of crime may be inevitable, given limited police and
prison resources. However, when the disparate enforcement of the law is obvious,
actors may form alternative heuristics to exploit the asymmetries in enforcement,
rather than adopting a wholesale “not to commit crime” heuristic.
In some sense, the second order analysis shifts the emphasis from enforcement-in-
fact to enforcement-perception. Upon accepting such a conceptual shift, it becomes
clear that the principal worry in criminal law is not that some people “get away” with
crime, but rather that people will engage in particularized cost-benefit calculations
whether to commit criminal acts. The more perceived exceptions and inequalities
exist in the law, the greater the incentive to explore them in the hopes of “gaming”
the numbers. The goal, I contend, of criminal punishment should not be to beat
criminality at the first level, but to cut criminality o↵ at the stage before it is even
contemplated. The criminal law has not succeeded when a would-be criminal under-
takes a cost-benefit analysis and is deterred by the expected cost of punishment—such
an individual may still act criminally in some subsequent situation if the payo↵s are
right. Rather, the criminal law succeeds when a would-be criminal elects not to
consider the option of committing crimes at all.
Upon reflection, this should not seem a daring proposition. A person who per-
forms cost-benefit analyses whether to commit particular criminal acts, we may fairly
suppose, does so because it is rational. The person who is always on the lookout for
an opportunity to circumvent the law, if engaging in such criminal activity produces
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a windfall, does so because the decision cost of considering whether to break the
law is o↵set by the windfall benefits won by violating the law when he encounters a
promising criminal opportunity. Common sense guides us well here: a person who
is constantly peeking into parked cars, to see if someone left the door unlocked is a
person who will at some point steal a car—even if he declines to steal this or that
particular car. The most cost-e↵ective strategy is not to lock as many cars as we
can, but to stop the would-be thief from being on the alert for opportunities to steal
cars.
It is my contention that if police and prison resources were better tailored to
encouraging the formation of heuristics, rather than the brute prevention of crimes
via legal disincentives, then the deterrent e↵ect will be at least equal (and possibly
better) than current criminal law practices. Moreover, the likely result would be a
savings in police and prison costs and a mitigation of the trend toward overcrimi-
nalization. However, at this point, more precise machinery is required to establish
those results concretely. And so I will now turn to the formal model in Section 3.3.
3.3 The Model
Let Pj denote the payo↵ function of a typical citizen, j. LetB(x) represent the benefit
of undertaking activity x, and let [x 2]Ajn represent the set of choices available
to j in fact-situation n. Let K(x) represent the cost of undertaking activity x.
Finally, let ⇡(x) represent the probability of enforcement (i.e. the probability of
detection, apprehension, and conviction, which we may further analyze as ⇡(x) =
d(x)⇥a(x)⇥ c(x)); and S(x) represent the magnitude of sanction associated with x.
Thus, the private payo↵ for parties contemplating criminal action will be the
Beccarian function (Formula 3.1), and the first order optimal choice will be:
a⇤ = max
x
Pj(x) = B(x) K(x)  ⇡(x)S(x) (3.4)
Now, let us consider second order welfare maximization. Let us represent decision-
making process k with the function Dk(Fn, Ajn) = x, which selects a possible action
x from the set of possible actions Ajn available to j, given a set of facts Fn. For
example, welfare-maximization is one such decision-making process, call it DR, such
that DR(Fn, Ajn) = maxx2Ajn Pj(x). However, there may be an infinite number of
decision-making processes, of which DR is but one special example.
Let us now describe the second order payo↵ function. A heuristic is a decision-
making process that is triggered when certain factual circumstances apply. Let us
denote the triggering facts as fn ⇢ Fn. Now, for any set of facts Fx, if it is the case
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that fn ⇢ Fx, then the heuristic will be applied. Thus, the second order payo↵ will
be:
P 2j (Dn, fn, Ajz) =
X
fn⇢Fi
p(Fi) [(Pj(Dn(Fi, Ajz))   (Dn, Fi))] (3.5)
That is, the second order payo↵ of decision procedure Dn is the sum of first order
expected payo↵s when using decision procedure Dn, minus the decision cost of Dn,
which we denote  (Dn, fy), discounted by the probability that the situation Fi occurs.
Thus, the second order optimal choice of decision-making procedure for a given fact-
trigger fy will be:
D⇤ = max
Dx
P 2j (Dx, fy, Ajz) (3.6)
Before proceeding, it is worth observing that the optimal decision-making pro-
cedure may fail to be unique, depending on the subset of triggering facts fy. Two
heuristics may develop, which are both second order optimal, but which overlap.
That is, one heuristic may be triggered by facts fy, while another heuristic may
be triggered by facts fz. Particular situations may arise, where some total set of
facts Fw describing an actual circumstance is such that both triggers are activated,
fy ⇢ Fw ^ fz ⇢ Fw.
For example, suppose someone were to form the heuristic, “Do not trust X,” with
the triggering fact “X is a Cretan’” And further suppose that the same person forms
the heuristic, “Trust Y ,” with the triggering fact “Y is a philosopher.’” Certainly,
there will arise a conflict of heuristics, when the person encounters a philosopher
from Crete.
However, this is not a problem for the model. When a situation triggers multiple
heuristics, which generate contradictory choices, other heuristics will be implicated
to resolve the conflict of heuristics. In particular, for two ith-order heuristics with
overlapping triggering conditions, the (i+1)th-order decision-making procedure that
led the actor to adopt them should provide a basis for deciding which one trumps
and when.40
Much more could be said about resolving the problem of conditions that trigger
multiple heuristics, however this would take us far afield of the present inquiry (and
indeed would require a generalized account of higher order rationality), but it su ces
merely to observe that this is not problematic for the theory in our application here.
40If the two heuristics were adopted due to di↵erent (i+ 1)th-order decision-making procedures,
then the (i+2)th-order decision-making procedure that led the actor to adopt the two (i+1)th-order
decision-making procedures should decide which trumps and when, and so on.
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Proposition 3.3.1. In the absence of decision costs (i.e.,   = 0), D⇤ = DR.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3.3.1 states the intuitively obvious baseline, where the second order
optimal decision-making procedure will be first order rational deliberation when de-
cision costs are ignored. This proposition explains why the first order rational actor
hypothesis is thought to represent a normative ideal.
Proposition 3.3.2. The product of a second order optimal decision-procedure will
not always be coextensive with first order optimal decisions, ¬8a⇤(a⇤ = D⇤(Fn, Ajn)).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3.3.2 is a critical point. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to furnish an
example to illustrate. Consider the potential car-thief, who peeks into the windows
of parked cars, checking to see whether they’ve been left unlocked, whether they
have security alarms, whether they have LoJack, whether they have steering wheel
locks, etc. Say that he performs a cost-benefit calculation for each car. Let us assign
some hypothetical values, to see how a decision that is first order optimal may fail
to be second order optimal.
Enforcement Deliberation
Benefit-Cost Prob.⇥Sanction Cost
Car 1 100-80=20 .05⇥ 1000 = 50 1
Car 2 109-70=39 .04⇥ 1000 = 40 1
Car 3 105-90=15 .05⇥ 1000 = 50 1
Car 4 120-85=35 .06⇥ 1000 = 60 1
... ... ... ...
Car 49 90-70=20 .04⇥ 1000 = 40 1
Car 50 100-25=75 .06⇥ 1000 = 60 1
Let the probability of enforcement vary, depending on whether the car is parked
in a private lot, or whether it is parked on the street, whether the surrounding area
is high-tra c, well lit, etc. Suppose the punishment for automobile theft creates a
disutility value of 1000. And suppose that for all but one of the cars, there exist
various security features, which render theft of the vehicle a net loss for the thief.
But notice that Car 50 represents a potential gain—perhaps because the owner left
the car unlocked, rendering the cost of undertaking the theft relatively low. Thus,
the payo↵ of stealing Car 50 is positive.
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Now, on the first order Becker-style analysis, the law has—in the particular case
of Car 50—failed to set su ciently high disincentives (note, this may still be an
“e cient” level on Becker’s account). The value of the car, less the e↵ort to steal
it, less the expected cost of enforcement, and less decision cost is 75  60  1 = 14.
Assuming opportunity cost OC < 14, the thief will choose to steal Car 50.
But does the thief really come out ahead? Of course he does not, because even
though he made the rational decision not to steal Cars 1-49, each rational calculation
cost him 1 in deliberation. Thus, after the whole exercise, the (first order rational)
thief comes out behind, 14  49 =  35.
Contrast the rational thief with a person, who has formed the heuristic “not to
steal cars.” Her per-decision decision cost will be zero, and her choice in every case
will simply be not to steal the car. It is true that she “misses out” on the potential
surplus of stealing Car 50. However, she comes out ahead overall, since her total
welfare from adopting a “not to steal cars” heuristic will be 0, as compared with
the first order rational thief, whose welfare is  35. Thus, the optimal decision-
making procedure can, given certain values, generate sets of decisions, which are in
the aggregate more optimal than the “optimal.” A startling result.
Let us now consider what happens when we reduce the sanction from 1000 to
900. Becker predicts that decreasing the “price” of crime will increase consumption,
leading to more cars being stolen.
Enforcement Deliberation
Benefit-Cost Prob.⇥Sanction Cost
Car 1 100-80=20 .05⇥ 900 = 45 1
Car 2 109-70=39 .04⇥ 900 = 36 1
Car 3 105-90=15 .05⇥ 900 = 45 1
Car 4 120-85=35 .06⇥ 900 = 54 1
... ... ... ...
Car 49 90-70=20 .04⇥ 900 = 36 1
Car 50 100-25=75 .06⇥ 900 = 54 1
According to Becker’s theory, by reducing the severity of punishment from 1000
to 900, the “price” of crime is decreased, and the result will be an increase in the
activity level of criminals. In particular, it seems that Car 2 now represents a net
profit of 2, so another car will ostensibly be stolen, due to the reduction in sanction,
assuming zero opportunity costs.
On my view, the reduction will not necessarily result in an increase in car thefts,
because it remains second order rational to adopt the heuristic “not to steal cars.”
That is, even with the improvement in the expected payo↵ 2+ 21 = 23, the decision
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costs ( 50) continue to represent a net loss ( 27), while the heuristic “not to steal
cars,” remains at 0. Thus, the second order rational person will continue to prefer
not to bother contemplating car theft, even though the potential for a windfall gain
has slightly improved.
Thus, despite a 10% reduction in punishment, the e↵ect of deterrence may well
remain constant. This result does not entirely contradict Becker’s theory, for price
theory e↵ects do play a role, even in my second order rationality conception. For
example, for individuals, whose opportunity cost is  35 < OC <  27, it will be
privately optimal to rationally weigh the costs and benefits of attempting a particular
theft, and in the examples above, Car 2 will be stolen if sanctions are decreased to
900. However, it is curious how a person could have such low opportunity costs
(indeed, it seems that doing nothing ordinarily has a payo↵ of 0, so that ordinarily
OC   0).41 And it remains true that a su cient diminution in the price of crime will
ultimately increase consumption (in the extremum case, observe that when S(x) = 0,
the heuristic people will form will be to always steal cars when possible). However,
the foregoing example illustrates that crime rates may be considerably less elastic
(with respect to enforcement) than under the Becker model, and that up to a point,
enforcement may be reduced without any reduction in deterrence e↵ects.
Proposition 3.3.3. Assuming actors are second order rational, maximal deterrence
will be achieved at the point where it becomes second order rational to adopt the
heuristic “not to commit crime.”
Proof. See Appendix.
The idea here is that assuming actors are rational, the maximal level of deterrence
will be achieved when parties choose to adopt a heuristic not to commit crime. The
alternatives would be the adoption of, for example, the heuristic, “not to steal locked
cars,” or “not to steal cheap cars,” or “not to steal expensive cars,” or “not to steal
red cars.” Such alternative heuristics may reduce decision costs, so that the net
private gains represent an improvement over the “not to steal cars” heuristic.
Practically, one mechanism for combatting the formation of opportunistic heuris-
tics, which exploit asymmetries in enforcement, would be to create increased second
order decision costs. For example, if police resources are limited, making it unfeasi-
ble to pursue all car theft cases e↵ectively, resources will have to be focused. Some
41It is possible that OC < 0 if for example, a prisoner of war is being tortured, and must weigh
whether to attempt an escape. In that case, the cost of doing nothing may be negative, such that
even a long-shot attempt will still be optimal. One must admit, however, that such scenarios are
rare.
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cases will go by the wayside, so greater resources can be spent on e↵ectively pursuing
a targeted subset of cases. In deciding which cases to investigate, and which cases
to “ignore,” it would be a mistake to focus resources on high value targets or low
value targets. Instead, resources should be allocated in a way that would be di cult
for would-be criminals to discern. For instance, investigating car thefts, where the
stolen vehicle’s license plate ends in an even number from January through June,
and investigating stolen vehicles, where the license plate ends in an odd number from
July through December. Certainly, if car thieves knew about the policy, they could
easily exploit it. However, the decision cost involved in generating such a heuristic
would be enormous, since in the absence of an informant with “inside information”
about police practices, car thieves would have to suss out the necessary information
through trial and error and careful analysis of the data.
Certainly, asymmetric enforcement is an inevitable consequence of limited re-
sources, however when asymmetric enforcement falls along obvious lines, it “helps”
criminals by reducing second order decision costs and serving up easy-to-follow
heuristics to avoid detection. When asymmetries in the allocation of enforcement
are unavoidable, the distribution of enforcement resources should be calculated to
employ decision costs as a tool to “hide” the asymmetries, such that only an in-
dustrious econometrist would be capable of discerning the circumstances where the
commission of crime entailed an expected gain.
Proposition 3.3.4. Inducing the development of a “not to commit crime” heuristic
is less costly than optimal first order deterrence.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3.3.4 expresses the comparative static that incentivizing the devel-
opment of a “not to commit crime” heuristic is more cost-e↵ective than Becker’s
formulation of optimal deterrence. The practical cash-out is that if deterrence is
the goal of criminal law, then we may be spending more than necessary—both on
enforcement and punishment—and that way we invest those resources is also ine -
cient.
3.4 Practical Considerations
I am hesitant to speculate about how the framework I have presented will pay out in
concrete policy terms. Such conclusions would require both a theory and real-world
data, of which I have only o↵ered the former. It is beyond the scope of this paper
(and my competence) to o↵er the latter. However, it may be worth suggesting some
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common-sense hypothetical applications of my theory, which at least provisionally
point the way toward possible real-world implementation.
First, if the reason why most ordinary people do not ever commit felonies is
because it is second order optimal for them to form a “not to commit crime” heuristic,
then a substantial majority will continue to refrain from serious criminal activities
even if the severity of sanctions and rigorousness of policing were decreased. One
consequence of my theory is that the “consumption” of crime is substantially less
elastic than under Becker’s model, and therefore crime rates will remain relatively
stable, with respect to changes in enforcement levels. The optimal points of detection
e↵ort and sanction predicted by my model will therefore be lower—possibly much
lower—than that predicted by Becker.
Determining precisely how much less enforcement will e↵ect “optimal” deterrence
is a di cult empirical question. However, if I am also right that the deterrence e↵ect
given present enforcement levels in industrialized nations has passed the point of
diminishing returns, then it may well be that for the < 10% of the population who
commit at least one felony o↵ense in their lives, inducing the formation of a second
order heuristic is either impossible or prohibitively costly. Thus, for the > 90% of
law-abiding citizens, policing and sanctions may be far in excess of what is required to
induce the second order heuristic “not to commit crime,” and significant reductions
in enforcement may have no detectable e↵ect on crime rates.
More practical still, in lieu of empirical research on this point, policymakers
can discover what the threshold and optimal points of deterrence are by gradually
reducing sanction severity up to the point where measurable increases in criminal
activity are detected. That is, we do not necessarily need studies to get to the desired
policy—this can be done through simple trial and error. Reducing punishment levels
and policing will also have the ancillary benefit of reducing the supernumerary social
injustices associated with the penal system,42 and result in pecuniary savings for the
state.
Moreover, not only can enforcement costs be reduced, but enforcement can also
be made more e↵ective. If the narrative that my model tells about law-abiding
citizens is that they form a second order optimal first order heuristic “not to commit
crime,” and criminals tend to be resistant to the formation of such heuristics, then
we can use this information to expand the reach of deterrence to the < 10% who
have hitherto been unresponsive to deterrence incentives.
For example, we may be better able to instill general “not to commit crime”
heuristics by intervening earlier on in the process of heuristic formation: focusing
resources on children and adolescents, increasing policing and sanctions for petty
42See generally Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization (Oxford University Press 2008).
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crimes, and reducing poverty (thereby increasing the opportunity cost of criminal
activity—though this strategy would also be e↵ective under Becker’s conception,
the responsiveness of individuals to increasing opportunity costs is more elastic in
my conception, thus the marginal benefit of poverty-reduction would be somewhat
greater. Of course, these suggestions are hardly novel. However, my model and al-
ternative policy objective suggest that they may be more e↵ective than traditional
economic models would predict, suggesting a di↵erent allocation of resources. More-
over, working from a heuristic-formation perspective will sharpen the policy goals of
juvenile justice reform, “broken windows” policing,43 and social welfare programs. It
also supplies an economic argument for further investment in such policy goals.
There is also room for much creativity in designing policies around information
costs. For example, several of former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s ac-
tions during his time as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York seem
likely to have economized on decision costs (albeit most likely inadvertently). For
instance, Giuliani famously favored public arrests of high-profile individuals, which
attracted much media attention, even though the charges were often later dropped
or reduced.44 To be sure, this strategy has obvious defects: arguably violating the
rights of the dubiously humiliated high-profile figures, and risking decreased public
confidence in the rule of law. However, the idea of “selling” the notion that white-
collar criminals (or earlier in Giuliani’s career, mafia bosses) are as vulnerable to
enforcement as other citizens surely exploited cheap publicity for the message that
the expected payo↵ for criminal activity is negative. Giuliani also reputedly insti-
tuted a policy of aggressively prosecuting di↵erent types of crimes exclusively on
certain days of the week and neglecting those that were not the arbitrarily chosen
prosecution-du-jour.45 This would e↵ectively “hide” the asymmetries in enforcement
by increasing the decision cost of discovering what crimes would actually be (ag-
gressively) enforced, and thereby frustrate criminals looking to exploit asymmetries
in legal enforcement (the asymmetries of course were still present—limited resources
necessitates some sort of distribution of enforcement e↵orts—the point is that assign-
ing particular o↵enses to arbitrary days of the week had the e↵ect of making those
asymmetries more di cult to perceive and thus more di cult to exploit, discouraging
fragmentary heuristic-formation).
Finally, it bears highlighting a critical point, which may be easily confused. I am
43George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
Atlantic Magazine (March 1982).
44Joel Cohen, National Law Journal (August 5, 2002).
45This story may be apocryphal, but it does not much matter whether Giuliani actually adopted
such a policy—it su ces to point out that such a policy would be favored under my model.
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not arguing simply for an increase in information costs. If the cost of information
were increased, then under a trivially modified version of Becker’s theory, crimi-
nals would decline to attempt crimes simply because they have become more costly.
Rather, my point is that high information costs trigger heuristics, and that by dis-
tributing information costs in a certain way (uniformly if possible or unpredictably
if resources are limited), would-be criminals are not deterred because the increased
cost of information has made the commission of a particular crime unprofitable, but
rather because the aggregate cost of rational deliberation has become unprofitable.
Even if Becker’s model were tweaked to account for information costs, it would still
yield di↵erent predictions from the model I have proposed here.
3.5 Conclusion
There are several insights I have hoped to communicate in this essay. First, I hope
to have contributed a methodological novelty, suggesting an alternative role for be-
havioral economics in social engineering—the opposite of debiasing: “biasing.” As
opposed to situations where first order rational behavior is the normative goal, and
where irrational biases and heuristics present obstacles, in the realm of criminal law,
first order rational behavior may sometimes be the source of the problem. In such
cases, the law should encourage citizens to develop “irrational” biases, which lead
them away from self-interested rational behavior.46 The use of biases and heuristics
therefore presents us with a new tool in the policymaker’s toolkit.
Second, I hope to help bridge the divide between the economic theory of criminal
law and criminal law sociologists. I concede that further research will be required to
determine whether my theory is predictive in fact, however it is at least a plausible
framework for making the economic account of criminal deterrence more compatible
with the empirical data gathered by social scientists.
Third, I have identified a more nuanced policy goal for the criminal law: en-
couraging the formation of a “not to commit crime” heuristic rather than merely
e↵ecting first order deterrence for particular cases. And I have suggested several
ways of pursuing this new objective. Developing further strategies for generating
anti-crime heuristics promises to be a fecund new territory for future research.
46This is di↵erent from traditional incentive-alignment, which has typically assumed that actors
are first order rational. My methodological contribution will have been to show how inducing
systematic non-rational behavior can serve as an additional mechanism for incentive-alignment.
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3.6 Appendix
Proposition 1. In the absence of decision costs (i.e.,   = 0), D⇤ = DR.
Proof. By definition, Pj(DR(Fn, Ajn)) = Pj(a
⇤) = P ⇤j . Thus, from Formula 3.5,
we know that P 2j (DR, fn, Ajn) =
P
fn⇢Fi
⇥
p(Fi)P ⇤j
⇤
, assuming  (DR, Fx) = 0. From
Formula 3.6, we know that D⇤ = maxDx P 2j (Dx, fy, Ajz), and because of Lemma
3.6.0.1, it follows trivially that D⇤ = DR.
Lemma 3.6.0.1. maxX=hx0,x1,...,xni
Pn
i=0 gi(xi) = Z, such that Z = hz0, z1, ..., zni =
hmaxx0 g0(x0),maxx1 g1(x1), ...,maxxn gn(xn)i.
Proof. Suppose for reductio that maxX=hx0,x1,...,xni
Pn
i=0 gi(xi) 6= Z. This implies
that there exists an ordered set Z†, such that maxX=hx0,x1,...,xni
Pn
i gi(xi) = Z
† =
ha0, a1, ...ani and that 9ay9zy(ay 2 Z† 6= zy 2 Z).
We now proceed by mathematical induction (assuming that gi is independent of
gi+1). If a0 6= z0, then
P0
i=0 gi(zi) >
P0
i=0 gi(ai), since z0 = maxxg0(x). Therefore,
it must be the case that a0 = z0. And likewise, if
Pk
i=0 gi(zi) =
Pk
i=0 gi(ai) and
ak+1 6= zk+1, then
Pk+1
i=0 gi(zi) >
Pk+1
i=0 gi(ai), since zk+1 = maxxgk+1(x). Therefore,Pk+1
i=0 gi(zi) =
Pk+1
i=0 gi(ai). By induction, this proves that Z
† = Z, contradicting the
assumptions that maxX=hx0,x1,...,xni
Pn
i=0 gi(xi) 6= Z and that maxX=hx0,x1,...,xni
Pn
i gi(xi) =
Z†.
Proposition 2. The product of a second order optimal decision-procedure will not
always be coextensive with first order optimal decisions, ¬8a⇤(a⇤ = D⇤(Fn, Ajn)).
Proof. Suppose that
P
fn⇢Fi p(Fi)(Pj(DR(Fi, Ajz)) = r, and that  (DR, fn) = e.
And suppose there exists some alternate decision-making procedure DQ, such thatP
fn⇢Fi p(Fi)(Pj(DQ(Fi, Ajz)) = q, and that  (DQ, fn) = h. It follows trivially that
if r   q <Ph  e, then in some cases, the non-first order rational choice 9x9y(y =
D⇤Q(Fn, Ajz) ^ x⇤ = DR(Fn, Ajz) ^ x⇤ 6= y).
Proposition 3. Assuming actors are second order rational, maximal deterrence will
be achieved at the point where it becomes second order rational to adopt the heuristic
“not to commit crime.”
Proof. This proof follows trivially from the definitions. In the interest of thorough-
ness, however: Let DNC denote the heuristic “not to commit crime.” Clearly then,
 (DNC) = 0, regardless of the inputs; and for any x = DNC(fn, Ajn), where fn con-
tains the fact that the contemplated act is criminal (and only that fact), the output
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x will be to decline to commit the crime in question, which presumably generates
the private benefit 0.47
Let fa include the fact that the contemplated act is criminal and some other
factor !, and let fb include the fact that the contemplated act is criminal and the
factor that ¬!. Thus, if S = {Fi : fa ⇢ Fi _ fb ⇢ Fi} and T = {Fi : fn ⇢ Fi}, then
S = T .
Let DA1 and DA2 be alternative heuristics, such that DA1(fa, Aja) is to decline
to commit the crime, with decision cost  (DA1) = 0; and DA2(fb, Ajb) may (or may
not) prescribe undertaking the criminal act, with decision cost  (DA2) = µ.
Clearly, if DA2 ever prescribes undertaking a criminal act, the combination of
DA1 and DA2 will be less than maximally deterrent, because DNC would decline to
undertake that criminal act. If DA2 never prescribes undertaking a criminal act,
then the combination of DA1 and DA2 are maximal, but extensionally equivalent to
DNC , though possibly with higher decision costs, where µ > 0. Thus DNC is the
maximally deterrent heuristic, though possibly not uniquely.
Proposition 4. Inducing the development of a “not to commit crime” heuristic is
less costly than optimal first order deterrence.
Proof. If we assume first order rationality, then the necessary enforcement required to
deter potential criminals from committing a potential crime (in a particular situation
F , such that the factual circumstances f exist to commit a crime, i.e., f ⇢ F ) will
be:
⇡1S1 = B  K    + ✏
where   is the opportunity cost, and ✏ is some “kicker” to e↵ect ⇡1S1 > B K  .48
For second order rationality, the necessary enforcement required to deter potential
criminals from committing a potential crime will be:X
fn⇢Fi
 
⇡2S2
    X
fn⇢Fi
(B  K      ✏   )
It is easy to see that, ceteris paribus, ⇡1S1 > ⇡2S2: first consider if the average
payo↵ for a type of crime h were Bh  Kh    h, and if the average cost of rational
deliberation for such a crime  h(DR, fn ⇢ Fi) > 0. Trivially then, it would be the
case that:
⇡1hS
1
h = Bh  Kh    h   ✏ > Bh  Kh    h    h   ✏ = ⇡2hS2h
47It may be worth observing here that such “negative heuristics” may be better understood as
constraining Ajn rather than prescribing the “null” action.
48I will use superscripts ⇡nSn to denote su cient enforcement at n-order to deter crime.
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Moreover, if ⇡2hS
2
h > Bh   Kh    h    h for a set of triggering facts fn, then
according to my model, potential criminals will adopt a “not to commit crime (with
triggering facts fn)” heuristic, and thus ⇡2hS
2
h = ⇡
2S2, whereas under the first order
rational model, there may be outlier cases k, such that ⇡1kS
1
k > ⇡
1
hS
1
h. To achieve the
same result as a “not to commit crime” heuristic, first order deterrence theory would
suggest the necessary deterrence level should be set at ⇡1S1 = Bj  Kj    j, where
Bj  Kj    j represents the maximum possible surplus derived from committing a
type of criminal act.
Thus, the required enforcement under a first order deterrence model will be
far higher than under a second order deterrence model. And trivially therefore
C(⇡1, S1) > C(⇡2, S2).
Chapter 4
Harmful Speech
The freedom of expression is a defining characteristic of liberal democracies.1 In
practice, exceptions are invariably allowed to pervade, which permit putatively open
societies to regulate disfavored categories of speech. A predominant justification
given for such regulation is that some classes of expressive activity are supposed on
balance to be harmful. This article presents an argument undermining that justi-
fication. I contend that merely identifying a category of speech as generating low
social benefit and high social cost is an insu cient ground to justify regulation of
that speech.
The arguments I oppose are methodologically consequentialist and economic in
nature. I correspondingly formulate my counterarguments to the received view within
that same analytical framework. Certainly not all arguments for speech regulations
are of this kind. Alternatives exist. For example: that the law should be an instru-
1Indeed, even the most brutally illiberal governments have at least nominally recognized a
general speech right. For example, presumptions against the regulation of speech were enshrined
in the constitutions of Nazi Germany, Weimar Constitution art. 118 (1919), the Soviet Union,
Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, art. 2.14 (1918), Maoist China,
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, art. 87 (1954), and North Korea, Constitution of
North Korea, art. 67 (1972, rev. 1998). Although Libya under Gaddafi lacked a formal constitution,
it was nevertheless the o cial position of the Libyan government that citizens should enjoy unlimited
expressive rights. Gaddafi, Muammar. The Green Book (1975) (“An individual has the right to
express himself or herself even if he or she behaves irrationally to demonstrate his or her insanity.”).
Indeed, Libyan law extended full freedom of expression even to commercial speech, even specifying
tobacco advertising as an example where speech rights trump public health interests. However,
Gaddafi also proclaims, “private individuals should not be permitted to own any public means of
publication or information,” id., which e↵ectively rendered the right irrelevant. Moreover, even
residual “non-public speech rights” tended to be disregarded in practice in Gaddafi’s Libya—as in
the aforementioned authoritarian regimes.
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ment for preserving a community’s “cultural identity,” or that a class of expressive
activity is “contrary to the will of to God.” This article are not aimed at address-
ing those alternative rationales. I take harm-based justifications to be the best and
most frequently advanced bases for speech regulation, and rebuttal of that class of
justification is the sole object of the present inquiry.
My exposition consists in three main parts. In the first, I provide a generalized
construction of the harm-based justification for speech regulation and establish its
prevalence in jurisprudential and scholarly thought. Next, I identify three counter-
vailing e↵ects, which undermine the logic of the received view. In the presence of
these countervailing e↵ects, I demonstrate that government e↵orts to reduce harm-
ful speech will be less e↵ective than proponents of speech regulation have supposed,
and that such regulations may even exacerbate the very harms they were intended
to remedy. Finally, I sketch out how the three e↵ects may arise in specific speech
contexts.
4.1 The Argument for Harm-Based Regulation
Let us begin by abstracting the class of speech restrictions which limit an individual’s
right to expression in cases where it generates negligible social value and imposes a
substantial negative externality. This is definitional. I take these two conditions to
define “harmful speech,” demarcating the scope of the present inquiry.
Definition. “x is harmful speech” is true if and only if:
(condition i). x generates negligible social value, and
(condition ii). x imposes a substantial negative externality.
The two conditions are stronger than necessary for my argument to work. The
principles I exposit below are generally applicable whenever social welfare maximiza-
tion is used to justify speech regulation. In other words, the arguments I advance in
Section 4.2 apply even if “harmful speech” were simply defined as “net social welfare
reducing speech.” Nevertheless, for practical purposes it is useful to constrain the
definition of “harmful speech” in terms of conditions (i) and (ii), because these are
the terms in which courts and scholars have tended to formulate their justifications
for speech regulation.
Presumably, the reasons why courts and scholars have limited speech regulations
to instances where conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied (rather than any net welfare-
reducing speech) are preemptive. They anticipate several common objections to
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speech regulation, with which I agree, but which I do not investigate in depth here.
First, that it is exceedingly di cult to quantify and compare the value and social
cost of speech. Second, that the risk of “slippery slope” e↵ects abound. Third, that
citizens of liberal democracies derive utility from the very possession of the legal right
itself—beyond its merely instrumental value. In light of these reasons, harm-based
rationales for speech regulation typically assume that the social costs of a class of
expression should not merely be greater than its benefits, but substantially greater
than its benefits before the government is justified in interfering. For this reason, I
formulate “harmful speech” in terms of “negligible” social value and “substantial”
negative externality. Of course, this does not lessen the burden for my position.
To the contrary, it distills the claims of the received view to its strongest cases.
The principles exposited below follow a fortiori for all harm-based justifications for
speech regulation.
Next, for present purposes I define “speech regulation” as being either the punish-
ment or prior restraint of expressive activities. The term “regulation” is, of course,
sometimes understood more broadly than this.2 I consider the subsidization of speech
only in passing. When I use the term “speech regulation,” I exclusively mean either
ex ante restraint or ex post punishment of expressive activity. Within the ambit of
ex post punishment, I include all sanctions which would decrease the utility of the
speaker engaging in the proscribed speech. This includes both criminal and civil
liability.
Next, observe that arguments for the limitation of speech rights assume the ex-
istence of a general speech right. It is not sensible to speak of justifying a limitation
of legal rights which are not recognized as rights in the first place. In the United
States, the general speech right is established in the First Amendment of the Consti-
tution.3 The extent of the general right is unspecified in the text,4 and it is generally
understood to be the prerogative of the judicial system to determine its boundaries.
Broadly, courts have adopted two approaches to limiting the speech right. First,
they can deem a category of behavior to fall outside the ambit of “speech.” In other
words, courts can decline to legally recognize an activity as being speech, though
it may have some incidental expressive component. Therefore, being non-speech,
it falls outside the protection of the First Amendment. The government can thus
2For example, “regulatory activities” may broadly be taken to include subsidies also.
3U.S. Const. amend. I.
4There is a reasonable textualist argument that the extent is specified. “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” implies that any law abridging
speech violates the rights of citizens. Id. Courts have declined to accept this view, and the “no
law” language is customarily treated as something less than absolute.
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regulate it—assuming of course that the proposed regulation otherwise falls within
the powers which the Constitution assigns to the government. Second, the courts can
acknowledge a category of behavior as being speech properly, but hold that public
policy demands an exception.5 The most forceful public policy rationales typically
involve the identification of some social harm, which the regulation of speech is meant
to remedy.
There is little di↵erence between the two approaches in e↵ect. Whether the
courts declare a category of conduct to be “non-speech,” or “speech for which an
exception to the general right exists” is a merely formal distinction. It is immaterial
in practical e↵ect. The justification for adopting either approach—to the extent that
the justification is grounded in the harmfulness of a speech category—will employ
essentially identical reasoning.
Suppose the government proposes to regulate a class of expressive activity. Call
it x. Harm-based arguments advocating for the regulation of x share the general
form:
5The battle lines are somewhat less clear than I have indicated when viewed up close. For
example, the “traditionally exclusions” of the general speech right are sometimes argued to be non-
speech, and sometimes argued to be speech but within a recognized exception. These “traditional”
categories include defamation, obscenity, and incitement. The distinction is important in the struc-
ture of the argument. If the categories are defined as falling outside speech, then no justification for
their regulation is needed. However, if they fall within the ambit of “speech,” then their regulation
does require justification. To the extent the latter view is held, the arguments I present in this
article will apply.
The arguments given for regarding such expressions as non-speech are often “originalist” in
nature. The originalist argument is that these suspect speech categories were assumed to be per-
missible in the English law, and that the framers of the Constitution would not therefore have
regarded nor intended the First Amendment to be a bar on their regulation.
This is clearly mistaken. James Madison, addressing Congress on the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, expressly sought a break from past practice, distinguishing the guarantees of individual
liberty from earlier political and legal norms, saying, “But although . . . it may not be thought
necessary to provide limits for the legislative power in [Britain], yet a di↵erent opinion prevails
in the United States,” and “The right of freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is
expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this Government . . . .” 1 Annals of Cong. 436, 738
(1789).
Madison does not say, “unless of course the Government’s interest were compelling, in which
case, infringe away!”
Yet lest I be seen to endorse amateurish historical speculation, I should add that I am skeptical
what value there is in the originalist mode of Constitutional interpretation, that I do not pretend to
be a historian, and that I question how seriously we should take the moral speculations of bewigged,
pre-Industrial-Revolution plantation owners. I point to Madison’s remarks merely to indicate an
“even if” argument. Regretfully, a fuller discussion of the topic would require a digression of such
magnitude as to overwhelm my present thesis.
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1. x is harmful speech.
2. If harmful speech is punished, then social welfare is improved.
3. If x is punished, then social welfare is improved. (from 1, 2)
4. If punishing x improves social welfare, then the government should be permit-
ted to punish x.
5. Therefore, the government should be permitted to punish x. (from 3, 4)
The target of my counterargument is premise (2). If it can be shown that (2) is false,
then the inference to (3) fails. And without (3), the inference to (5) fails. And if the
inference to (5) fails, then merely establishing the fact that some x is harmful speech
will be insu cient to justify regulation of x. This is the critical point: interrupting
the inference to (5).
It bears remarking that premise (4), as I have formulated it, is also vulnerable to
counterargument. Concededly, it could be nuanced to better reflect the varying levels
of judicial scrutiny which the courts have applied to First Amendment controversies.
Regardless, premise (4) is not the target of my present inquiry, and if I have stated
(4) too extravagantly, this does no damage to my counterargument, for I stipulate the
point arguendo. Again, stipulating to (4) does not lessen the burden of my argument,
but rather strengthens the argument I oppose.
Of course, proponents of speech regulations do not assume premise (2) axiomat-
ically. It is supportable with further argumentation. For convenience, let us call the
supporting sub-argument the “harm-deterrence argument”:
2.1. If harmful speech is punished, then the supply of harmful speech decreases.
2.2. If the supply of harmful speech decreases, then social welfare is improved.
2. If harmful speech is punished, then social welfare is improved. (from 2.1, 2.2)
This can of course be analyzed still further. I expect premise (2.1) to be founded
on a model of deterrence, borrowed from the standard economic analysis of criminal
law.6 And premise (2.2) seems to follow trivially from the definition of “harmful
speech” (conditions (i) and (ii) above).
6See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
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The harm-deterrence argument has a kind of elegance, benefitting from its re-
semblance to the economic approach to criminal and tort law.7 By association with
that scholarship, it feels familiar, uncomplicated, and vaguely “right.”
Of course, the explicitly economic reconstruction of the argument for harm-based
regulation is seldom stated in the general form I have articulated. The express
formualtion is however not entirely absent in the scholarly literature. Judge Richard
Posner, ever the pioneer, attempted a general economic analysis of speech rights in
Free Speech in an Economic Perspective. Posner devises a cost-benefit framework
for interpreting the First Amendment, which is essentially equivalent to the harm-
deterrence argument above.8 Unfortunately, Posner’s initial push, which he carefully
distinguished as being “partial” and “tentative,”9 has not succeeded in inspiring
many economists to expand upon his work. And in the three decades since its
publication, Posner’s article remains still the most comprehensive treatment of speech
rights from an overtly economic perspective.
It would however be a mistake to characterize the harm-deterrence argument as
Posner’s argument. The policy rationales of non-economists used to justify speech
regulation are very nearly all implicitly economic justifications, which tacitly rely
upon the harm-deterrence argument for their foundation. Indeed, most of the fre-
quently rehearsed arguments for speech regulation are really harm-based economic
justifications in disguise. This last assertion, of course, requires some defense.
To foreclose potential complaints that I am setting up a straw man, some ex-
amples of courts and legal scholars utilizing the harm-based justification for speech
regulation are wanted. The remainder of this section addresses this concern.
I aim to show in subsections 4.1.1–4.1.7 that the harm-based justification is a
common thread running through free speech case law and scholarship. Moreover,
that in the absence of a harm-based justification for regulation, the general right to
free speech is typically understood as controlling. In other words, subsections 4.1.1–
4.1.7 are meant to establish that courts and legal scholars are committed to the
proposition: that the general speech right can be abridged if and only if there exists
a harm-based justification for carving out an exception. To demonstrate this, I pro-
vide a capsule tour of First Amendment jurisprudence, highlighting the harm-based
argument underlying the justifications for regulation and non-regulation throughout
history and across speech categories.
7See, e.g., Becker, supra note 6; Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law
(Harvard University Press 2007).
8Richard Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1 (1986).
See also Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 955–972 (9th ed. 2014).
9Free Speech, supra note 8, at 3.
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When a court indicates that the low social value and high social costs of a class
of expressive activity are grounds for allowing regulation of it, we may infer that
the court is assuming the harm-based argument diagrammed above. Conversely,
when a court points out either the non-negligible value or innocuousness of a class
of expressive activity as a ground for protecting it, the court must be assuming that:
(1) the harm-based justification is the only relevant justification for abridging the
general speech right; and (2) that the type of expressions at issue commonly fail to
satisfy condition (i) or condition (ii).
In either case, the inferential connection between the relative harms and benefits
of the speech category and regulation of that category depends upon the harm-based
justification. The reference to harms in the context of speech regulation would not
make sense if the validity of harm-based justifications were not an assumed major
premise.
4.1.1 General Theories of Speech Rights
Innumerable general theories of speech rights have been o↵ered throughout history.
This subsection considers a mere handful of representative samples, highlighting the
prevalence of harm-based justifications for allowing abridgment of the general speech
right. Unavoidably, the task entails some insensitivity to the nuances of the various
positions considered. The reasons given for when and why speech rights should be
respected, and when and why they should make way for other concerns are diverse
and subtle. However, these subtleties are mostly irrelevant for present purposes.
What matters is that the authors ultimately accept some specification of the harm-
based argument for abridging speech rights.
It is worth observing first that the notion of a general speech right is not a
recent invention. The ancient Athenians claimed to recognize a general right to free
speech,10 although, recalling the death of Socrates, we may well wonder as to its
true extent. The nominal right seems in any case to have arisen in various legal
systems throughout history. Unfortunately few sustained defenses of the principle
are discernible in ancient texts.
John Milton’s Areopagitica is commonly recognized as being among the earliest
modern pleas for liberal governance.11 However, the reverence in which civil libertar-
10See, e.g., Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens
(2005); Stephen Halliwell, Comic Satire and Freedom of Speech in Classical Athens, 111 J. Hel-
lenic Stud. 48 (1991).
11John Milton, Areopagitica, in John Milton: The Major Works 236 (Stephen Orgel &
Jonathan Goldberg, eds., 2008).
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ians hold the poet is puzzling, for he seemingly would allow considerable incursion
upon his posited speech right.12 The concern which motivated the Areopagitica was
the licensing and censorship of printed material, and it is only against these particular
forms of speech regulation which Milton protested. Milton advocated no limitation
whatever on how far governments could punish the authors of blasphemous publi-
cations after the fact.13 In the present-day parlance of law, he opposed merely the
“prior restraint” of speech. Indeed, he was apparently an enthusiastic supporter of
ex post regulation. And even with respect to prior restraint, Milton’s commitment
seems tepid relative to present-day standards. He was generous in the exceptions
he would carve out of the prohibition on prior restraints of speech—conceding to
restrictions on “popery,” superstition, impiety, or “evil” speech generally.14
Milton’s arguments—both for and against speech rights—were predominantly
moral arguments. Nevertheless, the Areopagitica is a landmark in the evolution of free
speech, and it merits at least passing consideration whether even here the harm-based
justification may be retrieved. Inasmuch as “popery” and “open superstition” are
deemed su ciently extreme to warrant prior restraint by government intervention, so
too are expressions which have the tendency to extirpate “civil supremac[y].”15 The
contention seems to be that those ideas which threaten to undermine the government
may justifiably be censored by the government. This at least seems to be an exclusion
to the prohibition on prior restraints, founded upon the reduction of a distinctly non-
moral harm. Thus do we find—even in the murky moralistic dawn of the modern
age—a harm-based justification for the regulation of speech.
Immanuel Kant is also often characterized as a defender of speech rights. Given
his association with deontological ethics, it may surprise some readers to learn that
he seems at least in some of his work to have endorsed harm-based justifications
for abridging the right to free speech. For example, in What is Enlightenment?, he
writes, “Nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom, and
indeed the most harmless among all the things to which this term can properly be
applied. It is the freedom to make public use of one’s reason at every point.” Here
12His arguments for speech rights are unimpressive also. Much of his polemic is aimed at estab-
lishing the value of speech for the Christian religion. Quite a lot of his argument is founded upon
appeals to authority and vague references to the “will of God.”
13Areopagitica (“Those which otherwise come forth, if they be found mischievous and libellous, the
fire and the executioner will be the timeliest and the most e↵ectuall remedy, that mans prevention
can use.”)
14Id. “I mean not tolerated Popery, and open superstition, which as it extirpats all religions and
civill supremacies, so it self should be extirpat, . . . that also which is impious or evil absolutely
either against faith or maners no law can possibly permit, that intends not to unlaw it self.”
15Id.
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already is cause for doubt. Kant’s gratuitous characterization of speech as “harmless”
reveals much about his thinking. Why should it matter that the freedom of speech
is “harmless,” unless harm were a possible ground for abridgment of the right?
Indeed, Kant seems to have believed precisely this, for he goes on to write that
the speech of public o cials and pastors might justifiably be abridged on account
of the harms which would result from unencumbered expression of their thoughts,
owing to the authority of their o ces.16 Harms, therefore, can justify the abridgment
of speech, even in Kant’s relatively liberal view. It merely happens to be the case
that—according to Kant—most speech simply cannot be very harmful.17 Critically
however, this does not foreclose the justifiable regulation of speech if it were shown
to be harmful.
John Stuart Mill adopts a similar position—though his underlying political and
moral theory is quite distinct from Kant’s. Mill was arguably most important pro-
ponent of speech rights—certainly prior to the twentieth century.
The first two chapters of On Liberty express many fine arguments for a liberal
speech doctrine. He is generally understood as advancing an extremum position,
maximally favoring the right to free speech. Yet even Mill would allow abridgment
of the speech right in order to mitigate harms. He is explicit on this point, writing,
“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”18 The principle
was not merely a latent possibility for Mill. He furnished concrete examples of the
abridgments he had in mind. In the third chapter, he writes:
[E]ven opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which
they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive
instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn-dealers are
starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be
unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly
incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled
before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same
mob in the form of a placard. Acts of whatever kind, which, without
justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important
cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavourable sentiments,
and, when needful, by the active interference of mankind. The liberty
16Id.
17A Kantian basis for further abridgment of speech rights may be found, for example, in Helga
Varden, A Kantian Conception of Free Speech, in Free Speech in a Diverse World 39 (Deidre
Golash ed., 2010).
18John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 9 (Hackett Publishing 1978) (1869).
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of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a
nuisance to other people.19
Mill’s position is clear: the prevention of harms can justify abridgment of the
speech right. The example he supplies would fall within the category of “incitement”
in present-day American jurisprudence, however the reasoning he employs seems
easily extensible to other cognizable exceptions—for example, the publication of
state secrets, true threats, and communications facilitating criminal conspiracies. It
is unlikely however that Mill would allow much more than this.
Having opened the door to harm-based justifications, Mill’s reluctance to admit
exceptions for o↵ensive speech, obscenity, false or libelous statements, or otherwise
harmful expressions may seem puzzling. On this point, it is worth clarifying that
Mill’s definition of “harm” is di↵erent from mine. Mill’s conception is narrower.
He does not believe that any harm can justify the abridgment of the speech right,
because many of the things which satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) would not count as
proper “harms” by his lights. He would exclude psychic harms—for example, shock,
disgust, loss of dignity. These are not properly “harms” in Mill’s theory. For an
expression to justify exception to the general speech right, its harm must be both
substantial and physical. Mill would surely object to most of the speech regulation
which liberal democracies presently allow. Yet he would not reject their harm-based
justifications on principle.
Mill’s insensitivity to psychic harms is somewhat surprising. His utilitarian moral
philosophy—equating “pleasure” with the good, and “pain” with bad—seems to
ground all ethics upon wholly mental phenomena. He was moreover an economist,
making it all the more puzzling that he refrains from drawing the natural equivalence
between “harm” with disutility. Possibly he was concerned about the problem of error
and the inaccessibility of mental states to third-party observers. Regardless, little
interpretative work is required to see the harm-based justification at work in Mill’s
theory of speech rights. Though not all harms—as defined by conditions (i) and
(ii)—can justify speech regulation, any acceptable abridgment of the speech right,
according to Mill, requires some harm-based justification.
Many subsequent moral and political philosophers have accepted some variation
of Mill’s harm principle. For example, Jeremy Waldron advances a theory substan-
tially similar to Mill’s, though expanding the scope of the definition of “harm” to
include hate speech.20 For Waldron, psychic harms are no less “harm” for the pur-
poses of speech rights analysis than physical harms. More generally, philosophers,
19Id. at 54???.
20Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Harvard University Press 2012).
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psychologists, and lawyers have tended increasingly to recognize psychic and digni-
tary harms as properly warranting legal redress, and the extension to Mill’s harm
principle seems a natural and sensible evolution of the theory.
A far more ambitious expansion of Mill’s theory may be found in Professor Fein-
berg’s four-volume series, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. In the first volume,
Feinberg articulates a definition of “harm,” which is distinct both from my definition
and Mill’s definition: “[O]nly setbacks of interests that are wrongs, and wrongs that
are setbacks to interest, are to count as harms in the appropriate sense.”21 Interests
and wrongs are given careful treatment in succeeding sections. The relevant point is
that, like Mill, Feinberg’s conception is constrained to exclude quite a lot of what we
might ordinarily mean by “harm.” Unlike Mill, Feinberg’s aim was not to provide a
general normative theory of law nor of justified government interference, but rather
more narrowly—as his title indicates—of the criminal law. Nevertheless, quite a
lot of speech regulation occurs in the form of criminalization, to which Feinberg’s
theory is directly relevant. Moreover, to the extent that Feinberg’s principles are
generalizable, it is indirectly informative to non-criminal speech regulations.
Feinberg’s harm principle includes things which I would bracket o↵ as “moral.”
He therefore would reject the strong claim that only expressions satisfying conditions
(i) and (ii) can justify abridgment of the speech right. However, he does seem to
believe that “harms” (as I have defined them) are one of the possible justifications
for the abridgment of speech rights. He is therefore at least committed to the harm-
based justification. Importantly, Feinberg’s definition of “harm” does not include the
kinds of harms which Waldron would regard as falling within the harm principle—i.e.,
psychic harms.
Yet the exclusion of psychic harms from the definition of “harm” does not entail
that criminal punishment on the basis of psychological e↵ects cannot be justified
under Feinberg’s theory. The harm principle is not the only operative justification in
his framework. Feinberg would also allow abridgment of speech rights on the basis
of “o↵ense,” the topic of the second volume in his series.22 Not all o↵ense can justify
a criminal sanction. Similar to his narrowing of the meaning of “harm,” Feinberg
adopts a notion of “serious o↵ense” which requires an element of wrongfulness. For
present purposes, the distinction Feinberg draws between “harms” and “o↵enses,” is
immaterial. Expressions which cause “harm” or “o↵ense” (by Feinberg’s definition)
are both “harmful speech” (under my definition).
21Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: I. Harm to Others 36
(1984).
22Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: II. Offense to Others
(1985).
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The moral component in Feinberg’s theory undermines straightforward mapping
to the harm-based justification diagrammed above. Nevertheless, it is clear that
under Feinberg’s theory, no less than his predecessors, the reduction of harms can
justify incursions upon the general speech right.
4.1.2 The Structure of First Amendment Review
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the prevalence of harm-based justifications for
limiting speech rights from a philosophical perspective. I turn now to the judiciary’s
treatment of speech rights in the practice of law in the United States.
First Amendment review developed alongside mid-century innovations in Equal
Protection and Due Process jurisprudence, recognizing multiple “levels” of consti-
tutional scrutiny.23 Tiered review for constitutional questions arose in the context
of the Fourteenth Amendment in United States v. Carolene Products Co.24 Artic-
ulation of the “strict scrutiny” standard followed in cases decided in the following
decade.25 Although the speech right was not directly implicated in these cases, the
Court’s opinions averred that government regulation of “core freedoms”—including
the freedom of speech and freedom of the press—ought to trigger the most strin-
gent standard of review. Accordingly, as First Amendment controversies wended
their way to the Supreme Court, government intrusions upon the speech right were
assessed within the framework of tiered review.
The nutshell gloss of First Amendment judicial review is that “content-based”
regulations warrant strict scrutiny, and “content-neutral” regulations intermediate
scrutiny. The rationale is that incursions upon the ideas and beliefs of the citizenry
are anathema to the principles of a liberal democracy. Content-based restrictions tar-
get semantic content—the very thing feared of an oppressive government—whereas
content-neutral restrictions target conduct. Because conduct only incidentally a↵ects
the marketplace of ideas, so long as alternative channels of communicating the same
information remain available to speakers, its e↵ect was surmised to be less injurious.
The distinction trades upon the di↵erence between regulating what is said versus
how, when, and where it is said. Thus, if the speech a↵ected by a content-neutral
regulation can be expressed via alternative channels, it is presumed that the public
will not be deprived of access to the content of that speech, and therefore that the
expected damage to the free exchange of ideas would be less egregious (and therefore
23This correspondence has not been without criticism. For example, see Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 125 (1991) (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
24304 U.S. 144, 152 fn. 4 (1938).
25Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942).
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less in need of protection). The Fifth Circuit neatly captures the rationale:
Content-neutral time-place-manner restrictions are examined under in-
termediate scrutiny, meaning they are permissible so long as they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.
Content-based time-place-manner restrictions are examined under strict
scrutiny, meaning they must be narrowly drawn to e↵ectuate a compelling
state interest.26
Things are rather more complex in practice of course. For example, even content-
based speech regulation is typically scrutinized under a lower standard when the
speech is expressed in a government-owned non-public forum—for example, military
bases or prisons.27 Professor Kelso contends that First Amendment review should
therefore be understood as consisting in three tiers: strict scrutiny, intermediate re-
view, and reasonableness balancing.28 Others have raised doubts about employing
the categorical approach to First Amendment questions at all (and indeed constitu-
tional questions generally). Bunker, Calvert, and Nevin describe a gradual weaken-
ing of strict scrutiny over time,29 blurring the boundaries of tiered review. Professor
Shaman recognizes the trend more broadly in Constitutional jurisprudence, and wel-
comes a dissolution of “rigid” categories of review.30
The subtleties of judicial review need not detain us for present purposes. It suf-
fices to observe that even under the courts’ most stringent standard, public policy
objectives can justify intrusion on speech rights, so long as those objectives are suf-
ficiently “compelling.” This has consistently remained the majority position among
the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court from the earliest First Amendment cases.
It should be mentioned however that the defeasibility of speech rights has never
enjoyed unanimous approval. Justice Hugo Black envisaged a rather more mechan-
ical approach: that once a category of behavior is recognized as speech, the bar on
26Sonnier v. Crain, 613 F.3d 436, 441 (2010) (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,
213?14 (1997); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, (1989); and Perry Educ. Ass’n v.
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
27See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966); Greer v. Spock, 242 U.S. 828, 836–40
(1976); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354–58 (1980).
28R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate
Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 Elon L. Rev. 291 (2016).
29Matthew D. Bunker, et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict
Scrutiny and The Protection of Speech, 16 Comm. L. & Policy, 349 (2011).
30Je↵rey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny,
45 Ohio L.J. 161 (1984).
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government intervention should be absolute.31 Justice Anthony Kennedy, decrying
the slipshod manner in which the “compelling state interest” test meandered into
First Amendment jurisprudence, expressed similar reservations.32 Justices William
O. Douglas and Antonin Scalia have also been characterized as free speech “abso-
lutists,” although a careful consideration of their opinions reveals more complexity
than the label suggests.
In the argument framework of the harm-based justification for speech regulation,
the “absolutist” position appears to be founded upon a rejection of premise (4). I
should add parenthetically that although I do not argue for “absolutism” in this
article, I am sympathetic to that viewpoint. Even if a speech regulation were shown
to be welfare improving, I am skeptical whether it ought to be the government’s
business to intervene in the realm of ideas, beliefs, and preferences. My purpose in
granting premise (4) to proponents of speech regulation is merely to bracket o↵ a
digression which might threaten to overwhelm the principal point I hope to advance
here: the defectiveness of premise (2). I should reiterate however that I grant (4) only
for the purposes of argument, and ultimately I believe the harm-based justification
falters on both premises (2) and (4).
4.1.3 Defamation
It is often remarked how few First Amendment cases were litigated prior to the
twentieth century. There are several reasons for the relatively delayed emergence
of First Amendment case law. Facially, the language of the First Amendment only
limits the power of the federal legislature to make laws abridging the freedom of
speech.33 And the United States Congress evinced little interest in regulating speech
31See generally Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865 (1960); Reflections
on Justice Black and Freedom of Speech, 6 Val. U. L. Rev. 316 (1972); Loren P. Beth, Mr. Justice
Black and the First Amendment: Comments on the Dilemma of Constitutional Interpretation, 41
J. Pol. 1105 (1979).
32Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 126
(1991) (“The inapplicability of the compelling interest test to content-based restrictions on speech
is demonstrated by our repeated statement that ‘above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.’”) (citing Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
33Curiously, “originalist” proponents of speech regulation have relied upon this distinction to
justify incursions into the speech realm. Given that the First Amendment is now understood
to apply to states under incorporation (see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)),
the point seems to be that the “intent of the Framers” was only to assign powers in the design
of a federal government. Thus, when Madison proclaimed, “The people shall not be deprived
or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of
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in its early years—with the notable exception of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.
But the constitutionality of the Alien and Sediction Acts was never litigated before
the Supreme Court, as the power of judicial review was not established until 1803,34
and the legislation was written to expire in 1801.35
Thus, the First Amendment would not have protected individuals from state in-
cursions on their speech rights, and the federal government seems not to have tried—
but for the one exception. Consequently, we have a dearth of First Amendment case
law arising from the early decades of the Republic.
However, our historical inquiry need not end here, for the federal constitution is
not the sole source of speech rights in American law. Several state constitutions also
recognized speech rights, and the justifications for the abridgment of those rights
are informative. They are informative insofar as they are examples of rationales
which have been o↵ered in defense of speech regulation—not because they have any
precedential significance.
The early speech cases typically arose from defamation disputes. It is not di cult
to retrieve the harm-deterrence argument implicit in the courts’ opinions. For exam-
ple, in Runkle v. Meyer,36 a printer was sued for publishing a scandalous anecdote
involving the putative misdeeds of a clergyman. Among the several issues decided
in that case was the question whether libel constituted an actionable claim. The
court reasoned that because “slander” (i.e., a spoken defamation) was actionable, it
should follow that “libel” (i.e., a printed defamation) ought to be actionable also,
on the ground that the harm caused by written defamation, capable of reaching a
wider audience, would likely be greater than the harm caused by a spoken one.37
The court’s logic relies upon the harm-deterrence argument. Leveraging the
the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable,” the originalists seem to
say, he meant only that it should be inviolable by the federal government. 1 Annals of Cong.
434 (1789). State governments, of course, may violate at will. And when George Washington,
addressing his soldiers, announced, “[T]he freedom of Speech may be taken away, and, dumb and
silent we may be led, like sheep, to the Slaughter,” the originalists would contend, he was only
talking of the British—not state legislatures. Founders Online, National Archives, available at:
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-10840. The contention is ba✏ing.
34Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
35Later Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that it would—or at least should—have been
found unconstitutional. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 576 (1964) (“Although the
Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the
court of history. Fines levied in its prosecution were repaid by Act of Congress on the ground that
it was unconstitutional.”).
363 Yeates 518 (1803).
37Id. at 519 (“The o↵ence of a libel is more heinous, as its circulation of the slander is more
extensive . . . .”).
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harm-of-slander relative to the harm-of-libel in order to establish the actionability
of the latter, the court implies that harmfulness is the relevant factor in establishing
liability. To deploy its argument, the court must assume that slander is prohibited
because it generates little value and imposes a substantial externality.38 This im-
plies the general principle that the more harmful an expression, the stronger the
justification for regulating it.
The argument advanced by the court is that if the harm of slander is x, and
the harm of libel is y, and y > x, then it follows that y should be actionable. The
implication is that there is some threshold z whether a cause of action should be
recognized. And by transitivity, since x > z and y > x, it follows that y > z. But
this relies upon the premise that harm is the relevant consideration whether the
abrogation of speech rights should be permitted in a civil action. It is only upon this
premise that pointing out the relatively greater harmfulness of printed defamation
can have any relevance.
In another of the early defamation cases, Mayrant v. Richardson,39 the plainti↵
claimed to have lost a congressional election because the defendant had opined to
prospective voters, “[Mayrant’s] mind was impaired, weakened, and could never be
depended on.” The court ruled that the words did not constitute slander: First,
because the extent of the negative externality was thought to be marginal (the court
thought the words more likely to inspire “compassion” than “hatred, ridicule, or
contempt”).40 Second, because the expression of an opinion—especially of an indi-
vidual seeking public o ce—was at least potentially socially valuable.41 Thus we
find here again, the court’s reasoning relies implicitly upon harm-based reasoning:
failure to meet conditions (i) and (ii), the utterance was found non-harmful and thus
not actionable.
In Blunt v. Zuntz an attorney was sued for slander for statements made during
38As to the absence of value in the publication, the court mentions that truth would relieve the
printer of his liability. Id. at 520. As to the negative externality, see id. at 519 (“It will not be
denied, that if one designedly bespatters another’s cloathes with filth, as he passes the street, . . .
he would be liable for damages. And shall a printer with his types, blacken the fairest reputation,
the choicest jewel we enjoy . . . .”).
391 Nott & McC 347 (1818).
40The court stated that for an alleged defamation to be actionable, the externality should either
be legal punishment (presumably contemplating false reports to the police or perjury) or measurable
injury. Id. at 349. The imputation of mental impairment did not, in the view of the court, cause
any such injury. Id. (“[Mental impairment] was a misfortune and not a fault. It might have been
calculated to excite compassion, but not hatred, ridicule or contempt.”); and id. at 353 (“[T]he
words must be of an opprobrious nature, and such as are calculated to lessen the person of whom
they are spoken, in the opinion of the community.”).
41Id. at 353.
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litigation.42 The court notes:
It is an established rule, that no action can be maintained against a
counsellor for words pertinent to the issue, spoken in judicial proceedings
. . . . The object of this rule is closely connected with the utility of
the function of counsel, which consists principally in a liberal freedom of
speech, and that he may not be embarrassed by continually balancing in
his mind whether the remark he is about to make be slanderous or not.43
The court indicates that the relevant factor was failure of condition (i)—that the
utterances of lawyers in courts are not of low social value. Though the speech may
impose some negative externality, the court recognized the value of it to be non-
negligible—i.e., that there exists “utility” in “the function of counsel.” Ergo, such
speech is not harmful, and its expression should not be actionable.
Harm-based reasoning is thus clearly observable in the early speech cases of Amer-
ican courts. Defamation claims would not be tested against the federal constitution
until the mid-twentieth century, however the subsequent cases would fundamentally
track the harm-based concerns expressed in Runkle, Mayrant, and Blunt.
In its first major defamation case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,44 the U.S.
Supreme Court ratcheted up protection of speech rights against defamation claims,
holding that plainti↵s were required to prove “actual malice” to recover. Critically,
like in Blunt, the Court’s reasoning in Sullivan was founded on the failure of condition
(i), identifying a non-negligible social benefit in potentially defamatory expressions.45
Later, in a distinguishing case limiting the Sullivan holding to public figures, the
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. again weighed the balance of benefits and costs,
with Justice Powell writing, “The legitimate state interest underlying the law of li-
bel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory
falsehood.”46 And in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., retreating
further from Sullivan, Powell opined, “In light of the reduced constitutional value of
42Ant.N.P. (2d Ed.) 246.
43Id. at fn 1 (emphasis added).
44Supra note 35.
45Sullivan, supra note 35 at 281 (“The importance to the state and to society of such discussions
is so vast, and the advantages derived are so great that they more than counterbalance the inconve-
nience of private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations
of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The
public benefit from publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private character so small that
such discussion must be privileged.”) (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 724 (1908)).
46418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (emphasis added).
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speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest ade-
quately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages—even absent a showing
of ‘actual malice.’”47
It is abundantly clear from the Court’s language—both when strengthening and
weakening the speech right—that it is attempting to identify whether and to what
extent conditions (i) and (ii) apply. The harm-deterrence argument is implied
throughout the opinions. The Court consistently reasons in terms of the deterrence
objective—i.e., decreasing the supply of harmful speech—which defamation actions
are meant to e↵ect.48
Notably, the Court has been explicit that when abridging the speech right, it is not
recognizing a latent definitional quirk in the Framers’ conception of “speech.” The
opinions do not ground the defamatory speech exclusion on the basis of a “historical
understanding” of the speech right. They apply a balancing test essentially identical
to the implicit harm-based rationale employed in the nineteenth century in order to
determine whether a category of expression warrants protection.
4.1.4 Espionage Act Cases and Incitement
The first significant speech cases properly litigated under the First Amendment arose
in connection with the Espionage Act of 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918. In Schenck v.
United States,49 the defendant Charles Schenck, in his capacity as General Secretary
of the Socialist Party, oversaw the printing and distribution of leaflets encouraging
draftees to resist conscription. The government charged that he had violated provi-
sions of the Espionage Act, which prohibited e↵orts “to obstruct the recruiting and
enlistment service of the United States, when the United States was at war with
the German Empire.”50 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes devised his
47472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985).
48See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 35, at 279 (“Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden
of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.”); id. at
299 (“Such criticism cannot [presumably “should not”], in my opinion, be muzzled or deterred by
the courts at the instance of public o cials under the label of libel.”); Gertz, supra note 46, at
350 (“[Punitive damages for libel] are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines
levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.”); Dun,
supra note 47, at 762 (“[I]n the libel context, the States’ regulatory interest in protecting reputation
is served by rules permitting recovery for actual compensatory damages upon a showing of fault.
Any further interest in deterring potential defamation through case-by-case judicial imposition of
presumed and punitive damages awards on less than a showing of actual malice simply exacts too
high a toll on First Amendment values.”) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
49249 U.S. 47 (1919).
50Id. at 49.
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infamous “clear and present danger” test:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even
protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have
all the e↵ect of force. The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its e↵ort that their utterance will
not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them
as protected by any constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that if
an actual obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for
words that produced that e↵ect might be enforced.51
Holmes’s opinion indicates a balancing of utilities: the Socialist’s Party’s interest
in expression, the public’s interest in the receipt of ideas, and the government’s
interest in advancing the war e↵ort. He evidently felt the war e↵ort to be so weighty
an interest as to render all other considerations negligible. He accordingly found the
regulations constitutional.
Holmes was careful to distinguish that in di↵erent circumstances, the calculus of
costs and benefits could change. The implication is that the harmfulness of speech—
i.e., whether it satisfies conditions (i) and (ii)—is context-dependent, and therefore
that the constitutional protection of speech ought to be correspondingly context-
dependent.
It is of critical importance to recognize that this conclusion follows only if Holmes
assumes the major premise: “If harmful speech is punished, then social welfare is
improved.” There is no conceivable other purpose to his pointing out the harmfulness
of Schenck’s leafletting except to establish the reduction of harm as a ground for
abridging the speech right.
This framework is reinforced in Abrams v. United States,52 the facts of which are
substantially similar to those in Schenck, where Holmes wrote in dissent:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would
justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally
may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and
51Id. at 52.
52250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive
evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent. The
power undoubtedly is greater in time of war than in time of peace because
war opens dangers that do not exist at other times.
But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle of
the right to free speech is always the same. It is only the present danger
of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress
in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are
not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all e↵ort to change the
mind of the country. Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious
publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would
present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success
of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so.53
History of course has noted Holmes’s apparently shifting disposition. In Schenck,
he found the wartime leafletting to have satisfied the requirements of the “clear and
present danger” test, while in Abrams, under substantially the same set of facts,
he found that it did not. The reason for the apparent transformation has fueled
much speculation among historians and biographers.54 Yet Holmes contended his
position had not changed.55 Historians propose two possible assessments: first, that
Holmes inexplicably failed to notice that he had arrived at divergent outcomes when
presented with substantially identical facts; and second, that his protestations of
self-consistency were intellectually dishonest.
I believe there is a third possibility. What Holmes may have meant when he
claimed his position had not changed was that his reliance on the harm-based ar-
gument remained consistent. In his dissent, Holmes rea rms the premise that the
harmfulness of speech can justify carving out exceptions to the First Amendment.
The distinction is merely that in Abrams he no longer seemed to regard anti-war
leafletting as satisfying the definition of “harmful speech.” What altered his as-
sessment is unknown. Possibly he thought Schenck’s leaflets more harmful than
Abrams’s leaflets, or possibly he reconsidered his assumptions about the harm of
leafletting generally. In either case, it would have been the minor premise—not the
rule—which determined the di↵erent outcomes.
53Id. at 627–628 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
54Holmes, writing for the majority, rea rmed the “clear and present danger” test in two other
pre-Abrams cases, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) and Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919). His use of “clear and imminent danger” rather than “clear and present danger”
in Abrams is also curious.
55Id. at 627.
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Viewed in the context of Holmes’s approach to law generally, it is unsurprising
that his First Amendment jurisprudence relied upon distinctly economic premises.
It was his sensitivity to the economic tradeo↵s in rule-making—more than any par-
ticular set of decisions—which has proved to be his greatest contribution to the law.
The economic torch was duly passed in United States v. Dennis, in which the suc-
ceeding generation’s great proto-economist, Judge Learned Hand, elaborating upon
Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test, o↵ered a yet more explicitly economic
construction of the rule:
In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger.56
Hand’s analysis is uncannily familiar, for it closely resembles the negligence formula
he famously articulated in United States v. Carroll Towing Co..57 Hand’s opinion
in Carroll Towing, ubiquitous in torts casebooks, prescribes a balancing of expected
benefits against expected costs to e↵ect e cient precautionary care incentives for
prospective injurers. The Dennis elaboration of the “clear and present danger” test
simply extends the tort principle to the First Amendment context.
Interestingly, prior to Dennis, when Hand was still a district court judge, he
had fashioned a rather di↵erent First Amendment test in Masses Publishing Co. v.
Patten.58 The plainti↵—publisher of the socialist magazine The Masses—moved for
preliminary injunction against the postmaster, who refused to deliver the publication
on the ground that it was “seditious” under the terms of the Espionage Act. The
magazine was critical of the decision to go to war and praised citizens who would
resist conscription. Hand’s test in Masses was to require that the incitement be
direct to justify exception to the general speech right.59 Thus, legislation prohibiting
the expression, “You must violently overthrow the government,” would be consti-
tutional, whereas prohibition of the expression, “It would be laudable if someone
56United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), a↵ ’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
57159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947) (defining the duty of care as B < PL, or the burden of precautions
less than the probability of loss). Posner, of course remarks upon the convergence of principle. Free
Speech, supra note 8 at 8; Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 8 at 958.
58244 F. 535 (1917).
59Id. at 540 (“[T]o assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent
resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation which in normal times
is a safeguard of free government. The distinction is not a scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought
acquisition in the fight for freedom, and the purpose to disregard it must be evident when the power
exists. If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the
law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation.”).
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would overthrow the government,” would not be. The distinction is a crystalline
one, for it reduces the factual question to one of linguistics. The former expression
is imperative, whereas the latter is declarative.
Throughout his Masses opinion, Hand repeatedly emphasized the high social
value of political dissent as a ground for narrowly construing the Espionage Act.
Thus, even before the question went to the Supreme Court in Schenck, it seems
Hand had already envisaged that conditions (i) and (ii) would need to be satisfied to
overcome the presumption favoring the freedom of expression. Though the Masses
test is distinct from the “clear and present danger” test, a convergence in reasoning is
observable. Both approaches seek to formulate a harm-based framework for limiting
the general speech right.60
4.1.5 Fighting Words and Hate Speech
A third context in which the courts have recognized limitations to the general speech
right is the “fighting words” exception. The precedent was established in Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire, in which Justice Murphy, writing for a unanimous Court,
premised the constitutionality of speech regulations upon whether the targeted ex-
pressions, “by their very utterance inflict[ed] injury or tend[ed] to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.”61
In the facts which gave rise to the controversy, a proselytizing Jehovah’s Wit-
ness was fined for insulting a police o cer, calling him a “damned racketeer,” and
a “damned Fascist,” in violation of New Hampshire laws prohibiting expressions
susceptible to provoking violence. In justifying the holding, Murphy explained:
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
60In Masses, Hand would grant the plainti↵’s motion for preliminary injunction on the ground
that condition (i) was not satisfied. The Second Circuit reversed. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244
F. 535 (1917). And the Supreme Court, as we have seen, would ultimately chose a di↵erent rule—
at least initially. The story does not quite end here, however, for Hand’s test is widely regarded
as having inspired the “imminent lawless action” test in Brandenburg v. Ohio, which would later
displace the “clear and present danger” test. 395 US 444 (1969).
Although Brandenburg remains the standard for evaluating the constitutionality of incitement
laws today, the published opinions are not particularly enlightening for present purposes. Chief
Justice Warren’s majority opinion gives no reason for the departure from the Holmes cases, pre-
tending continuity with Dennis. Justice Black’s concurring opinion, consisting of one paragraph,
merely indicates his view that Brandenburg does invalidate the “clear and present danger” test.
And Justice Douglas’s concurrence takes the position that the First Amendment should not be
subject to any exceptions, and thus supplies no reasoning to justify why the Court carves out the
limits that it does.
61315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.62
The identification of conditions (i) and (ii) could not more clearly have been within
the contemplation of the Court. Moreover, the harm-deterrence argument is also
evident in the Court’s reasoning. Envisioning a deterrent e↵ect leading to an im-
provement in social welfare, Murphy wrote:
[T]he statute had been previously construed as intended to preserve the
public peace by punishing conduct, the direct tendency of which was to
provoke the person against whom it was directed to acts of violence.63
The language in Chaplinsky does not establish the stronger proposition—implied
in some later cases—that harmfulness is the only justification for the abridgment of
the general speech right. Murphy writes about balancing “social value” against the
“social interest in order and morality.” This is ambiguous, potentially leaving room
for non-consequentialist considerations. Regardless, the Court in Chaplinsky was
indubitably asserting that social cost can be one justification for abridging speech
rights.
Chaplinsky would provide the foundation for the Court’s hate speech doctrine.
These cases are an interesting avenue for further exploration. In R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul,64 a divided Court—though unanimous in judgment—ruled upon the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance proscribing expressive activities which
might arouse “anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.”65
The petitioner was charged under the St. Paul ordinance for burning a cross in
the front yard of a Black family. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, premised
his judgment upon the legislation’s use of an “impermissible motive.” The gravamen
of his argument was that even where legislation falls within a recognized exception
to the general speech right, prohibiting a subset of that excepted class requires an in-
dependent justification. Absent this, Scalia’s concern was evidently that Chaplinsky
could be used as a workaround to allow content-based regulations:
That would mean that a city council could enact an ordinance prohibit-
ing only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the city
62Id. (emphasis added).
63Id. at 574, fn 8.
64505 U.S. 377 (1992).
65Id. at 377.
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government or, indeed, that do not include endorsement of the city gov-
ernment. . . . The proposition that a particular instance of speech can
be proscribable on the basis of one feature (e.g., obscenity) but not on
the basis of another (e.g., opposition to the city government) is common-
place and has found application in many contexts. We have long held,
for example, that nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of
the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses—so that
burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be
punishable, whereas burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against
dishonoring the flag is not.66
Scalia’s apprehension seems to be a sensible one, which the hostile concurring opin-
ions may not have fully appreciated. However, the doctrinal solution he devised
seems to have been confused—or at least profoundly unsatisfying.
Scalia apparently understood Chaplinsky to do no more than carve out a con-
stitutional exception for the category “fighting words.” Yet Chaplinsky does more
than this. It establishes a cost-benefit framework for evaluating First Amendment
controversies. Having determined—sensibly—that the abrogation of speech rights
within the subset of a recognized exception requires independent justification, Scalia
does not proceed to the natural followup question whether the expressions proscribed
under the St. Paul ordinance would satisfy the Chaplinsky test. Rather, he simply
strikes down the ordinance on the ground that it is content-based.
The concurring opinions of Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens are unsparing
in their criticism of the majority. White lambasts Scalia’s proposed requirement that
the regulation of a subset of an already recognized First Amendment exception must
have an independent content-neutral justification. White contends that speech within
a recognized exception may permissibly be proscribed without further inquiry.67
Blackmun’s brief concurrence is ambiguous, on the one hand reasoning that if the
regulation of fighting words is permissible, then its more harmful variants ought—on
the basis of being more harmful—be regulable a fortiori. This echoes the argumenta-
tive move the Runkle court used in recognizing the actionability of libel claims.68 Yet
on the other hand, Blackmun writes also that the parsing of recognized exceptions
66Id. at 384.
67Id. at 400 (“To the contrary, those statements meant precisely what they said: The categorical
approach is a firmly entrenched part of our First Amendment jurisprudence. . . . [T]he majority
holds that the First Amendment protects those narrow categories of expression long held to be
undeserving of First Amendment protection—at least to the extent that lawmakers may not regulate
some fighting words more strictly than others because of their content.”).
68Supra note 36.
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could lead to a dissolution of speech protections. Assuming he did not think the ero-
sion of speech rights a desirable outcome, his position seems puzzlingly inconsistent.
Stevens’s concurrence seems to provide the widest perspective.69 Stevens recog-
nized that Scalia’s position, embracing a set of speech categories as exceptions to
the First Amendment, is at odds with the Court’s treatment of speech categories.
Scalia would allow only a categorical—not a content-based—incursion upon the gen-
eral speech right. Stevens contends however that all the Court’s First Amendment
exceptions are fundamentally grounded upon the harm-based justification following
Chaplinsky. The categorical exceptions are exceptions because they are harmful—
which is very often a content-based determination. Thus, the ground for a First
Amendment exception according to Stevens should not be mere membership within
a pre-established category, but rather the expected harmfulness of expressions typical
of the category. If the representative expression within the class satisfies conditions
(i) and (ii), then that class of expressions warrants less protection.
R.A.V. is a confused case. For present purposes, its most notable feature is
that Scalia’s opinion eschews harm-based arguments entirely. His opinion proposes
a purely legalistic test: x is a permissible regulation of speech if and only if x is
neither more nor less than the whole category of obscenity, fighting words, criminal
conspiracy, defamation, etc. The reasons why these categories have been carved out
of the general speech right are given no serious consideration. Scalia declines to say
whether further categories can be added to this list, or whether changing circum-
stances might warrant removing a category.70 The basis is characterized in formalistic
terms (patterned on “legal logic” rather than consideration of consequential e↵ects).
The concurrences, though not fully appreciative of the concern motivating Scalia’s
opinion, are correct that Scalia’s formalistic approach is at odds with the Court’s
prior treatment. Pointing out the harm-based ground for the St. Paul ordinance,
White insisted:
This selective regulation reflects the city’s judgment that harms based on
race, color, creed, religion, or gender are more pressing public concerns
than the harms caused by other fighting words. In light of our Nation’s
long and painful experience with discrimination, this determination is
plainly reasonable. Indeed, as the majority concedes, the interest is com-
pelling.71
69505 U.S. at 417.
70Scalia acknowledges that “compelling state interests” may override the general speech right,
conceding to cost-benefit weighing in principle, though he seems to regard the St. Paul ordinance
as overly broad in achieving the government’s objective. Id. at 395–96.
71Id. at 407.
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Blackmun’s concurrence also mentions the relative harmfulness of generic fighting
words as compared with racially charged symbols.72 And Stevens discusses at length
the harmfulness justification in limiting First Amendment rights in several contexts.73
Scalia’s opinion is interesting in the present context because it represents one of
the few genuine exceptions where the Court has employed non-harm-based justifica-
tions for speech regulation. It is important to recognize however that in R.A.V., the
result was not to allow the disputed regulation, but rather to invalidate it. Whether
Scalia would have considered harmfulness when deciding to permit an exception is
unclear.
Discerning a consistent thread in Scalia’s First Amendment jurisprudence is a
di culty which has motivated much commentary.74 Regardless, taken in the context
of succeeding cases, R.A.V. seems not to represent a general departure from harm-
based justifications for speech regulation for the Court as a whole.
In a factually similar subsequent case, Virginia v. Black,75 the Court struggled to
apply Scalia’s content/category test from R.A.V. Justice O’Connor, writing for the
majority in Black, distinguished that the Virginia statute at issue, which prohibited
cross-burning specifically, was constitutional under the “true threats” exception—
though the statutory specification that cross-burning should be taken as prima facie
evidence of intimidation was not constitutional (being “content-based”). As Justice
72Id. at 415.
73Id. at 423, 424–26, 429–435.
74Justice Scalia’s First Amendment jurisprudence is a fascinating web of apparently contradictory
positions, which I cannot satisfactorily explore within the scope of this article. On the one hand, he
established a reputation as a stalwart defender of individual speech rights in cases like R.A.V., id.;
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (finding prohibitions on flag-burning unconstitutional); and
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (striking down a California
law banning the sale of violent video games to children). On the other hand, he voted to allow
the regulation of speech in cases like Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)
(carving out an exception for student speech in a curricular context); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393 (2007) (expanding the scope of “school speech” to school sanctioned events generally).
Unlike his judicial philosophy in other contexts, Scalia’s First Amendment decisions have only
vaguely implicated “originalism.” See discussion, supra note 5, 33. See also Antonin Scalia, Orig-
inalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 849 (1989). There are traces of his “originalist”
philosophy to be found in R.A.V. and also in his dissent in Board of County Com’rs, Wabaunsee
County, Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 686 (1996) (curiously characterizing the majority’s position
as “formalist”). On Scalia’s First Amendment jurisprudence generally, see David Schultz, Justice
Antonin Scalia’s First Amendment Jurisprudence: Free Speech, Press and Association Decisions, 9
J. L. & Pol. 515 (1993); Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a
Power Theory of the First Amendment, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 251 (2000); and the symposium articles
in 15 First Amend. L. Rev. 152–330 (2017).
75538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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Souter observes in his dissent, distinguishing the prima facie evidentiary provision
from the substantive prohibition cannot sensibly save the statute, for the prohibition
itself (not merely the presumption clause) specifies cross-burning rather than “true
threats” generally.76 O’Connor’s response was to distinguish Virginia’s statute—
singling out cross-burning—as consistent with R.A.V., because cross-burning is an
especially virulent form of intimidation.77 It constituted a permissible partition of a
recognized exception, because the reason for regulating the subset was identical to
the reason for regulating the category generally. The distinction seems a flaccid one,
for one might just as well say that the St. Paul ordinance was directed at a subset
of “fighting words,” which are especially virulent in the form of a burning cross.
Regardless how the cross-burning cases should be reconciled, or how the Court
would decide future cross-burning cases, the relevant point is that to the extent
that R.A.V. seemed to eschew the harm-based justification, Black grafted it onto
the content/category test in allowing “particularly virulent” subsets to be regulable
independently of a category. Thus, even if R.A.V. were understood to represent an
abandonment of harm-based reasoning, the harm-based framework was reinstated in
Black.
One last representative case worth considering in the context of fighting words
and hate speech is Snyder v. Phelps,78 where members of the infamous Westboro
Baptist Church picketed at the funeral of a fallen marine with signs reading, “God
hates fags,” and “Fags doom nations.”79 They were sued by the soldier’s family for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts
recognized the distasteful speech to be constitutionally protected, emphasizing the
76VA Code Ann. § 18.2–423 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any
person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of
another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision
of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a
person or group of persons.
77Id. at 363 (“It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any
person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a
highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be
guilty of a Class 6 felony. Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons.”).
78562 U.S. 443 (2011).
79Id. at 469. It is perhaps worth mentioning, given the theme of the signage, that the deceased
was not gay. Evidently, members of the Westboro Baptist Church inferred his death to have been
vengeance for what they perceived to be a generalized moral deterioration of Christian values.
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non-negligible value of political speech:
The “content” of Westboro’s signs plainly relates to public, rather than
private, matters. The placards highlighted issues of public import—the
political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate
of the Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the
Catholic clergy—and Westboro conveyed its views on those issues in a
manner designed to reach as broad a public audience as possible. Even
if a few of the signs were viewed as containing messages related to a
particular individual, that would not change the fact that the dominant
theme of Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader public issues.80
Restated in the framework of harmfulness, Roberts’s opinion indicates the failure
of condition (i). Because the speech is not of negligible value, the speech is not
“harmful speech,” therefore the harm-based justification fails, and therefore there is
no exception to the general speech right protecting it.
Justice Alito, the lone dissenter, engaged the majority within the framework of
harmfulness, citing Chaplinsky and contending condition (i) was satisfied: “Allowing
family members to have a few hours of peace without harassment does not undermine
public debate”;81 and that condition (ii) was also satisfied: that the picketing would
have the “potential to wound as a personal verbal assault on a vulnerable private
figure.”82
the distinction between speech relating to matters of public versus private con-
cern. The doctrine is, I think, little more than a categorical presumption relating to
the conditions of harmful speech. Pulling on the thread, it reveals a neat alignment
with the harm-based justification, relying on the additional premise that matters of
public concern presumptively fail condition (i). The argument for the presumption is
that matters relating to politics and social institutions are so paramount in impor-
tance, that any limitation of that type of speech should be especially disfavored.83
80Id. at 444.
81Id. at 473.
82Id. at 475.
83The Court’s unwavering commitment to political speech over other categories seems myopic. I
would hazard to suppose that if violinists were polled what kinds of expression deserved the most
stringent protection, they might name music; and if painters, then paintings; and if physicists,
then physics publications. The privileging of political speech seems to be founded upon little more
than the vanity of political actors. Looking across the broad sweep of history, I can think of no
statesman, activist, revolutionary, or judge whose expressive contributions compare favorably to
those of Bach, Shakespeare, Picasso, or Newton. And I see no sensible reason why political speech
should be privileged over expressions in art, science, mathematics, or philosophy. Presumably,
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Put di↵erently, the public/private distinction is premised upon the proposition that
political speech (broadly construed) is so important that it should be singled out as
failing condition (i) by default.84
4.1.6 Commercial Speech
Another realm of expression where the Court has commonly allowed regulation is
“commercial speech.” The rationale tracks the “public versus private concern” dis-
tinction previously discussed, which in turn hinges upon the satisfaction of condition
(i).
As a historical matter, the Courts’ development of its commercial speech doctrine
was erratic. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court held, “We are . . . clear that the
Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising.”85 The Court cites no precedents, nor provides any argument for the
the thought is that political speech is most important, because it is essential to a well-functioning
liberal democracy. And poorly functioning social institutions—especially those of an autocratic or
oppressive government—might impinge upon all other areas of speech. Thus, if any category of
speech is valuable, then political speech must be the most valuable of all. See cases cited supra
note 84. This argument is weak. Even if the premise were conceded, the form of the argument is
to privilege means over ends. It is like claiming that instruments are more valuable than music,
because without instruments there would be no music. How unquestioningly courts seem to accept
this plainly fallacious reasoning is nothing short of ba✏ing. Yet regardless whether this is right,
the point is that the Court has viewed political speech as deserving special protection because it
regards expressions of political speech as being distinctly unlikely to be expressions which satisfy
condition (i).
84See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (“[I]t can hardly be doubted that
the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct
of campaigns for political o ce.”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.
concurring) (“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to
make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary. . . . They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak
as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion a↵ords ordinarily
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.”); Mills v. State of Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218–219 (“Whatever di↵erences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental a↵airs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and
forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all
such matters relating to political processes.”).
85316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
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principle. Subsequent scholarship and judicial opinions have regarded the decision
unfavorably.86
In truth, the doctrine was hardly “clear” in the common law of the states prior
to Valentine. For example, in People v. Osborne,87 a California court ruled that the
state could not permissibly interfere in the speech of a barber, who was fined for
displaying prices for his services outside his shop in violation of a city ordinance.88
The court observed:
The constitutional liberty of speech implies the right to freely utter and
publish whatever the citizen may please and immunity from legal censure
and punishment for the publication so long as it is not harmful in its
character when tested by such standards as the law a↵ords, and what
may be spoken may be written.89
Similarly, commercial speech in the context of newspaper advertising was recognized
in earlier cases as protected speech.90 Yet regardless, Valentine was the first di-
rect treatment of “commercial speech” by the U.S. Supreme Court in relation to
the federal constitution. And the Court proclaimed no protection whatever of its
expression.
Doubts about the doctrine grew steadily in the ensuing decades.91 Valentine was
finally overturned in Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,92 which concerned a statute declaring it unprofessional for pharmacists
86See, e.g., Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. Rev.
627 (1990).
8759 P.2d 1083 (1936). See also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-
History of Commercial Speech, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 747, 763–772 (1993) (describing several similar
cases and the history preceding Valentine in considerable detail).
88Predating incorporation of the First Amendment (See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938)
and Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)), Osborne was decided in the context of the speech guarantee of
the California Constitution.
8959 P.2d at 1087 (citations omitted).
90See, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878); In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134 (1892);
Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 315 (1913).
91See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas J., concurring);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 401, fn. 6 (1973)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 404 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298, 314–315 fn.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975).
92425 U.S. 748 (1976).
4.1. THE ARGUMENT FOR HARM-BASED REGULATION 123
to advertise prices, fees, premiums, discounts, rebates, or credit terms.93 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, rejected the proposition that commercial speech
presumptively satisfied the conditions of harmful speech:
Our question is whether speech which does no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction is so removed from any exposition of ideas, and from
truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its di↵usion of liberal sen-
timents on the administration of Government, that it lacks all protection.
Our answer is that it is not.94
It is revealing to observe the way that Blackmun attacks the commercial speech
exception established in Valentine. He disputes whether commercial speech is pre-
sumptively harmful speech, explaining how plausible it would be for instances of
commercial speech to fail conditions (i) and (ii). Describing why it ought not be
assumed that commercial speech satisfies condition (i):
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allo-
cation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. . . . even if
the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to en-
lighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the
free flow of information does not serve that goal.95
And why it ought not be assumed that commercial speech satisfies condition (ii):
Price advertising, it is said, will reduce the pharmacist’s status to that of
a mere retailer. The strength of these pro↵ered justifications is greatly
undermined by the fact that high professional standards, to a substan-
tial extent, are guaranteed by the close regulation to which pharmacists
in Virginia are subject. And this case concerns the retail sale by the
pharmacist more than it does his professional standards. Surely, any
pharmacist guilty of professional dereliction that actually endangers his
customer will promptly lose his license.
Subsequent courts have repeated in unequivocal terms the proposition that the jus-
tification for regulating commercial speech is harm-based. For example, in City of
93Va. Code Ann. § 54–524.2(a) (1974).
94425 U.S. at 762 (citations omitted).
95Id. at 765.
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Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,96 the Supreme Court wrote, “[The govern-
ment] has not asserted an interest in preventing commercial harms by regulating
the information distributed by respondent publishers’ newsracks, which is, of course,
the typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental
regulation than noncommercial speech.”97
Analysis of an intermediate standard of review was articulated four years later
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,98 where the
Court announced a four-part test for determining the constitutionality of commercial
speech regulations. Only the first element is relevant to the present inquiry—i.e.,
that the regulation of commercial speech which is “misleading” merits no heightened
scrutiny.99
The proposition that misleading statements or “false advertising” should be reg-
ulable is grounded upon its harmfulness.100 The assumption is that false or mislead-
ing utterances have a systematic tendency to generate negligible social value—there
being no good in promoting false beliefs—and a substantial negative externality aris-
ing from the disappointment or injury caused to consumers. Joined with the harm-
deterrence argument,101 the received view asserts, when a category of speech satisfies
conditions (i) and (ii), its regulation is justified.102 Therefore, regulating commer-
cial speech with the objective of deterring false advertising enjoys the support of a
harm-based justification.
96507 U.S. 410 (1993).
97Id. at 426.
98447 U.S. 557 (1980).
99Id. at 564.
100See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983) (“The interest in
protecting consumers from commercial harm justifies a requirement that advertising be truthful
. . . .”); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 549 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[F]alse
or misleading commercial speech should receive no protection, because commercial speech merely
gives information to consumers about a producer’s goods, and any false information either has no
value or is harmful.”); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977) (justifying regulation
of false advertising by attorneys).
101See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 380 (acknowledging the balancing of “possible harm to society
from allowing unprotected speech to go unpunished”); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 762 (1993)
(“A governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree.”).
102Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 563 (“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is
based on the informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no constitutional
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about
lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public
than to inform it.”) (citations omitted).
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4.1.7 Obscenity
The last speech exception, for which I furnish examples of harm-based justification,
is obscenity. Here, the appeal to the harmfulness of the proscribed expression is
relatively undisguised.
Obscene speech was of course commonly regulated in English law. Whether
this practice was intended to carry over after ratification of the Bill of Rights was
an open question. However, as I discuss above, the United States Congress was
in the early years of the Republic generally disinclined to intrude upon speech—
with the exception of the short-lived Alien and Sedition Acts—and there were no
federal obscenity laws until the mid-nineteenth century.103 Wholesale regulation of
obscenity was not aggressively pursued until passage of the Comstock Act in 1873,
which banned the mailing of “[e]very obscene, lewd, or lascivious, and every filthy
book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an
indecent character,” as well as any information or products which could be used for
the purpose of contraception.
To be sure, the legislation’s leading proponent, Anthony Comstock, o↵ered only
vague consequentialist justifications for regulating speech.104 Victorian social norms,
a prying preoccupation with the sexual activities of the others, and assorted moral
and religious fixations seem to have constituted Comstock’s primary motivations. His
moral crusading might be regarded quaint today, if not for a significant contingent
of religious ideologues committed to carrying his torch into the twenty-first cen-
tury. Unfortunately, Comstock’s prurient grandstanding should not be dismissed as
merely comic, for moral crusaders of his ilk still exert some—if thankfully dwindling—
influence in the political arena.
Like his modern-day successors, the nearest Comstock came to a consequentialist
justification for the wide-ranging regulation of “morally corrupting” speech was to
gesture vaguely at the corruption of children and dissolution of the family. It is
di cult to address these amorphous speculations directly, for neither Comstock nor
his successors have attempted anything resembling a rigorous argument for them.
He merely insists—without evidence—upon dubious psychological conjectures.105
103See, e.g, An Act to Provide Revenue from Imports, ch. 270, §28, 5 Stat. 548, 566–67 (1842)
(prohibiting the importation of obscene material from abroad); Post O ce Act, ch. 89, §16, 13 Stat.
504, 507 (1865) (prohibiting the mailing of obscene materials to Union troops); Post O ce Act, ch.
246, §13, 15 Stat. 196 (1868) (prohibiting the mailing of information pertaining to lotteries).
104For an excellently informative historical review on the regulation of obscenity, see Margaret A.
Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize
Society—From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 741 (1992).
105See Anthony Comstock, Traps for the Young (4th ed., 1883). This work is a singularly
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I shall nevertheless attempt a rational reconstruction of Comstock’s argument:
it seems he takes as a premise that human beings are universally happier when
partaking in lifelong monogamous relationships, spawning o↵spring, and practicing
obeisance to religious norms. He also evidently believed that ordinary persons are
liable to be tempted—easily tempted—to a less fulfilling existence mired in sin and
debauchery. The law ought therefore intervene, to set children and wayward adults
on a better path, obliterating any information which might entice the weak-willed to
act against their self-interest.
Though I have attempted to render Comstock’s claims as charitably as I think
possible, it is di cult to take any step of the argument seriously. It is plainly a harm-
based justification, though for reasons I will enumerate below, I am skeptical whether
it was (or is) ever intended sincerely. Although my aim in this article is to rebut
harm-based justifications for the regulation of speech, and Comstock’s argument is
a harm-based one, I should not want to lump Comstock’s argument with the rest.
It is especially bad, and warrants separate treatment.
First, there is no evidence that human beings are generally (much less universally)
happier in lifelong monogamous relationships. The archaeological record strongly
suggests that early humans were polyamorous.106 Lifelong monogamous relations
fascinating historical artifact, which I would commend anyone interested in obscenity law to skim.
It is a tour de force of moral righteousness and paranoia: Comstock wastes no time, writing from
the very first chapter, “Evil thoughts, like bees, go in swarms. . . . There is something wonderfully
strange in the rapidity with which youthful minds take up lewd thoughts and suggestions.” Id. at
7.
In a later chapter discussing the “free-love trap” (essentially, all sexual relationships except
marriage), Comstock analogizes pre-marital and extra-marital sex to a “stone trap” he devised as a
child to crush squirrels and rabbits. The analogy may perhaps resonate with priggish psychopaths—
I must confess the significance of the grotesque allusion escapes me. Of “free love,” he preaches:
It takes the word ‘love,’ that sweetens so much of earth, and shines so brightly in
heaven, and making that its watchword, distorts and prostitutes its meaning, until it
is the mantle for all kinds of license and uncleanness. It should be spelled l-u-s-t, to
be rightly understood, as it is interpreted by so-called liberals. . . . As advocated
by a few indecent creatures calling themselves reformers—men and women foul of
speech, shameless in their lives, and corrupting in their influences—we must go to a
sewer that has been closed, where the accumulations of filth have for years collected,
to find a striking resemblance to its true character. I know of nothing more o↵ensive
to decency, or more revolting to good morals, than the class of publications issuing
from this source.
Id. at 158. Though Anthony Comstock’s personage has faded somewhat from public notoriety, I
hazard to suppose historians shall one day yet accord him his rightful place alongside the great
moral purifiers—Savonarola, Torquemada, and Robespierre.
106See generally Christopher Ryan & Cacilda Jetha´, Sex at Dawn: How We Mate, Why We Stray,
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are an artifact of culture—not an inherent biological tendency. The preference for
monogamy—to the extent that it exists—is not innate in the human species.
Of course, biology alone is not dispositive. Family values advocates will eagerly
point to studies measuring the relative “happiness” of married versus unmarried
persons, which they claim as evidence that traditional “family oriented” lifestyles
tend to be more fulfilling. However, these surveys fail to disambiguate the influence
of social norms and cultural expectations. Activists read the research as establishing
the proposition that people tend to be happier in marriages. However, the data could
just as well be read to reveal the perniciousness of social norms and expectations: that
nonconformity with conventional social practices results in decreased happiness.107
In other words, the data could be read as indicating not that marriage makes people
happier, but rather that intolerant pro-marriage cultures cause unmarried people to
feel less happy. Research on the discriminatory treatment of non-married people is
still at a nascent stage, yet the evidence of insidious and pervasive mistreatment is
compelling.108
The case for procreation as a universal private good is weaker still. Even in
the face of pervasive social pressure to bear and raise children, there exists strong
empirical evidence that individuals with children tend to be less happy than those
without. More probing research on the e↵ects of children on the welfare of parents
is suspiciously di cult to find. Yet given the opportunity costs associated with
having children, it is plausible to suppose that parents also su↵er—in addition to
psychological detriment—significant financial disadvantages from having children.
Comstock’s premise—that people tend to be “better o↵” having children—is wholly
contradicted by the evidence. There may of course be other public policy arguments
for encouraging procreation. I am doubtful however that anyone could reasonably
argue that procreation is better for parents.
Finally, even if we were to grant arguendo that people tended to be more sat-
isfied in lifelong monogamous relationships producing children, there is no evidence
for the causal inference that individuals are as easily led to deviate from welfare-
maximizing choices as Comstock assumes. The Comstock argument presupposes of
humankind a degree of such abject stupidity, that even the hint of an “unwholesome”
and What It Means for Modern Relationships (Harper 2011).
107Moreover, no studies of which I am aware control for omitted variable bias.
108See, e.g. Bella M. DePaulo & Wendy L. Morris, The Unrecognized Stereotyping and Discrimi-
nation Against Singles, 15 Current Directions in Psych. Sci. 251 (2006); Wendy L. Morris et
al., No Shelter for Singles: The Perceived Legitimacy of Marital Status Discrimination, 10 Group
Processes & Intergroup Relations 457 (2007); Wendy L. Morris et al., Singlism—Another
Problem That Has No Name: Prejudice, Stereotypes and Discrimination Against Singles, in The
psychology of modern prejudice 165 (M.A. Morrison & T.G. Morrison, eds.) (2008).
128 CHAPTER 4. HARMFUL SPEECH
thought would entice countless innocents to self-destruction. Even conceding that hu-
man decision-making is frequently and systematically susceptible to cognitive bias,109
there is no principled reason to suppose “unwholesome” choices to be the product of
cognitive bias rather than straightforward preference satisfaction. If lifelong monog-
amous relationships producing children were so clearly utility-maximizing, then the
law would not need to enforce it. People would gladly pursue it of their own accord.
Curiously, Comstock denied that the regulation of obscene speech was speech
regulation at all. In a glib move—frequently rehearsed by his successors—Comstock
claimed that under his namesake legislation citizens would be free to express any
thought or idea they pleased, so long as the expression were a legally permissible
one. Thus, it was no limitation of the speech right to censor obscene expressions. It
amounts to little more than saying that people are free to express what they please,
except when they are not. Obviously, by this reasoning, the freedom of expression
would be operative under any set of laws, no matter how restrictive. It is astounding
how frequently this patently circular rhetoric is repeated.
Regardless of this, I expect that the modern day proponents of Comstock’s posi-
tion will find my counterarguments unsatisfying, because the harm-based arguments
they propose were never what truly motivated their position. The consequentialist
argument is for them an afterthought. The true ground for Comstockery seems not
to be the regulation of harm, but rather the enforcement of morals. The reason
why I expect my counterarguments against their harm-based justification would be
unlikely to persuade them is because the harm-based justification was never the real
justification for their position.
Nevertheless, it is revealing that Comstock and his successors felt the need to
construct a consequentialist facade. They seem to intuit that nakedly advocating for
the enforcement of morals would fail to persuade legislators, judges, and the public.
There is implicit in their pseudo-harm-based justification a recognition that the law
would require an identification of harms.
The earliest court opinions in cases challenging the Comstock Act ignored its
First Amendment implications.110 Disputes about its enforcement hinged upon pro-
cedural issues and precisification of what kinds of materials constituted obscene ex-
pressions.111 The test which emerged was imported from the British case, Regina
109See Daniel Pi, Meta-Rational Choice, draft available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3226242.
110See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 24 F.Cas. 1093 (1879); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29
(1896).
111Skepticism about the semantic project was immediate and widespread, with Judge J.C. Rup-
penthal neatly summing up:
From the foregoing it may be seen that no general principle runs through the statutes
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v. Hicklin.112 For an expression to be obscene, it must “deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publica-
tion of this sort may fall.”113 Deferring to the legislature, the courts refrained from
undertaking any constitutional review of the justification for the obscenity excep-
tion. To the extent the courts averred any justification at all, it was to acknowledge
the propensity of obscene material to “corrupt the morals” of the citizenry (it is
ba✏ing that the courts seem unquestioningly to have regarded this the business of
government to do).114
Such a condition could not stand, of course, and the courts have subsequently
devised harm-based justifications—albeit ex post facto—to support the obscenity
exception. The first test was articulated in Roth v. United States.115 Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan invalidated the Hicklin test writing:
The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the e↵ect of isolated passages upon
the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately
treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restric-
tive of the freedoms of speech and press.116
Brennan articulated the new standard: “whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest.”117
In justifying the new standard, Brennan seems to reject the need for harm-based
justification, writing:
It is insisted that the constitutional guaranties are violated because con-
victions may be had without proof either that obscene material will per-
ceptibly create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct, or will
of all the states, etc. As with laws everywhere that impinge upon sex matters in any
way, there is more of tabu and superstition in the choice and chance, the selection
and caprice, the inclusions and exclusions of these several enactments than any clear,
broad, well-defined principle or purpose underlying them. Without such principle,
well-defined and generally accepted, the various laws must remain largely haphazard
and capricious.
Criminal Statutes on Birth Control, 10 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 48, 50 (1919).
112L. R. 3 Q. B. 360 (1868).
113Bennett, 24 F.Cas. at 1104 (quoting Hicklin).
114Judge Blatchford uses the phrase “corruption of morals” fourteen times in Bennett. Id.
115354 U.S. 476 (1957).
116Id. at 489.
117Id.
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probably induce its recipients to such conduct. But, in light of our hold-
ing that obscenity is not protected speech, the complete answer to this
argument is in the holding of this Court in Beauharnais v. People of State
of Illinois, [343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).]
Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to
consider the issues behind the phrase “clear and present danger.” Cer-
tainly no one would contend that obscene speech, for example, may be
punished only upon a showing of such circumstances.118
Yet while denying the requirement of a harm-based justification, he contradictorily
proceeds to reason in terms of harm-based justification. Brennan first asserts that
exceptions to the general speech right must satisfy condition (i), writing:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion—have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable be-
cause they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.
But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejec-
tion for that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity
should be restrained . . . .119
And with respect to the particular controversy of the case, he emphasizes the likely
failure of condition (i) to obtain, writing:
Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably
been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is
one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern120
Thus, despite asserting the absence of a harm-based justification, Brennan justifies
invalidating the Hicklin test on the basis of overbreadth for likely failure of conditions
(i) and (ii) to obtain in a substantial number of instances.
The cases which followed reveal the courts struggling to make sense of the Roth
standard. The confusion was largely resolved in Miller v. California,121 adopting
an unequivocally harm-based justification for the obscenity exception, and setting
118Id. at 486–487.
119Id. at 484–485.
120Id. at 487.
121413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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the standard which remains the basis for determining whether expressions fall under
the obscenity exception. Justice Burger, writing for the majority, established the
three-part test:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the average
person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently o↵ensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.122
The third factor of the Miller test ensures that condition (i) is satisfied, and the first
two factors ensure that condition (ii) is satisfied. If a work “lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value,” then it presumptively has negligible social
value. And if a work is “patently o↵ensive,” adjudged by “contemporary community
standards,” then it presumptively generates a substantial negative externality. Thus,
works which satisfy the three factors are potentially “harmful speech” and may be
subject to government regulation.
4.2 Refutation of the Harm-Based Argument
The foregoing section establishes that throughout history, the harmfulness of a cat-
egory of speech was indeed adduced as a justification for its regulation. In this
section, I present my counterargument to harm-based justifications. Recall the harm-
deterrence argument is implied in support of premise (2):
2.1. If harmful speech is punished, then the supply of harmful speech decreases.
2.2. If the supply of harmful speech decreases, then social welfare is improved.
2. If harmful speech is punished, then social welfare is improved. (from 2.1, 2.2)
My objective is to show that sub-premises (2.1) and (2.2) are false.
4.2.1 Endogenizing the Harm of “Harmful Speech”
Consider the inferential move in (2.2): that decreasing the supply of harmful speech
will tend to e↵ect an improvement in social welfare (or equivalently, a reduction in
122Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
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total harm). The assumption driving the received view is that the average magnitude
of harm caused by any particular harmful expression is constant, such that total
harm varies with the quantity of harmful expressions. In other words, if one harmful
expression generates social cost c, and the supply of a harmful type of expression is
 , then the total social cost is simply the harm multiplied by quantity, c⇥  .
I contend that this formulation is too simplistic. In very many circumstances, the
harmfulness of an expression will decrease as supply increases. In other words, the
average per-unit harm h will be a function of the quantity of expressions  , such that
marginal harm decreases as supply increases.123 Thus, in case the marginal harm
varies with supply, the social cost will not be c⇥  , but rather h( )⇥  .
The question now arises whether this is a better characterization of harmful
speech in fact. For the sake of organizational clarity, I postpone full discussion of
this issue to §3 below. However, I should remark in passing the facial plausibility of
this premise. Consider obscenity as an exemplar. The intuition is that increasing
exposure to “obscene” speech will tend to render it commonplace and less scan-
dalous. The phenomenon is easily observed in the divergence between American and
European attitudes toward nudity.124 The relationship seems to be that the more
common a putatively “obscene” expression is within a community, the weaker the
negative reaction (if any). The intuition is easy to accept: that psychic phenom-
ena like o↵ense, credulity, outrage, or alarm obey the law of diminishing marginal
returns. It is a lesson we all recognize from Aesop’s Boy Who Cried Wolf.
Now, if within a given interval   2 I,   increases at a slower rate than h( )
decreases,125 then it follows trivially that decreasing the supply of harmful expressions
in that interval will have the e↵ect of increasing total harm.
Consider the following numerical example. Suppose that h :   7! 400  2. This
satisfies the relevant conditions.126 The following table, representing the values re-
123I.e., @h@  < 0.
124See, e.g., Terrence Witkowskia & Joachim Kellner, Convergent, Contrasting, and Country-
Specific Attitudes toward Television Advertising in Germany and the United States, 42 J. Busn.
Res. 167, 171, 172 (1998) (finding Americans were much less likely than Germans to regard televi-
sion advertisements as depicting a “wholesome” world, despite occasional frontal nudity in German
advertisements); Colin R. Harbke & Dana F. Lindemann, Acceptance of Female Public Toplessness:
Structural, Contextual, and Individual Predictors of Support 27 Canadian J. Hum. Sexuality,
92, 97 (2018) (finding 18% of Americans absolutely opposed to female public toplessness, as com-
pared with 0% of Europeans).
125I.e., if @h@   <  h( ) obtains. To see that this condition results in a decrease in social welfare,
observe that social welfare is decreasing i↵ @@  (h( ) ) < 0. Therefore,
@h
@   + h( ) < 0, which is
equivalent to @h@   <  h( ).
126I.e., @h@  =  800  3 < 0 for all   2 [0,1); and @h@   =  800  2 <  400  2 =  h( ) for all
  2 [0,1).
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turned by the function, illustrates the point:
Supply Average Per-Unit Harm Total Harm
  h( ) h( ) 
5 16 80
10 4 40
20 1 20
Observe that although the supply of harmful speech   increases, the average per-unit
harm h( ) decreases at a faster rate, and therefore total social harm h( ) ⇥   will
decrease as the supply of harmful speech increases.
Of course, the numerical example is not proposed to model any specific real-world
class of expressive activity. The function h :   7! 400  2 was chosen to illustrate a
mathematical point. In some real-world contexts, the harm function may be constant
or increasing, in which case sanctions on harmful speech would, ceteris paribus, e↵ect
an improvement in social welfare. But the point is that situations comparable to the
numerical example are conceivable. And if such conditions are conceivable, then
premise (2.2) is false, and the harm-deterrence argument is unsound.
As a practical corollary, even when @h@      h( ), so long as @h@  < 0, the marginal
e↵ectiveness of legal sanctions will be mitigated to some extent. In such cases, even
though decreasing the supply of harmful speech would decrease the social cost arising
from that speech, it may still be ine cient to sanction harmful speech when we factor
in the costliness of detection, sanctions, and litigation costs.
To restate the foregoing discussion less formally, the intuition is this: the aver-
age potency of some types of harmful speech diminishes as instances of such speech
become more commonplace. Inversely, the average potency of such expressions in-
creases as instances become scarcer. It is possible therefore that the average potency
of expressions increases faster than the quantity of expressions decreases, in which
case total harm is greater when there are fewer instances of harmful speech. Granting
“harmful expressions” are net harmful, the tradeo↵ is that fewer expressions entail
greater per-unit harm, and more expressions entail less per-unit harm. The question
is what the total e↵ect is. It is conceivable that a decrease in the quantity of harmful
speech actually increases the total harm arising from that category of speech by
increasing per-unit harm. As shorthand, let us refer to this phenomenon—where
decreasing supply increases potency—as the “potency e↵ect.”
4.2.2 Endogenizing the Benefit of Harmful Speech
I next counter premise (2.1): the proposition that if harmful speech is punished, then
the supply of harmful speech decreases. This premise may be further analyzed as
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relying upon the principle that the imposition of legal sanctions on certain kinds of
speech will tend to decrease the expected value of expression for prospective speakers
of the relevant class. Assume that the prospective speaker of some harmful speech
would derive some value from expressing it.
We may analyze the value the speaker derives from harmful speech into two com-
ponents. First, the speech could generate value simply because the expression itself
is gratifying to the speaker. Possibly it serves some innocent non-harm-directed pur-
pose. Or possibly it is “therapeutic.” Second—and more interestingly—the speech
could generate value because the harmful e↵ect it causes is desirable to the speaker.
In other words, the “harm” is not merely incidental, but the very object of the
speaker’s intention. For convenience, let us call the first component “intrinsic value,”
and the second component “extrinsic value.” I am principally concerned with the
latter component.
Extrinsic value is a function of the magnitude of the externality. The greater its
impact, the more value the speaker derives from engaging in it. This characterization
is eminently plausible in speech contexts where the purpose of an expression is to
shock, cause hurt, insult, or scandalize. In the category under consideration, extrinsic
value VE increases as the average per-unit harm h increases.127
The argument for the received view ignores the extrinsic value of harmful speech.
Accounting for extrinsic value illuminates a second countervailing e↵ect, which at a
minimum weakens the argument for legal sanctions (and entirely nullifies it in the
extremum case). For the purpose of illustration, suppose that the imposition of legal
sanctions has the desired consequence of reducing the supply of some type of harmful
speech. If the supply decreases, then assuming some level of potency e↵ect,128 the
reduction in supply will e↵ect an increase in the average per-unit harm of a given type
of expression. This increases the extrinsic value of speech to prospective speakers,
and thereby increases incentives to produce harmful speech, counteracting the initial
reduction in supply.
Thus, in cases where potency e↵ect and extrinsic valuation are present,129 speech
regulation operates like a spring. When the “force” of legal sanctions is applied in
one direction, it is met with a proportional “force” in the opposite direction.130 In the
extremum case,131 increasing sanctions will have no e↵ect whatever on the supply of
127I.e., @VE@h > 0.
128I.e., @h@  < 0.
129I.e., when @h@  < 0 and
@VE
@h > 0.
130Although, unlike a physical spring, there is no particular reason to suppose the relation must
be linear. Yet I am informed by my physics-degree wielding research assistant that not all springs
respond linearly to force in any case.
131I.e., where @VE@h
@h
@ 
@ 
@S > 1, with S denoting the sanction level and
@ 
@S  0. In other words, if the
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harmful expressions.132 This defeats the claim that the imposition of legal sanctions
on harmful speech necessarily decreases the incentives of prospective speakers to
engage in it.
This general principle may also be observed in non-speech contexts. For example,
in the worldwide market for elephant ivory, it has been argued that the imposition of
legal sanctions on the international ivory trade, a policy adopted by 183 countries,133
has had the perverse e↵ect of decreasing the supply of ivory, thereby increasing its
market value, and thereby increasing incentives for poachers to hunt elephants.134
The underlying principle is essentially the same here.
Again, we have a practical corollary. In cases where the marginal e↵ect of sanc-
tions on the supply of harmful speech is de minimis, the costliness of detection,
sanctions, and litigation can tip the balance, such that the net e↵ect could be a
reduction in social welfare when all factors are considered.
Restating the foregoing discussion less formally, the intuition is this: the speakers
of some classes of harmful speech intend their expressions to cause harm. The
imposition of sanctions on that class of speech reduces the payo↵s that speakers
receive from expressing it, reducing the supply of harmful speech. However, if the
reduction in the supply of such speech increases hearers’ sensitivity to that speech,
they will be more susceptible to being harmed by it. This increases the benefit that
speakers receive from expressing it, thereby increasing the supply of harmful speech.
In the limiting case, the countervailing e↵ect entirely cancels out the reduction in
the supply of harmful speech. As shorthand, let us refer to this phenomenon as the
“inverse supply e↵ect.”
4.2.3 Filtering
For the third countervailing e↵ect, I return to premise (2.2): that if the supply of
harmful speech decreases, then social welfare is improved. Assuming the first two
e↵ects are present for some class of expressive activity, there arises the possibility of
e↵ect of increasing sanctions decreases supply, and decreasing supply increases marginal harm, and
increasing marginal harm increases marginal extrinsic value, then the net e↵ect on the speaker’s
incentive could, in the limiting case, be null.
132I have in mind a formulation of the speaker’s utility function as being U = VI + VE   S, where
VI denotes the intrinsic value of speech. This formulation ignores imperfect enforcement—without
loss of generality.
133The relevant treaty is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
134For example, see Daniel W.S. Challender & Douglas C. MacMillan. “Poaching is More than an
Enforcement Problem.” 7 Conservation Letters. 484–494 (2014).
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a selection e↵ect, which further undermines the premise.
If we assume that prospective speakers are heterogeneous in the magnitude of
harm their speech causes, then the imposition of legal sanctions may not only a↵ect
the size of the population of speakers, but also the composition of that set. Let
us partition the population of speakers into two subsets: high-harm speakers and
low-harm speakers.135 The distinction is that high-harm speakers are those who—
whether by circumstance or skill—are likely to cause greater harm than low-harm
speakers when engaging in a type of speech. The construction is open to the possibil-
ity that an individual may be a high-harm speaker in one situation, but a low-harm
speaker in another. For example, a given person who is artless in lying (and thus a
low-harm speaker with respect to libel) may have a talent for causing o↵ense (and
thus be a high-harm speaker with respect to obscenity).
Now, suppose the conditions for the potency e↵ect and the inverse supply ef-
fect are satisfied.136 It follows that low-harm speakers will be more susceptible to
deterrence than high-harm speakers, because they derive less benefit from causing
harm. This is definitional. A low-harm speaker is one whose harmful speech causes
less harm than that of a high-harm speaker. Thus, the extrinsic benefit that the
low-harm speaker derives must be less than the extrinsic benefit that the high-harm
speaker derives, because the harm caused is less. Recall, extrinsic value is defined as
increasing as the harm caused increases. Therefore, assuming the sanction level is
held constant for all individuals, low-harm speakers will, ceteris paribus, be deterred
more easily than high-harm speakers.
But if low-harm speakers elect to refrain from engaging in harmful speech, then
they will have decreased the supply of total speakers, and by the potency e↵ect, in-
creased the marginal harm experienced by hearers. And by the inverse supply e↵ect,
this increases the incentives of speakers to engage in harmful speech. Specifically,
it will tend to be high-harm speakers, less sensitive to the deterrent e↵ect of sanc-
tions, who are incentivized to “fill the gap” left by the low-harm speakers who were
deterred.
Thus, even if the benefit of regulating speech outweighed the potency e↵ect
and inverse supply e↵ect, it may still be the case that speech regulation would be
ine cient. Although the supply of harmful speech may be reduced, nevertheless the
altered composition of the population of speakers might result in an increase in total
harm. The principle is intuitive and may be better communicated with the aid of
135We might formalize this by defining two distinct harm functions, such that the high-harm
speaker’s expressions generate hH harm, and the low-harm speaker’s expressions generate hL harm,
such that hH( ) > hL( ) for all  .
136I.e., @h@  < 0 and
@VE
@h > 0.
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a numerical example. The following table illustrates the point with hypothetical
values. Assume that the average per-unit harm of low-harm speech is 5, and the
average per-unit harm of high-harm speech is 10.
Total Supply Low-Harm High-Harm
of Harmful Speech Speech Speech Total Harm
Unregulated 10 7 3 65
Regulated 9 4 5 70
Note that these numbers were chosen not to represent a specific real-world e↵ect,
but rather to develop an intuition for the general principle. As shorthand, let us
refer to this phenomenon—where the imposition of sanctions screens out low-harm
individuals, increasing incentives for high-harm individuals to fill their place—as
“filtering.” Again, in the interest of organizational clarity, I discuss the plausibility
of filtering in real-world circumstances in §3 below.
To be sure, filtering is the most tenuous of the three countervailing e↵ects. It is
tenuous, firstly, because it assumes the presence of the other two e↵ects. Whereas the
potency e↵ect may arise even when the conditions for the inverse supply e↵ect and
filtering are not satisfied, the inverse supply e↵ect depends upon the presence of the
potency e↵ect. And filtering depends upon the presence of both the potency e↵ect
and the inverse supply e↵ect. Secondly, filtering requires additional assumptions,
which are disputable. It assumes that high-harm speech and low-harm speech of a
given type are substitutes, di↵ering only in magnitude. It also assumes that high-
harm individuals are, apart from the definitional distinction, otherwise identical to
low-harm individuals. However, it may be that low-harm individuals inflict low
magnitude harm, because they di↵er in motivation. For example, it may be that
high-harm individuals inflict high magnitude harm because their speech is principally
motivated by a desire to cause harm, whereas low-harm individuals inflict harm only
incidentally. If the reason why low-harm individuals inflict low magnitude harm
is because they are motivated by other objectives, then the comparatively lower
extrinsic value they derive (relative to high-harm speakers) may be o↵set by higher
intrinsic value (i.e., their principal motive for engaging in such speech—whatever
that might be). If this were the case, then my claim that low-harm individuals are
more susceptible to deterrence would be mistaken. Nevertheless, I think filtering
could arise in many speech contexts, and recognition of the possibility is su cient
to establish the falsity of premise (2.2).
And once again, there is the corollary that even if regulation were welfare-
improving, despite the presence of all three countervailing e↵ects, extending the
model to account for the costliness of detection, sanctions and litigation can still
render speech restrictive policies ine cient in practice.
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4.2.4 Counter-Argument in General Form
In the preceding subsections, I have identified three countervailing e↵ects, which
undermine the argument for restrictions on harmful speech. The point is that merely
identifying a class of expressive activity as satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) does not
su ce to justify its regulation. Indeed, I identify conditions where regulation of
harmful speech can even have the e↵ect of increasing total harm.
To summarize: the potency e↵ect identifies a tradeo↵ between the quantity of
harmful speech and the average per-unit harm of that speech; the inverse supply
e↵ect identifies a friction which can undermine the e↵ectiveness of sanctions on
expressive activities, arising from increasing incentives to produce harmful speech
when quantity decreases; and filtering identifies screening that could arise when
speakers are heterogeneous in the magnitude of harm their expressive activity causes.
Where speakers are analogized to producers and hearers are analogized to consumers,
it may be helpful to think of the potency e↵ect as a “demand-side” e↵ect, and inverse
supply and filtering as “supply-side” e↵ects.
All three e↵ects undermine steps in the argument for the received position. The
conventional view is that imposing (or increasing) sanctions on harmful speech de-
ters production of that speech, thereby e↵ecting an improvement in social welfare.
I demonstrate that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from these premises.
Because premises (2.1) and (2.2) of the harm-deterrence argument can fail, it fol-
lows that premise (2) is not necessarily true, and therefore that the harm-based
justification requires more than satisfaction of conditions (i) and (ii) to be sound.
It is important to distinguish what I am not saying. The presence of these e↵ects
does not establish that sanctions cannot be welfare-improving (or are always welfare-
reducing). To assert this would be claiming too much. Rather, what the possible
presence of these e↵ects does is it undermines an essential inferential component of
the harm-based justification. It reveals two premises to be less sturdy than previously
supposed. This raises the argumentative bar for the regulation of speech. It requires
proponents of speech restrictions do more than merely point to the net harmfulness
of a category of expression to justify regulating it.
It is also important to distinguish how my argument di↵ers from other counterar-
guments opposing the regulation of harmful speech. Very many of the counterargu-
ments opposing the regulation of harmful speech contest whether a putatively “harm-
ful” expressive activity is truly harmful—when all factors are considered. These
counterarguments seek to undermine claims that a category of expressive activity
satisfy conditions (i) or (ii). Although I am broadly sympathetic with this line of
attack, this is not the nature of my counterargument here. My counterargument
accepts, arguendo, the undesirability of putative “harms,” but contends that the im-
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position of sanctions may be ine↵ective at reducing that harm. Indeed, my argument
suggests that sanctions may even exacerbate the harm in some circumstances.
Building on my negative argument, I have also hinted at a stronger, a rmative
claim: that the presence of costly detection, sanctions, and litigation may tip the
scale. Even if a speech regulation would reduce the direct harm from speech—
despite the three countervailing e↵ects—their presence would nevertheless mitigate
the positive e↵ects of such regulation. At this point, the enforcement costs (i.e.,
detection, sanction, and litigation costs), could push marginal regulation into the
negative, so that it represented a social loss.
Yet aside from the enforcement cost “kicker,” I have another a rmative argument
still. If the countervailing e↵ects are su cient to nudge the balance of social welfare
close enough to the indi↵erence point—where we are uncertain whether the total
e↵ect is positive or negative—then I contend the presumption ought to be against
regulation, for if there is any meaning at all to the general speech right, it must at a
minimum establish a default rule in cases of uncertainty. If it is not even that, then
it is nothing at all. Ergo, when it is unclear whether a speech regulation would e↵ect
an improvement or reduction in social welfare, the presumption ought to be against
government interference. This is not only what the law ought to be, but what the
law is. The principle is implicit in nearly every judicial opinion: that in the absence
of a harm-based justification, the government may not regulate speech.
Thus, if the three countervailing e↵ects succeed only in pushing the balance of
social welfare to within the penumbra of uncertainty, two considerations will mili-
tate against the regulation of speech. First, the costliness of detection, sanctions,
and litigation. Second, the default presumption of the general speech right against
regulation.
4.2.5 Counter-Counterarguments Anticipated
I anticipate two potential objections. First, the critic might object that the three
e↵ects I have described heretofore are not unique to speech restrictions. I imagine
such objections hitting upon the presence of the three countervailing e↵ects in other
realms of conduct, where a restrictive law is nevertheless deemed warranted. These
objections would be in the class of ad absurdum arguments, possessing the following
form:
Some non-speech activity X exhibits one or more of the three e↵ects.
When some of the three e↵ects are present, regulation may be ine cient.
Therefore, regulation of X may be ine cient. Therefore X should not
be regulated absent further evidence.
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But it is absurd to think that regulating X could be ine cient. Therefore
the inference—that regulation in the presence of the three countervailing
e↵ects might entail a reduction in social welfare—must be invalid.
The strength of this counter-counterargument depends entirely upon the strength
of the premise that regulating X is “obviously” e cient. Presumably, the proponent
of speech regulation would choose an X that most people would readily agree ought
to be regulated.
For example, consider if X were vandalism. The counter-counterargument would
observe the possible presence of the potency e↵ect, the inverse-supply e↵ect, and
filtering when regulating vandalism. Thus, if my argument were to be taken seri-
ously, then it would follow that the law ought not prohibit vandalism. And yet,
my hypothetical opponent would contend, it is obvious that the law should prohibit
vandalism, and therefore the general principle of my argument fails.
I have three responses. First, assuming the wisdom of regulating X is obvious,
I would question whether one really could not satisfactorily provide the additional
reasons which justify the inference to premise (2). In the case of vandalism, I think
it may be plausibly argued that decreasing the quantity of vandalism would not
necessarily increase the average per-unit harm of the undeterred residual vandalism.
In this case, it may simply be observed that the potency e↵ect is not present, and
since the inverse-supply e↵ect and filtering depend upon the potency e↵ect, we may
conclude that none of the three countervailing e↵ects obtain in fact.
However, if it were established empirically that the potency e↵ect were present
for some X, then my second response would be to inquire whether there exist kickers
militating against regulation of X. Again, in the case of vandalism, there does not
seem to be any general category of behavior, of which vandalism is a subset, which
the law accords as a general right. Also, it seems that enforcement costs may be o↵set
by the cost of repairing the vandalized property. Therefore, even if it were uncertain
what e↵ect vandalism regulations would have on social welfare, there would be no
a rmative reason not to regulate it.
And finally, if it were established that the potency e↵ect were present for some
X, and if there were a general right to some broader class of activities which included
X, then my response would be to embrace the “absurdum” conclusion. Supposing it
were shown that vandalism regulations exhibited the three countervailing e↵ects, and
supposing there were some general right that vandalism regulations would incur upon,
I would incline to accept the conclusion that vandalism ought not be prohibited. I am
skeptical of course that either of the conditions could be met in the case of vandalism
particularly, but if it could be shown that the three countervailing e↵ects were truly
present, and the balance of social costs were unclear, and there existed kickers which
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tended to militate against regulation, I should think it not at all “obvious” that X
should be regulated.
The second objection I anticipate is more general. Some readers may complain
that my negative argument proceeds from armchair observations about a theoretical
model unsupported by empirical data. The hostile critic will protest that I do not
even attempt to determine the values of variables nor to discern concrete facts.
This grossly misses the point. As I demonstrate in §1, the conventional justifi-
cation for speech regulation relies upon an economic inference—the harm-deterrence
argument. The harm-deterrence argument depends upon premises which are theo-
retical economic claims. The counterargument which I provide is correspondingly a
theoretical economic counterargument.
Complaining that my counterargument fails to delve into empirics mistakes the
logical structure of my contention. To illustrate the point, suppose a person asserted
the argument: all cats are quadrupeds; all dogs are quadrupeds; therefore all cats
are dogs. This is clearly a textbook “illicit minor” fallacy. The proper counter here
is to demonstrate the invalidity of the inference: that “all X are Y ” and “all Z are
Y ” does not entail “all X are Z.” The counter requires no empirical investigation
into the nature of cats, dogs, quadrupeds, or any other possible X, Y , or Z.
Similarly, the received justification for speech regulation relies upon an economic
inference. The presence of the three countervailing e↵ects undermines that inference.
No empirics are necessary to demonstrate the unsoundness of the inference. Indeed,
empirical claims are entirely irrelevant to the point in dispute. To insist otherwise
is to misunderstand the nature of scientific theory generally.
4.3 Applications
My objective in this article being to show that the harm-deterrence argument is
unsound, it su ces to demonstrate the possible occurrence of the three countervailing
e↵ects to establish my thesis. However, some intuitive connection to real world
controversies may be wanted. I expect both proponents and opponents of speech
regulation will be interested not only in whether the three countervailing e↵ects are
possible, but whether they are plausible. In other words, whether there is a coherent
intuitive story where the three countervailing e↵ects are believably present in areas
of controversy.
In this section, I consider several prominent examples, supplying reasons to be-
lieve that potency, inverse supply e↵ect, and filtering might arise. I do not intend
these examples to be exhaustive. My counterargument is deliberately framed in
general terms, and I expect the three countervailing e↵ects might arise in any cir-
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cumstance where harm-based justifications for regulation are proposed. Neither do I
intend the examples to be conclusive. A rigorous empirical investigation into any of
the particulars would require considerably more than I could hope to furnish within
the scope of this article. My aim in this section is simply to sketch out the facial
plausibility of the e↵ects obtaining in a variety of contexts.
4.3.1 A↵ronting Speech
Let us start by considering a subset of harmful speech, the supposed harm of which is
psychic injury. Let us refer to this subset as “a↵ronting speech.” A↵ronting speech
represents the simplest and most straightforward context to which my argument
applies.
There are two relevant player categories in the context of a↵ronting speech: injur-
ers and victims. The conventional justification for the regulation of a↵ronting speech
is that injurers impose negative externalities upon victims, reducing social welfare.
Regulation is meant to deter injurers from expressing harmful speech. To reiterate:
I take the characterization—that the relevant harm is the psychological e↵ect it has
upon victims—as defining the subset of speech which is a↵ronting.
A↵ronting speech is analyzable into familiar doctrinal types. I include in the
category of “a↵ronting speech”: o↵ense, fighting words, hate speech, obscenity, in-
decency, and profanity.
O↵ense
In the context of o↵ensive speech, the relevant “a↵ront” is the displeasure experienced
by some portion of the public when a cherished symbol or idea is debased. Typical
examples include the desecration of flags or religious symbols.137
137An especially broad curtailing of speech rights on the basis of o↵ense may be observed in the
jurisprudence of Poland. Curiously, the Polish Supreme Court has ruled that the freedom of religion
includes the right of religious people “not to be o↵ended.”
“The subject of the protection to which Article 196 of the Criminal Code pertains are
the religious feelings arising from the constitutional freedom of religion. It is accepted
in the jurisprudence that the religious feelings are, due to their nature and the direct
link with freedom of religion, subject to special protection. . . . There is no doubt
that the protection of religious feelings, and thus human emotion associated with the
faith professed by the individual, is also linked to the protection of the inherent and
inalienable dignity of the human person, which is the source of freedom and human
and civil rights [citing Article 30 of the Polish Constitution] . . . Article 196 of the CC
serves as an expression of a specific position taken by the legislature in the potential
conflict of freedom of expression . . . The legislature decided the conflict in favor of
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Here, the presence of all three countervailing e↵ects may be observed. First, it
is surely the case that marginal harm decreases as quantity increases. To take the
most notable exemplar of “o↵ensive speech,” observe that public sentiment toward
the proposal for a constitutional prohibition on flag-burning has, since Texas v.
Johnson in 1989,138 steadily waned.139 Without intending to diminish the possible
contribution of other causal factors,140 I would nevertheless expect the magnitude of
popular support for a “Flag-Burning Amendment” to be a reasonable proxy for the
magnitude of psychic harm that the public experiences when witnessing immolation
of the flag.
This is of course a thoroughly unsurprising fact. It cannot reasonably be doubted
whether an expression which elicits hostility will tend to diminish in potency as indi-
viduals susceptible to o↵ense grow inured to the stimulus through repeated exposure.
Common sense and everyday experience confirm this phenomenon.
Second, the inverse-supply e↵ect requires that the benefit to injurers increase as
harm increases. This is plausible for o↵ensive speech. Returning to our exemplar, it
is surely the case that those who burn flags do so precisely because they anticipate
the o↵ense it will cause. Indeed, it is di cult to imagine any other reason to endure
the expense, risk of injury, and noxious fumes which the act entails, except to agitate
the passions of those spectators who witness the incineration of their beloved symbol.
freedom of religion, assuming that it is unlawful to express the views that consist
of insulting of religious object or place intended for public performance of religious
ceremonies, which leads to o↵ending religious feelings of others.”
Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of October 6, 2015 (Case no. SK 54/13).
138491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding the burning of the American flag to be constitutionally protected
speech). See also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
139A Gallup poll taken in 1989 found 71% of respondents in support of a Constitutional
Amendment prohibiting flag burning. By 1990, this number had declined to 68%. By 1995,
those in favor had declined to 62% (the support level held in 1999 at 63%). By 2006,
Gallup found only 56% in favor of such an Amendment. Carroll, Joseph, “Public Support
for Constitutional Amendment on Flag Burning.” Gallup News Service. June 29, 2006,
available at: http://news.gallup.com/poll/23524/public-support-constitutional-amendment-flag-
burning.aspx. The most recent numbers—the 2011 State of the First Amendment Report, available
at: http://www.newseuminstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/FAC sofa 2011report.pdf—
suggest that a majority of Americans now oppose a flag burning Amendment, with only 39% in
favor. It is worth noting that the numbers available from Gallup and the State of the First Amend-
ment Reports do not agree on the years where they overlap. Nevertheless both surveys demonstrate
clear diminishing support for a Flag-Burning Amendment.
140For example, I imagine that the expressive e↵ect of the law would be pronounced in these
circumstances. The expressive factor—although not identical to the potency e↵ect—would tend to
reinforce my arguments regardless.
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Unfortunately, there do not exist good statistics on the frequency of flag-burning.
Yet even if there were, the other relevant variable—i.e., the magnitude of outrage—
would remain di cult to quantify. It is telling however that the incidence of flag-
burnings seems to increase precisely during those periods when proposals for flag-
burning prohibitions are prominent in public discourse.141 The economic explanation
is obvious: proposing to ban the burning of flags is tantamount to a declaration that
one is acutely susceptible to its intended e↵ect. It signals to injurers a high “price”
they can extract from o↵ensive expression, which naturally elicits an increase in
production.
Additionally, the inverse supply e↵ect also has an interesting interplay with pub-
licity. News outlets, motivated to attract a novelty-craving audience, have greater
incentivizes to report on seemingly uncommon events. Thus, even if the imposition
of sanctions were to reduce the supply of injurers, this may have the perverse e↵ect
of amplifying instances of a type of speech so as to a↵ect more recipients. As the
publisher Alfred Harmsworth once famously quipped, “When a dog bites a man, that
is not news, because it happens so often. But if a man bites a dog, that is news.”
Correspondingly, when the “news” is something many people find o↵ensive, the con-
sequence of decreasing supply is increasing publicity, and with increasing publicity,
increasing harm. The publicity e↵ect can be regarded as a species of (or at least
approximately equivalent to) the inverse supply e↵ect.
Third, it seems plausible that filtering would also arise in the context of of-
fense. Again, to take flag-burning as an example, we expect that the imposition
of sanctions would naturally increase the expected cost of expression. Given that
the inverse-supply e↵ect obtains, injurers will tend to derive greater utility the more
widely publicized their flag-burning, and less utility the less widely publicized. Thus,
injurers will be deterred from burning the flag in circumstances where the harm is
low (i.e., when there are fewer potential recipients/victims), reducing supply, and
increasing the potency of the expression. The e↵ect is that the grandiose act of flag-
burning will be reserved for those occasions when it will have the most impact. The
savvy protester will refrain from burning the flag when few passersby will notice,
avoiding the disutility of sanction. He will hold his shock tactic in reserve until he
has attracted the attention of photographers and journalists—to maximize the value
he derives from incurring the sanction.
141For example, after President-elect Trump suggested that flag-burners should su↵er criminal
punishment (or a loss of citizenship), a small band of protestors gathered in front of Trump’s New
York Hotel to burn American flags. Stapleton, Shannon. “Trump flag-burning tweet leads activists
to burn some flags in New York.” Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
flag/trump-flag-burning-tweet-leads-activists-to-burn-some-flags-in-new-york-idUSKBN13P06L.
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It is thus eminently plausible that all three e↵ects would arise in the regulation
of flag-burning. And the intuitive story maps easily to o↵ensive speech generally.
Whether the vehicle for expression takes the form of burning flags, draft cards, or
books, carrying o↵ensive signage, or printing o↵ensive slogans on tee-shirts, we should
expect increasing the supply of such expressions will tend to reduce their impact. And
it is a safe surmise to suppose the speakers derive utility from the disutility they cause
in others. And increasing the cost of expression through sanction would tend to deter
low-harm instances more than high-harm instances, as strategic speakers “reserve”
their expression for those occasions when it is likely to have the most impact.
Obscenity, Indecency, and Profanity
Similarly, in the context of obscenity, indecency, and profanity, we may conceive
the relevant a↵ront to be the displeasure experienced by some portion of the public,
when some “vulgar” expression is given voice. Typical examples include the portrayal
of sexual activity, defecation, or urination; utterances of “dirty words”; depictions
of nudity; devices and implements of sexual fetishists; and media tending to the
subversion of social norms.142
Let us take the “shock art” movement as our first exemplar.143 A cursory investi-
gation of its history reveals robust examples of the potency e↵ect. Among the prin-
cipal developmental mechanisms of “shock art” seems to be simple one-upmanship.
Each subsequent generation of shock artists seeks to unsettle conventions more rad-
ically than their predecessors had done. This may not be the only mechanism at
work, however it is surely one of the main factors driving the genre.
The phenomenon follows from the principle: that scandals subside. It is the
artist’s analogue to the second law of thermodynamics. Entropy, it seems, can be dis-
covered in many forms. Marcel DuChamp’s once outrage-inducing Fountain (1917)
sits today in the Museum of Modern Art in New York, evoking little reaction but the
cool insouciance of perplexed tourists. The premiere of Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring
in 1913 induced a riot. It is now a staple of the orchestral repertoire; and its per-
142Curiously, this has, in many totalitarian regimes, included abstract artistic works with little
or no representational content whatever. For example, [DISCUSS Entartete Kunst in NAZI GER-
MANY]. It is ironic that historically the most ferocious attacks on art have targeted those works
which have possessed the least political content.
143Notable representatives of this “movement” include Andres Serrano, who photographed a cru-
cifix submerged in his urine (Piss Christ, 1987), Chris Ofili, whose Holy Virgin Mary (1996) depicts
the eponymous subject as a Black woman, with one exposed breast constructed from varnished
elephant dung, against a collage of pornographic imagery, and Rick Gibson, who fashioned earrings
from freeze-dried human fetuses (Human Earrings, 1987).
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formance provokes little more than dumb indi↵erence from geriatric concertgoers
struggling with their hearing aids.144 What is an artistic a↵ront today is merely
banal tomorrow. Its potency diminishes as audiences grow inured to its novelty.
Discounting the attestations of shock artists themselves (their propensity to use
public statements to subvert expectations renders their putative self-reflections in-
credible), it certainly seems from observation of their behavior that they are delib-
erate in their attempts to elicit “shock” responses.
This is wholly consistent with economic principles. The shrewd artist, seeking
novelty, attention, notoriety, and wealth, is wise to court controversy. Thus, reducing
the quantity of shock art would tend to increase incentives for shock artists to create
it. In other words, if the imposition of sanctions on obscene art reduced the supply
of shock art, then by the potency e↵ect it would increase audiences’ sensitivity to
shock, thereby increasing the incentives for shock artists to produce it, and by the
inverse supply e↵ect counteract the initial reduction in supply.
The conditions for filtering seem to be satisfied also. Low-harm artists, whose
work might incidentally cause shock, or who lack talent for producing shocking art,
would be more susceptible to deterrence, because they derive less benefit from their
relatively less e↵ective attempts to elicit outrage. If they exit the market, decreas-
ing the supply of obscene art, then by the potency e↵ect, audiences’ sensitivity to
obscenity will increase. And those artists whose comparative advantage lies in their
talent for shocking will experience stronger incentives to produce obscene art.
All three e↵ects are therefore plausibly present in the context of shock art. It
follows that imposing sanctions on shock art could result in a net reduction in social
welfare, undermining harm-based justifications for censorship of it. The critic may
object that I am cherry-picking in my choice of exemplar—that I have deliberately
chosen shock art, because it is an especially availing context in which to observe the
three countervailing e↵ects. This misses the point. Shock art is acutely relevant,
because it is the sort of artistic expression most liable to be regulated. It is the
frontline in the battle for free speech. I am happy to concede that the inverse supply
e↵ect is unlikely to arise if governments were to regulate, for example, landscape
paintings or muzak. This is irrelevant. The implausibility of the countervailing
e↵ects arising from the regulation of landscapes and muzak follows directly from the
implausibility of their causing harm in the first place.
A still more vivid illustration of the three countervailing e↵ects may be observed
144I do not mean to imply that the Rite of Spring was conceived as “shock art.” Arguably, no
analogous movement ever arose in music—although George Antheil seems to have invested some
e↵ort in assuring that the premiere of Ballet Me´canique (1926) resulted in scandal, and of course
John Cage also routinely courted controversy.
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in the regulation of “pornographic” films. The earliest cinematic depiction of a
remotely sexual nature is The Kiss (1896). One of the first commercially distributed
films, The Kiss depicts a fully clothed man and woman nuzzling and exchanging brief
pecks over the course of eighteen seconds (looped thrice). The Kiss was distributed
by Thomas Edison in an e↵ort to promote the kinetoscope—a nickel-operated, hand-
cranked motion picture invention.145
The kiss depicted in The Kiss is not, by modern standards, a remarkably pas-
sionate osculation. Yet it was deemed reprehensible in the twilight of the nineteenth
century, provoking one critic to write:
The spectacle of the prolonged pasturing on each other’s lips was hard
to bear. When only life size it was pronouncedly beastly. Magnified to
Gargantuan proportions and repeated three times over, it is absolutely
disgusting.146
The Catholic Church denounced The Kiss, calling for censorship.147 Outrage over
the film had hardly subsided before Edison released a still more scandalous vignette,
Dolorita’s Passion Dance (1897), depicting a (once again fully clothed) woman en-
gaging in an Iberian “passion dance.” So intolerable were her bodily contortions it
seems that the sage authorities of New Jersey were left with little choice but to raid
the Atlantic City parlor, in which it was being shown, and to ban the film.148
The modern media consumer need only introspect, to seek out even a quantum of
revulsion in his own mind upon viewing The Kiss, to recognize the potency e↵ect at
work. Indeed, I doubt modern viewers would recognize The Kiss as being erotic in
any sense at all. Whatever harms contemporary moral figures may have experienced
in the furor over The Kiss are wholly incomprehensible in the present day, and the
complete dissipation of that harm is undoubtedly due to the overwhelming quantity
of onscreen kissing in television and cinema.
Evidence of the inverse supply e↵ect can also be observed in the early days of
cinema. The notoriety of The Kiss inspired imitators, presumably seeking to exploit
the titillating potential of the new medium.149 Yet the erotic novelty of The Kiss and
its copycats abated rapidly. While the demise of the kiss porn genre was likely due
145See generally Geltzer, Jeremy, Dirty Words and Filthy Pictures: Film and the First Amendment
(2016) for a thoughtful historical survey of censorship in cinema.
146Id.
147Id.
148Dolorita’s Passion Dance was thus the first censored work of cinema. It was also, at the time
the mayor’s order was issued, the “most viewed Kinetograph picture the parlor had ever hosted.”
Geltzer, 9, citing.
149The Kiss in the Tunnel (1899) and The Kiss (1900).
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to the emergence of more extreme content,150 the requisite principle is retrievable:
that injurers derived a benefit positively correlated with the magnitude of o↵ense
caused.151 As the sensitivity of audiences to onscreen kissing diminished, so too did
incentives to exploit that e↵ect.
It is true that onscreen kissing remains exceedingly common in films today, and
the inverse supply e↵ect implies that as audiences grow inured to the e↵ect, incentives
to depict it should decrease. Yet it is important to distinguish that the cinematic
depiction of kissing was not exclusively or (except perhaps in the very earliest days
of cinema history) even predominantly motivated by the pursuit of extrinsic value.
The portrayal of kissing has substantial intrinsic value. It is a useful expository tool
in the construction of stories—in depicting the relationships between characters, and
revealing characters’ emotional states visually. The speaker’s extrinsic motivation—
the benefit received from causing o↵ense—in the depiction of kissing seems entirely
absent in the modern filmmaker.
Likewise, filtering also seems to be present. Whereas mainstream filmmakers, for
whom eroticism was but an incidental element of their art, sought to stay within
(if only just within) the boundaries of what was permissible, the sco✏aws whose
very purpose was to produce lascivious content would exploit the regulatory e↵ect
of censorship, charging high prices for content which prevailing social norms would
ensure possessed a high degree of potency.
Now, proponents of obscenity, indecency, and profanity regulation may counter
that I have missed the point entirely. They will not dispute that the e↵ect of porno-
graphic imagery tends to dissipate with increased exposure. Indeed, this is the
gravamen of their complaint. They will concede that liberal speech laws dilute the
harm of The Kiss, yet they will insist that a society indi↵erent to “corrupting im-
agery” is somehow a worse society. The harm, they might argue, is not the a↵ront,
but rather the coarsening of standards which preempts a↵ront. Their argument is
that it would be as though a patient went to a doctor complaining of soreness in his
arm, and the doctor “cured” the ailment by severing a nerve so that the patient lost
all feeling that limb.
This counter does not touch my argument. Indeed, it concedes to it. The ar-
gument that a society more sensitive to harms is somehow a “better society” relies
150For example, Georges Melies’ Apre`s Le Bal (1897, Fr.), depicting a fully nude woman, and A
L’Ecu d’Or ou la Bonne Auberge (1908, Fr.), depicting penetrative intercourse.
151The mechanism has one complication. The pornographer seems not to have been motivated
to cause o↵ense directly. There is an intermediate inference. Content which is su ciently novel
to stimulate erotic sentiments for a segment of the population will tend to be su ciently novel to
o↵end the indignation of the other. The e↵ect will follow, even if the extrinsic valuation is not
direct.
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on premises which cannot easily be reconciled with a welfarist model. It is a moral
argument masquerading as a consequentialist argument. And indeed I think its ir-
reconcilability with a welfarist model is itself evidence that there is no substance
whatever in the claim.
Nevertheless, I think a brief digression may be warranted on this flimsy con-
tention. I have two responses. First, to the extent that proponents of the obscenity,
indecency, and profanity exception would claim that censorship is something like a
defense of a society’s moral identity, they are taking up the losing side of a settled
controversy. They revisit the arguments of Lord Patrick Devlin in his debate with
H.L.A. Hart, in which Hart conclusively prevailed.152 Second, it seems doubtful that
any person today would honestly contend that society was somehow better o↵ (even
“morally” better o↵) when a grainy close-up shot of a poorly-aimed kiss constituted
a scandal. Can any proponent of the obscenity, indecency, and profanity exception
really believe that our present indi↵erence to The Kiss is a detriment? The question
may be extended to later targets of censorship. Would our society be better o↵ with-
out films like Scarface (1932) or Monty Python’s Life of Brian (1979)? Would we
be better o↵ if Lenny Bruce or George Carlin were deterred from the expression of
profane comedy? Would we be better o↵ if the censors had prevailed in extinguishing
James Joyce’s Ulysses or Nabokov’s Lolita from bookstores? I expect no reasonable
person would answer these questions in the a rmative.
The modern proponent of the obscenity, indecency, and profanity exceptions may
concede that these historical examples were unwarranted government intrusions, and
that our society is no worse o↵ for tolerating these former targets of speech regulation
after all. But he may contend those obscenities were never really obscene in the first
place. He will maintain that the obscenities, indecencies and profanities he perceives
today are di↵erent. These things really are obscene, indecent, or profane. And this
time—he will insist while marveling at the stupidity of his censorious predecessors
in drawing the line so poorly—this time he has surely gotten it right.
There is no scientific answer which would satisfy the moral ideologue, though I
am skeptical whether he deserves a response at all. Regardless, for present purposes
it su ces to observe the plausibility of the three countervailing e↵ects arising in the
context of obscenity, indecency, and profanity regulation.
152I have nothing to contribute to Hart’s refutation, which I consider conclusive. Readers interested
in these arguments are encouraged to consult the primary sources.
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Hate Speech
Hate speech is another context in which the three countervailing e↵ects are very
likely to arise.153 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s protean positions on the
controversy,154 it seems quite clear that hate speech does possess negligible value
and imposes a high social cost.
The hate speech context provides a unique opportunity for observation, because
the social sanctions attached to bigoted expressions are especially severe. And the
absence of legal sanctions (in the United States) tends to reduce speakers’ e↵orts at
concealment. The presence of sanctions and absence of centralized enforcement allow
us to easily observe how individuals tend to respond to the imposition of informal
speech regulation.
Let us first consider the potency e↵ect. One can hardly fail to observe that the
psychic harm arising from racist, sexist, homophobic, or ableist expressions exhibits
an inverse relationship to their frequency of use. For example, utterance of the
term “nigger” has been abolished from civilized discourse. It is never uttered, but
only referenced as “the N-word.” Due to the infrequency of its expression, the term
is imbued with great weight. Its mere utterance, when directed toward a Black
individual, rivals the harm of physical violence. When uttered among non-Black
individuals, it taken as conclusive evidence of a heinous defect in the speaker.
There can be no doubt as to the loathsomeness of racial bigotry and its e↵ects,
and the desire to do something to curb its harms is understandable. Yet we should
be cognizant of the consequence of reducing the incidence of expressions of hate.
Eradicating racial epithets from civilized discourse magnifies their power. It hands
to the unapologetic racist, unencumbered by civilized norms, a potent weapon.
153In the United States, hate speech has enjoyed relatively strong Constitutional protection. Other
putatively liberal democracies have taken a less tolerant stance toward hate speech. See, e.g., §130
of the German criminal code, Strafgesetzbuch, StGB promulgated on 13 November 1998 (Federal
Law Gazette I, p. 945, p. 3322) (“(1) Whoever, in a manner that is capable of disturbing the public
peace: 1. incites hatred against segments of the population or calls for violent or arbitrary measures
against them; or 2. assaults the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning, or
defaming segments of the population, shall be punished with imprisonment from three months to
five years.”), the French penal code, Code Pe´nal R. 624-3–4 (prohibiting non-public defamation or
insults to individuals on the basis of ethnicity, nationality, race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation),
and in the United Kingdom, The Public Order Act 1986 (c 64) §4A, amended by §154 of the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (“A person is guilty of an o↵ence if, with intent to
cause a person harassment, alarm or distress, he (a) uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or
behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or (b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation
which is threatening, abusive or insulting, thereby causing that or another person harassment,
alarm or distress.”)
154See supra §1.4.
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This insight is not novel, of course. Discriminated communities have seemingly
intuited the danger of the potency e↵ect which arises from the policing of language.
Black comedians and musicians have for many decades incorporated use of the term
“nigger” into their routines and lyrics. In much the way a vaccine immunizes patients
to disease, repeated utterance of the term in innocuous contexts mitigates its poten-
tial to hurt in more virulent circumstances. The phenomenon, which activists have
termed “reappropriation” or “reclamation,” has attracted some scholarly attention,
although the research (mainly in sociology and cultural studies departments) wants
somewhat for rigor.155 Analysis in terms of the potency e↵ect represents a possible
avenue for improvement.
Reappropriation is a widespread strategy. Although its use by Black Americans
furnishes a prominent and easily recognizable example, we can observe a variety of
discriminated groups employing it. The disabled community has reappropriated the
term “cripple.” The Asian American community has attempted to reappropriate
“slant.”156 And the gay community seems to have been especially successful in
di↵using the pejorative connotations of words like “queer” and “dyke.”
Reappropriation is not a recent phenomenon. Deliberate attempts to exploit the
potency e↵ect have occurred throughout history. For example, in the eighteenth
century, Protestant followers of John and Charles Wesley were pejoratively labeled
“methodists.” The group embraced that term, accepting it as the proper name of
their denomination. So successful was the reappropriation, few people are even aware
that the term was once used to denigrate the adherents of that faith.
Let us next consider the inverse supply e↵ect. It follows trivially from the extrin-
sic value that bigoted speakers derive from causing hurt that the conditions for the
inverse supply e↵ect will obtain in the context of hate speech. Given that there is a
potency e↵ect—i.e., that decreasing the supply of hateful expressions increases hear-
ers’ sensitivity to them—individuals wishing to cause harm will experience stronger
incentives to exploit that increased sensitivity. Reducing the supply of hate speech
will thus tend to increase incentives for bigots to express it.
Lastly, let us consider filtering. Filtering is the most evident of the three coun-
tervailing e↵ects in the context of hate speech. It is practically axiomatic that less
racist individuals are more easily deterred from expressing hate speech, and more
155More serious scholarship investigating the causes of semantic change exist of course in the study
of linguistics. See W.V. Quine, Quiddities 53–54 (Belknap Press 1987).
156Interestingly, a rock group consisting of Asian members, calling themselves “the Slants,” at-
tempted to register for trademark protection, which the Patents and Trademark O ce rejected,
essentially on the ground that expressions of hate speech would not be granted trademark protec-
tion. The case was litigated to the Supreme Court, where musicians prevailed. See Matal v. Tam,
582 U.S. (2017).
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racist individuals are less easily deterred. There will also be marginal individuals,
who are deterred from engaging in hate speech day-to-day, but who deploy the lan-
guage only on those occasions when they feel it will have the most impact. The
increased potency and asymmetric deterrence of hate speech regulation will tend to
filter out the low-harm expressions and increase incentives for high-harm expressions.
Fighting Words
Another context in which the three countervailing e↵ects arise is in fighting words.
The analysis requires some finesse. The justification for regulating fighting words
lies not in the harm caused by speech, but rather in the harm which results from the
harm caused by speech. The concern is not the psychic injury done to the hearer
of fighting words, but rather the consequent public disorder that results when the
hearer seeks reprisal through violence. In other words, the primary harm (a↵ront
to the hearer) is the catalyst for secondary consequential harms (the public disorder
and injury resulting from reprisal). The policy objective is to reduce the secondary
harm, and mitigating the magnitude of primary harm—it is supposed—will tend to
have the knock-on e↵ect of reducing the secondary harm.
However, regulation of the primary harm is susceptible to the three countervailing
e↵ects. Consequently, it is conceivable that regulation would reduce rather than
improve social welfare. Consider that if the prevalence of fighting words increases,
hearers’ sensitivity to the a↵ront will tend to decrease, reducing the probability
of violent reprisal. Conversely, if the prevalence of fighting words decreases, then
hearers’ sensitivity to the a↵ront will tend to increase, raising the probability of
violent reprisal. The concern with the knock-on e↵ect does not alter the potency
e↵ect analysis.
Likewise, the secondary e↵ects objective, idiosyncratic to fighting words, amplifies
the inverse supply e↵ect and filtering. Consider that low-harm injurers are more
likely to be deterred by regulation (than high-harm injurers), because their e↵orts to
cause a↵ront are less e↵ective. And high-harm injurers will thus experience increasing
incentives to produce fighting words. High-harm injurers may be comparatively more
e↵ective at producing fighting words, either because they have a talent for invective,
or because are especially good at choosing targets more susceptible to injury.
Moreover, victims are also filtered, because hearers insensitive to fighting words
will tend not to find themselves in a circumstance requiring litigation. This leaves
only injurers who are especially skilled at insult, and hearers who are especially liable
to violent retaliation.
The narrative is a plausible one. A community, where insults and threats are
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commonplace, is one where disparaging remarks are more likely to be shrugged o↵ or
ignored. An individual accustomed to coarse conversation is less likely to feel the cut
of an a↵ronting jibe, and less likely to feel inspired to respond with violence. It is the
genteel victim, unfamiliar with harsh treatment, who is liable to feel an obligation to
vengeance. So far as the objective is to reduce the incidence of public disorder, the
better strategy is to encourage policies which inure the population to a↵ront. The
alternative is to cultivate a community of eggshells, astounded by insults to their
honor, and inspired to dueling at the slightest provocation.
4.3.2 Persuasive Speech
Let us turn now to the regulation of harms which are supposed to result when hearers
are convinced to adopt false beliefs or odious preferences. I will refer to expressions
intended to a↵ect hearers’ beliefs and preferences as “persuasive speech.” In contrast
to a↵ronting speech, the harm is not to cause o↵ense, outrage, hurt, or distress in the
recipient. Rather, the harm of persuasive speech is in the proliferation “bad ideas.”
I include within this category several subcategories, including defamation, com-
mercial speech, and “fake news.”
Defamation
Defamation can occur when a group or individual transmits a signal to other individ-
uals about a third party. There are four relevant player categories in the defamation
context: (1) the purveyors of true information, (2) the purveyors of false information,
(3) the recipients of information, and (4) the subjects of information.
There are two economic justifications for the enforcement of defamation claims.
First, that defamatory speech generates an externality. Purveyors of false information
enjoy some utility by sending false signals about subjects. And subjects su↵er harm
to their reputations. Assuming the value (to the purveyor) of transmitting false
signals is less than the harm caused (to the subject), the conventional view is that
the law should deter the sending of false signals. The argument is that by imposing
sanctions on purveyors of false information, the expected benefit (to the purveyor) of
purveying false information decreases, and therefore the activity level of purveying
false information decreases, e↵ecting a reduction in social cost.
The second justification is that defamation laws have a screening e↵ect. Recipi-
ents enjoy utility from the receipt of true information and disutility from the receipt
of false information. By imposing a sanction on purveyors of false information (as-
suming purveyors of false information experience a higher probability of sanction
than purveyors of true information), the asymmetric deterrence causes the supply of
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false information to decrease faster than the supply of true information (at least up
to some socially e cient point), leading to a net improvement in social welfare. In
other words, enforcement satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, increasing
the ratio of purveyors of true information relative to purveyors of false information.
Notice that both justifications depend upon the belief level of recipients. If re-
cipients of false information disbelieve, then neither the recipients nor the subjects
su↵er any harm. It is only when recipients of false information believe the false infor-
mation that they and the subjects su↵er harm. Thus, the problem may be simplified
to some extent by focusing our analysis on the belief level of the recipients.
All three countervailing e↵ects are present in the defamation context. Consider
the harms su↵ered by recipients of false information. Observe that recipients’ welfare
will tend to increase, the greater their belief level in false information, and the
weaker their belief level in true information. In other words, if some information
X is expressed, and a recipient’s belief level is represented by ↵ 2 [0, 1], where 0
is complete disbelief, and 1 is complete belief, then the recipient’s welfare function
UR will be decreasing as ↵ increases (
@UR
@↵ < 0) if X is false, and increasing as ↵
increases (@UR@↵ > 0) if X is true. The trouble, of course, is that with any given signal
X, recipients will not know whether X is true or false without further investment in
search.
If we assume that recipients are rational, and their beliefs are Bayesian, then
they will set their belief level according to the prior probability that X is true, and
update their belief level to account for the probability that the truth of X produces
a confirming signal. In the simplest case, where recipients have no additional in-
formation about the relative credibility of a particular purveyor, they will take the
probability that a given signal is true to be the supply of true signals  T divided by
the total supply of signals  T T+ F (where  F is the supply of false signals). It follows
immediately that if the imposition of sanctions decreases the supply of false speech
relative to true speech, then the belief level for any given expression will increase.
And clearly, there will exist values for which the decrease in the supply of false speech
is more than o↵set by the harm due to the increased belief level.
The intuition here is straightforward. Imagine a world in which everyone defames
and no one tells the truth. Clearly, the rational recipient would disbelieve all signals,
and the harm caused by false signals would be zero. Now, as the proportion of truth-
tellers increases, the credibility of a signal will tend to increase, and the marginal
increase in harm for any given instance of defamation will tend to increase as well.
Thus, increasing the supply of truth-tellers relative to the supply of defamers will
tend to increase the per-unit harm of defamation. In other words, a recipient will tend
to rely more when the ratio of purveyors of true information relative to purveyors of
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false information is higher.
However, defamation represents a special case. Although the potency e↵ect is
clearly present, in the defamation context it cannot result in a net increase in harm.
If the increasing belief level generated a decrease in the recipient’s payo↵s, then
the rational recipient will behave as if the belief level were less than their actual
belief level. Framed di↵erently, we might disambiguate belief level from “trust level,”
where the trust level   2 [0, 1] is a function of belief level ↵. Formulated thusly, the
rational recipient selects the trust level max  UR(↵,  ) given ↵.157 It follows trivially
that in the limiting case, increasing the sanction level (thereby decreasing the supply
of purveyors of false information) will have no e↵ect on the trust level, and thus no
e↵ect on the harm generated by the expression of false speech. In case the recipient’s
trust level is una↵ected by a change in the proportion of purveyors of true and
false information, neither the recipient’s harm nor the subject’s harm will change.
Nevertheless, even when the extremum circumstance does not obtain, the potency
e↵ect will act as a friction, reducing the social benefit accrued from a reduction in
the supply of false speech. Ergo, the potency e↵ect can nullify the e↵ect of changes
to the relative composition of purveyors, and it will at least lessen the benefit of
reducing the supply of defamers. However, it cannot increase the total harm.
Next, even if the imposition of sanctions decreases the relative supply of purvey-
ors of false information, the inverse supply e↵ect will create a further friction on the
social benefit of sanctions on defamatory speech. Assuming a prospective defamer’s
extrinsic value is a function of the potency of his defamatory expressions, it follows
that his incentives to defame will increase as recipients become more likely to believe
his false statements. Thus, if sanctions are e↵ective in a↵ecting recipients’ trust
levels, this will e↵ect an increase in the incentives of defamers, creating a further
friction on the e↵ectiveness of sanctions.
Finally, even if the imposition of sanctions results in a net social benefit, despite
the presence of the potency e↵ect and inverse supply e↵ect, there remains a further
obstacle in filtering. Suppose there are two types of defamers: low-harm defamers
and high-harm defamers. Let us define “low-harm” defamers as being those less
credible than “high harm” defamers. In the face of sanctions, prospective low-harm
defamers are more likely to refrain from engaging in defamatory speech than high-
harm defamers, because they will receive less benefit from transmitting a defamatory
signal. The imposition of sanctions will tend to dissuade more low-harm defamers
from engaging in speech, and by the inverse supply e↵ect, this will increase the
incentives of high-harm defamers to exploit the increased credulousness of recipients.
It follows that filtering will further reduce the e↵ectiveness of legal sanctions, and
157Assume ↵ is the subjective probability that the signal is true.
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in case the change in the composition of defamers (and the di↵erence in magnitude
between high-harm and low-harm) is su ciently large, filtering may even result in a
reduction in total social welfare.
Of course, if we assume away information costs, then the rational Bayesian recip-
ient of information will strategically adjust his trust level to account for this as well,
ensuring an equilibrium that represents a reduction in total social harm. However,
I think the information costs associated with this are likely to be significant, given
that the proportion of high-harm and low-harm defamers is likely to be opaque to
prospective recipients. And I do not think this should be assumed out of the model.
Nevertheless, even if we accept this assumption, although the net e↵ect of filtering
could not result in a reduction in social welfare, it would again in the extremum case
render the imposition of sanctions null, and introduce yet another friction impairing
the e↵ectiveness of legal sanctions at a minimum.
Stepping back, the intuition here is easy to grasp. Prospective defamers crave a
credulous audience. And the greater the proportion of defamers (relative to truth-
tellers), the more skeptical the population of information recipients will be. Thus,
allowing defamatory speech—or false statements of fact more generally—to go un-
regulated will tend to incentivize greater skepticism in the population of hearers,
mitigating the harm to the recipients of potentially false information, and also mit-
igating the harm to subjects of potentially false information. It must be conceded
that under some conditions, increased skepticism will reduce the benefit that recip-
ients derive from true information (they will be skeptical of the true information
insofar as they are unable to distinguish a true signal from a false signal without an
an independent search investment). Yet the point is not that the imposition of legal
sanctions will have no e↵ect (or a negative e↵ect) on social welfare, but rather that
plausible conditions exist, under which the imposition of legal sanctions could have
no e↵ect (or a negative e↵ect) on social welfare.
And once again, even if the imposition of legal sanctions in some subset of defama-
tion cases were welfare-improving, their e↵ectiveness will tend to be undermined.
And it is then plausible that the costliness of sanctions, litigation costs, and other
kickers could tip the balance, such that the regulation of defamatory speech would
be net welfare-reducing when all factors are considered.
Commercial Speech
Expressive rights in the realm of commercial speech have historically enjoyed only
attenuated protection.158 In particular, fraudulent inducements and deceptive ad-
158See supra §1.5.
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vertisements are wholly outside the First Amendment guarantee. The argument for
the received view is that false signals, designed to entice consumers to purchase a
product, service, or property, may reduce incentives to enter into mutually beneficial
exchanges. Unprotected from false signals, consumers will forgo many potentially
Pareto-improving exchanges to avoid incurring the cost of information gathering re-
quired for verification of a signal’s truth. Furthermore, false signals can result in
consequent harms arising from misplaced reliance on inferior or dangerous goods.
For example, if a tobacco company runs an advertisement claiming that cigarettes
whiten teeth, freshen breath, and aid in children’s pulmonary development, then
it could persuade some individuals to smoke. And if consumers later discovered
that smoking actually increases the probability of developing various cancers, heart
disease, emphysema, and rancid breath, then they would be reluctant to trust future
promises of a product’s qualities and e↵ects, refraining from entering into potentially
Pareto-improving exchanges. When they do purchase goods, services, or property,
they will at least invest more e↵ort in search to validate the claims of advertisements.
Additionally, those individuals who are induced by the false advertisement to
take up smoking might become addicted, continue the habit, and succumb to the
maladies associated with cigarette smoking. The healthcare expenses which ensue
are a further source of social cost, which regulations on deceptive advertising might
prevent.
Restated somewhat more precisely, if the promised value of an exchange is B, the
cost of disappointment is C, the investment in verification is x, and the probability
that the signal is true is p(x) such that @p@x > 0, then consumers face an expected
payo↵ of p(x)B (1  p(x))C x in the absence of regulation. Allowing disappointed
consumers to collect damages when producers communicate false signals increases
the consumer surplus. With regulation, consumers can expect a payo↵ of B.
The case for regulating fraudulent inducements and deceptive advertising is com-
pelling. However, the cost in a deregulated regime may be somewhat less than the
received argument predicts. The freedom to express false signals in a commercial
context would not free promisors of their contractual obligations generally. It would
simply be an abrogation of the promisee’s right to void a fraudulently induced agree-
ment. In order to ensure liability for claims about a product, service, of property,
the promisee—knowing he cannot rely on non-promissory claims—will simply insist
that the claims be expressed in promissory terms.
Even still, there will be an increase in transaction costs and forgone surplus, and
the harm-based reasons to favor regulation persist. This leads us to consider once
again the possible countervailing e↵ects. First, with respect to the potency e↵ect,
if false signals are regulated, then the ratio of true signals to false signals will tend
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to increase. Thus, consumers will decrease investments in verification and increase
investments in reliance. This will magnify both consumers’ susceptibility to harm
and the magnitude of harm when false signals are believed.
Second, with respect to the inverse supply e↵ect, when unscrupulous sellers ob-
serve the increasing credulousness of consumers in the presence of regulation, they
will want to exploit that gullibility. Additionally, for those products or services where
the consumer’s reliance entails additional profit—for example, with subscriptions or
brand ecosystems—sellers will have even greater incentives to engage in deceptive
practices.
Third, with respect to filtering, it will tend to be the producers who sell the most
inferior or dangerous goods who experience the strongest incentives to exploit the
increased susceptibility of consumers in a regulated regime. Producers with quality
products will simply refrain from overstating the excellence of their merchandise.
Producers whose goods are only slightly substandard can more easily invest in im-
proving quality or seek buyers who require products of lesser quality with honest
advertising. The producer who has the most to gain from exploiting the greater
credulousness of consumers is the producer whose goods are in least demand, and
for whom it would be most costly to improve.
A full analysis of fraudulent inducement and deceptive advertising would require
an excursus well exceeding the scope of this article. Additional complicating factors
which a comprehensive investigation might include are: the e↵ect of reputation,
insurance, and private information screening services.
The case for regulation seems stronger for these subspecies of commercial speech
than in the other speech contexts heretofore discussed. Yet even if the benefit of
regulation were su cient to overcome the countervailing e↵ects, it is nevertheless
important that lawmakers be cognizant of the tradeo↵s in the design of commer-
cial speech regulation. For example, devising a doctrine analogous to contributory
negligence, such that consumers are obliged to undertake reasonable verification in
order to claim damages, would help to mitigate underinvestment in search. And a
“reasonable reliance” standard would help to mitigate excessive reliance investments.
Fake News
I should like to conclude my inquiry with a phenomenon which has arisen rather
more recently: the problem of “fake news.” It is becoming ever more apparent that
the Russian government in 2016 undertook an active disinformation campaign to
bias the U.S. presidential election in favor of Donald Trump. Similar e↵orts have
been observed in the “Brexit” referendum in the United Kingdom and in recent
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elections in the Ukraine, France, and Germany. There is little reason to suppose the
Russian government will discontinue its activities, and it seems likely that foreign
disinformation campaigns are likely to pose an ongoing threat to the democratic
process. Indeed, it is a plausible surmise that the e↵ectiveness of the Russian e↵ort
will inspire other states to embark upon similar escapades.
Much of the policy discussion concerning Russia’s disinformation campaign iden-
tifies it as a species of “cyber attack,” warranting defensive measures. There is of
course an intuitive appeal to the proposition that the one must defend when attacked
by hostile foreign actors. However, we should be wary of a knee-jerk response. Here
again, attempts to combat persuasive speech will be likely to result in countervailing
e↵ects.
With respect to the potency e↵ect, the analysis here is analogous to that in
defamation and commercial speech. If measures aimed at reducing the supply of
foreign disinformation are successful, then citizens will tend to invest less e↵ort in
search and verification. Assuming citizens want to acquire true information—or
at least information not motivated by hostile motives—they will naturally tend to
undertake greater investment in verification and less investment in reliance when
there is a greater risk they are receiving foreign disinformation. Therefore, reducing
the supply of foreign disinformation will tend to increase citizens’ vulnerability to
the residual fake news which remains.
Next, with respect to the inverse supply e↵ect, if the citizenry were made more
credulous due to successful e↵orts to restrict the dissemination of foreign disinfor-
mation, then this would render it a yet more enticing target. Hostile foreign actors
would be incentivized to redouble their e↵orts, engaging in more sophisticated and
subtle mechanisms to influence voters, made more gullible by the reduction in the
supply of fake news. Presumably the payo↵ from swinging an election would be sub-
stantial, and hostile foreign actors could be expected to invest considerable resources
to exploit the impressionability of voters.
Finally, filtering may plausibly occur in at least two ways. First, relatively less
hostile or less powerful foreign actors would be more likely to be deterred, leaving
more hostile or more capable foreign actors to fill the void. A less hostile foreign actor
would be more easily deterred, because its interests would be relatively more aligned
with the target nation’s interests. I take this to be what it means to be relatively
less hostile. Those less hostile foreign actors would thus enjoy less benefit from
interfering in the target nation’s democratic processes. Less capable foreign actors
would be deterred, because their e↵orts at disinformation, if not widely received,
would tend to be less successful in generating the critical mass of mutually confirming
counter-narratives which a comprehensive disinformation campaign would require.
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Second, hostile foreign actors may strategically invest in disinformation only when
the stakes are highest. Assuming e↵orts to curb foreign disinformation impose at
least some cost upon the purveyors of disinformation, they would tend to focus their
resources on e↵orts calculated to impose the greatest e↵ect. They might save their
e↵orts for those occasions when elections seem likely to be closely fought, or when a
potential outcome is anticipated to be especially unfavorable.
It is of course possible that increasingly sophisticated disinformation campaigns
may be countered with increasingly sophisticated regulation. However, this commits
states to a rent-seeking game. Hostile foreign actors invest in more streamlined
disinformation; and target states invest in more savvy regulation. The stando↵ is
liable to lead to ever-escalating investments in expression and suppression, and a
considerable dissipation of resources.
It is di cult to say with specificity how well strategies to combat foreign disin-
formation would fare in the face of the countervailing e↵ects. Target governments
are still developing their strategies. It is not yet clear whether such e↵orts would
e↵ect a reduction in supply even absent the countervailing e↵ects. As governments
work to formulate their responses to this fresh nuisance, I suggest they take seriously
the option of doing nothing. Admittedly, the initial e↵ect will tend to subvert the
democratic process. However, a prevalence of foreign disinformation is, over time,
likely to incentivize citizens to invest greater e↵ort in verification, to reduce reliance,
and generally to harden themselves against future subversive influences.
I suspect that the Russian government would rather deal with the regulation of
social media than a population of skeptics.
4.4 Conclusion
This article reveals that the courts and doctrinal literature have embraced an im-
plicitly economic framework in nearly every controversy concerning the freedom of
expression. It is therefore a surprising irony that the economic analysis of speech
rights has received so little attention from Law & Economics scholars. This article
accepts the latent invitation, undertaking an explicitly economic exploration of the
speech right, extending the simplistic harm-deterrence model assumed by courts and
prior scholarship to reveal a fuller, more capacious account of the issue.
The received view assumes that the speech realm is an implicit market. If the
market analogy is taken seriously, the countervailing e↵ects I identify go to the
essence of the speech right and threaten to overwhelm the fundamental justification
for speech regulation.
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My argument does not entail an absolute prohibition on speech regulation. It
merely undermines the logic of the received view. It is a theoretical point, raising
the evidentiary burden for the proponent of regulation. More research is surely
needed, and I hope some attempt is made to empirically verify or falsify the intuitive
narratives I sketch in section 3. It may well be that some of the speech regulations
I have discussed are (or would be) e cient law. The final determination whether a
regulation is e cient requires empirical supplementation.
If we value the freedom of speech even one half as dearly as our hymns proclaim,
it is incumbent upon the law that any diminishment of it be soundly justified. This
article shows the defectiveness of the justifications upon which the law has hitherto
relied. The mere harmfulness of an utterance cannot support incursions upon its
expression.
